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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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KOMMUNIST

No 4, March 1990

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

CPSU BEFORE THE CONGRESS

The Party Cannot Lag Behind

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No 4, Mar 90 (signed to press 22 Feb 90) pp 3-7

[Text] Once again, our political lexicon includes the words: speed, acceleration, loss or gain of pace. This is understandable: historical time itself has accelerated. Three, 4, or 5 years ago, time dragged on slowly, but we urged it on and hastened it. Now, it is urging us on. We are making a historical choice today. However, the historical choice is also "making us," turning a population of almost 300 million into citizens. As Marx wrote, the soundness of historical action grows along with the mass, whose business it is. In this sense, the February (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenum can rightly be called a civic forum. The contradictions revealed in it, sometimes extremely sharp, are a manifestation of political pluralism.

We may or may not like this, but it is reality. In this sense, the plenum reflected public moods fairly completely. Here, there were emotions and reason, appeals for confrontations, searches for compromise and, of course, rallies. It is noteworthy that precisely those speakers, who condemned perestroika's "rally" democracy, most often did so at a rally.

Near the end of the 5th year of perestroika, many important phenomena of recent years and the concepts marking them began to take on ever more definite outlines and a synonymous interpretation. Above all, we should remember how long and hard it was to shape the contemporary concept of perestroika, to develop the course toward the profound democratization of our entire economic and political system. Let us recall the evolution in assessments of our past, from the merciless, emotionally charged criticism of Stalin and Stalinism, to critical inquiry, then to attacks on the views of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and even at times to wholesale rejection of everything that has been done in 72 years. Furthermore, we should remember how, from the seemingly radical first steps of economic reform, we began to realize that the economy will not budge without a basic change in the conceptual understanding of ownership and its forms.

Finally, at the theoretical level there is a raging debate, sometimes irreconcilable and embittered, that we have built a "bad" socialism, but it is still socialism or some kind of society, even if it is beyond the time and space of modern world civilization. Moreover, in looking at the

classics critically, people are asking: Did history generally stipulate some place along this road for socialism of a Marxist persuasion? The passing of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress, essentially, completed a certain stage in the struggle of the political forces in society and in the party, the period of reservations, of fear of "foregoing the principles" and calling things by their proper names.

What are the reasons for the duration of this period?

The basic reason is the strength of stereotypes and the lack of political experience, culture, development of social sciences, and a great deal else that would have helped us move forward with fewer costs, not creating such "mental chaos." However, there is also another reason. This is the unusual vitality of ideological "sacred cows," allegedly valuable in themselves, but in reality only concealing real, very powerful social, group, and individual interests.

The draft platform evoked criticism from all directions at the Central Committee Plenum. Evidently, we can expect an even greater range of criticism during its public discussion. Unquestionably, the document itself gives grounds for this. To some, it seems intolerably revolutionary, to others—unbearably conservative. However, this is to a far greater degree the consequence of the patchwork nature of the social consciousness, than the patchwork nature of the document itself. In a most odd and improbable manner, our social consciousness mixes totalitarianism and democracy, dependence and responsibility, radicalism and conservatism.

Indeed, the platform is contradictory: as contradictory and approximate as our knowledge of society. After all, modern domestic social sciences are a topic for endless discussions. Gather 100 of our best economists, and they will give 100 different answers to, for example, the question: What exactly is a market, and can it be socialist?

One could object to this, saying that a platform, as a political document, should not simply conform to the contemporary level of scientific knowledge about society, but should also be the result of a definite political choice. However, first, that which is justifiable for documents of traditional parliamentary parties, expressing the interests of quite definite sociopolitical strata (party, after all, literally means "part"), is not quite fitting for a vanguard party claiming to represent the interests of a whole people, which the CPSU is at present. Therefore, second, they wrote it not only with their left and right hands (as one speaker put it), but also read it with "left" and "right" eyes, and thought with "left" and "right" heads. Of course, third, a politically simpler and more consistent platform, in all likelihood, could not be a platform for consolidating and uniting the party. If it were written by the right and left hands separately, the result would be different platforms from different political parties. This prospect is not ruled out, but it would scarcely be wise to hasten it.

The new quality of political thinking of the country's leadership, the understanding that the logic of development of events under conditions of glasnost and political democratization will not upset any present-day cabinet scheme tomorrow—all this was clearly reflected in the plenum. Its leitmotif was the idea that, in approaching the critical point of development of events in society, the party should re-think its policy of recent years, taking into account mistakes made after April 1985. Today it is clear: perestroika should be implemented more decisively and rapidly, but without premature actions, as occurred in the campaigns against unearned income and drunkenness, which only undermined trust in authority. It should be implemented more consistently and firmly, but without "turning the screws" or curtailing the democratic process, if it occurs in civilized forms and in the framework of the law. In addition, the Central Committee plenum clearly demonstrated what troubles or frightens whom in the present stage of perestroika.

The draft platform, to state it directly, is open to criticism, alternatives and suggestions. The discussion of it will also be a unique party referendum, that will show which hand, right or left, the communists favor, and which one voters will be ready to choose. In this case alone, great political definiteness will not obstruct consolidation. We are holding such a discussion, to which we invite our readers, in the pages of our journal. In the end, the party and its program will be as millions of communists wish to see them.

Their moods and assessments are, it seems, sufficiently "heavily, crudely and visibly" displayed in the unprecedented events that have shaken the gorkoms and obkoms recently. It is becoming clear that the acceleration and radicalization of perestroika in society, and especially in the party, really are necessary. Historical time has accelerated and we must not lag behind. The party does not have the right to remain yesterday's party and acknowledge reality only when nothing else remains.

It is inappropriate for us to fall either into overconfidence, or into panic-mongering; today we need courage and a firmness of political spirit and will for reforms. The question right now is: either the party rapidly and confidently leads society along the road of democracy, reform, and law, or a society that is democratizing chaotically will drag the party down the road of lawlessness and extremism in a lasso of denunciations, demands, and ultimatums.

Today, people often speak of the weakness of power, although they sometimes mean different things by this. If a leader reacts to dissidence by entering into dialogue, and not by striking the table with his fist, this is not a weakness, but a strength. Yet, it is an obvious weakness, if not worse, if he resorts to applying an extraordinary clause, stipulated by the Constitution, only when slaughter and pogroms have been going full speed for days, or when pogrom organizers, the preachers of ethnic dissension, chauvinism, and racism, are not put on trial. However, not everything here is simple. All too often,

through habit acquired long ago, we devote ourselves to finding "scapegoats," specific culprits for making (or not making) one decision or another. In principle, this is right: Responsibility should be personal. However, is it worth forgetting what kind of atmosphere the authorities, including the army, militia, and state security, operate in if they have to make decisions under the pressure of at least two equally strong demands: "Give us freedom!" and "Institute law and order!"? Perhaps, we ourselves should first answer: What, seriously, do we really want?

The weakness of power or, if you wish, its sluggishness, also occurs because a kind of vacuum has formed: essentially, state power functions have not yet been fully transferred to the soviets, and the soviets are not always ready to take them upon themselves. Of the three "main" elements of any classical political system—institutions, functions, and the political regime—only the first is close to definitive formation today. For the time being, there is serious confusion regarding the other two, above all in the legal sphere. The idea of introducing an acceptable form of presidential government in the country appeared in time. The situation simply requires a strong central executive power.

The plenum confirmed that the party is rejecting the monopoly of power, a monopoly that relied for decades on a hierarchical, branched party and state apparatus, isolated from the people. Thanks to it, according to Stalin, "not those who choose and vote, but those who rule," people who "have taken control in fact of the executive structures of the state, who lead these apparatuses," ran the country. Finally, democratically elected bodies of power are taking their legitimate place and the party is faced with "detaching itself" from state structures and operating together with other movements and parties within the context of a civil society, under conditions of political pluralism and competition among programs suggested for society.

However, one cannot help but note that some people see a certain "inverse" meaning in the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!," namely: for them, it is important not so much to **give** power to the soviets, so much as to **remove** it from the party and, moreover, to eliminate the party in general from participation in the political process. This is an unconstructive approach. While ceasing to be the sole political force, the party cannot be an equal among equals and, moreover, is striving, in the democratic electoral process, to become first among equals. Today, the CPSU, under the conditions of its profound self-renovation, has the necessary intellectual resources, the will for changes, and the people's trust (in any event, in competent, honest, and decent people personally, of whom there is an overwhelming majority in the party), in order to ensure society's consolidation and not permit the country's crawl into an abyss of uncontrollable torment, chaos and violence. It is becoming increasingly clear (the February plenum confirms this) that the CPSU itself is far from homogeneous and needs consolidation no less than society.

Renovation in the party is occurring unrestrainedly, despite intensified resistance from conservative forces. Proclaimed and in part begun from above, it is being put into practice on the spur of the moment, so to speak, locally where, under pressure both from communists, as well as from non-party members, under the onslaught of irrefutable proofs of incompetence, helplessness, and often even of moral unscrupulousness, first secretaries and even entire party committee bureaus are being forced to abandon their chairs. It is easy to see that the lower-level party structures are initiating changes and crowding out those who stand above them. Thus, a truly democratic renovation is occurring, proceeding from the depth of the party ranks, long alienated from practical participation in drafting party policy, making decisions, and forming the higher leadership that personifies them, the party, and the state.

In the final account, theoretical approaches to many fundamental problems of perestroika and the searches for their solutions depend on the assessments of the society built in the USSR and on the model of that, toward which we strive. In a most general form, as the Central Committee platform states, it is a question of dismantling administrative socialism and converting it into a democratic society, which creatively interprets everything progressive in the political and economic systems of developed countries. We are abandoning the mechanical, dogmatic interpretation of the socialist idea and contributing a humanistic and scientific meaning to it that conforms to the intellectual level of society's progressive forces in the late 20th century. In all likelihood, the word "communist" is also acquiring its own real meaning today: he is not a preacher of equality in poverty and forced collectivism, not one who calls for taking everything away and sharing it, but one who has enriched his memory "with the knowledge of all the riches that mankind has developed" (Lenin), a true humanist, a fighter for the freedom, dignity, and rights of every man.

Conservatives see the acknowledgment of realities as the yielding of positions, for which they intend to fight their own people. This is not a promising undertaking. We must not unleash new battalions, but build a warm and hospitable Union-wide home, suitable for living. The CPSU Central Committee platform offers the necessary minimum of tools and means for such creative work, i.e., the minimum, without which the job is simply impossible.

The suffering and even despair of many honest communists, who are coping unsuccessfully with the growing mass of social changes, are understandable. However, it is quite another matter when such suffering becomes the object of manipulations with entirely definite goals. Unfortunately, this was also displayed at the plenum. If these very responsible comrades, or ones who are striving to be responsible, simply panic when people speak of destruction of the economy, of the pit of anarchy and permissiveness into which we have fallen, of the abyss of crisis, universal ruin or other "horrors" of perestroika, this characterizes them as poor politicians.

Yet, if this is an intentional frightening of the philistines, we are dealing not with politics, but with intrigue.

Indeed, society, the economy, ideology, and the party are undergoing a crisis. However, the crisis is not a catastrophe, not a failure. It is not the end, but the beginning of the history of a free Fatherland of free people. The crisis in politics, as well as in the economy, is a push toward renovating fixed capital. In this case, it is a push toward the theoretical and practical review of our entire view of socialism and the party. The way out of crisis does not lie in moving backward toward the monopoly of power, toward equalization, ideological pressure, and unthinking and callous implementation, but in moving forward toward a humanistic society, an economy aimed at the person, free labor, and honest competition among sociopolitical forces.

Historical rightness is proven in the course of the real political process and confirmed daily and hourly, but it does not guarantee the right of communistic primacy. Even in recent days and weeks, the political process has been showing who was right in the plenum debates, and who lagged hopelessly far behind. Who is for the past, and who is for the future. Who holds the marked cards of demagoguery and intrigue in his hand, and who holds the mandate of popular trust. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

Socialism: From Dreams to Reality

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[Article by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, Politburo member, CPSU Central Committee secretary. The article is based on A.N. Yakovlev's speech at a meeting with students, graduate students and the faculty of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov on 12 February this year, as well as his answers to some questions from participants]

[Text] Today there is no policy-shaping factor so broad, that could have such a decisive influence on world development, as the processes in our country, their crucial nature and revolutionary meaning, rejecting everything inhuman that Stalinism brought with itself. This is a historical anomaly in social development.

The draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress is an event in the history of our country, a noteworthy advancement in the development of theory and methodology.

The point is not only that it examines cardinal questions in a new and, in many respects, fundamentally new way, such as ownership and ownership relations; the correlation of planned and market methods for regulating economic activity; commodity-monetary relations now and in the future; the building and changing of society's political structures; and the forms for participation of working people in political and economic democracy.

We should also note something else. Above all, the pre-congress program is an attempt to enrich theoretical concepts of socialism under qualitatively different conditions, the conditions of perestroika and its interpretation and analysis. The summarized, general, and comprehensive assessment of the path taken for almost three-quarters of a century is acquiring special significance: not its separate episodes and segments—light or dark, marked by victory or defeat—but precisely the entire path.

A genuinely scientific theory is vitally important, in that it constantly seeks the objective laws, tendencies, and dialectics of development. In the past, one of the main principles of dialectics was forgotten: the negation of negation. We forgot, or wanted to forget, that any solution found one day, no matter how successful or perspicacious it may seem, sooner or later exhausts itself and requires re-interpretation, new approaches. Perestroika is a gigantic negation of negation, which has become necessary and, at the same time, so difficult precisely because a burden of unsolved and unrecognized problems, theoretical straightening, and methodological speculations have accumulated over the decades. However, it is by no means the socialist idea that is being rejected, as some would like to imagine, but everything that has grown obsolete. This is the core of practical Leninism, its method. All this directly relates to the platform.

It is the nature of human reason: in order to comprehend the new, a correlation with the old, an analogy with the habitual or well-known, is needed, as well as breaking away. The processes giving rise to the new world are unique and time does not repeat itself. There is delight and repentance, holidays and tears, pride and demoralization, discovery and disillusionment. The eternal dilemma of Good and Evil has played perfidious games with us, with our contemporaries who have made so bold as to, albeit timidly, experience freedom, which for now is only pulling faces, apparently not yet trusting us, still afraid that violence may prevail over reason through outbursts of emotion, annoyance, and intrigue.

Today, near the end of the April 1985 5-year period, the comprehension of the new quality of life and pressure of the complex situation in the country are causing an intense collision of different opinions and views, emotions and ambitions. Some people are suffering and struggling, others are fussing, a third are gloating, and a fourth simply have become embittered, realizing that the land has tilted inordinately for them and the angle of incidence is very close. The country is in turmoil. The struggle is often without rules; it is collisions not as much of culture, so much as of lack of culture, the feverish search for truth, and an anguished longing for freedom and justice.

In short, the play of a liberated but excited mind is incomprehensible. Moods range from hate to fear, from doubt to the firm resolve to do everything so that free men can live and create in a free land. However, it

turned out that this seemingly imperative formula—movement toward freedom—and, moreover, the ideal vector of human development have come up against a deeply entrenched defense of misunderstanding, bitterness, panic, and fireproof dogmatism and scholasticism. This defense often alternates with dangerous counterattacks.

Precisely these conservative attacks also create a feeling of uncertainty, fetter reforms, cultivate distrust, and obstruct forward movement. They disrupt society with witch-hunts and "headhunting," using the extreme right groups for these purposes. Not without their help, philistine leftism makes a fuss too, ready to destroy something, as well as populism, which blinds people with promises of riches that do not exist.

Some speak of "collapse" and long for the past, from the recent Brezhnev to the more distant Stalinist, or even the quite remote monarchic period. Others accuse perestroika of inconsistency and indecisiveness, and call for short bursts, for a new February revolution. A third, it seems, would simply like to give free play to the wild outburst of elements and violence, rightly assuming that there will be no place for them in a civil democratic society and a rule-of-law state.

So, to what can we compare this most diverse social, ideological, and political mosaic that has taken shape in our country? What kind of analogy can put perestroika on a relative historical scale and determine the reading point? Indeed, perestroika is a social renovation, but we have no experience with such renovation: It itself needs historical interpretation.

I would like to avoid comparisons with our Russian past. It still remains too politically relevant and opportunistic. In short, it has not been played out. We still discuss Peter's reforms, reviewing them almost as though they were today's. What should we say about days long past? While understanding the conditional nature of any analogy, especially a historical one, I would nonetheless seek parallels to the transformation that perestroika is bringing into the socialist idea in certain general ideological and political trends of the past.

In the age of Enlightenment. The analogy here is that our policy of renovation puts the main stress on a live, direct connection between theory and practice. It calls for rationality, a scientific approach and common sense. It is based on a combination of philosophical, political and humanitarian activity. It proceeds from the fact that knowledge, conviction and moral principles must be put into practice aggressively. Either we build life according to them or, if life resists, we accept this in good time, reconsider views and develop them.

I would also risk comparing perestroika to the **Reformation**. Do not sin, listen to the church, said the Catholic hierarchs, and a place will be reserved for you in Heaven. No, the reformers objected, God could not conceive of such silliness. He tests man in this life. A place in Heaven should be earned through good actions. On Judgment

Day, God will evaluate the personal merits of every person through his actions, not the innocence of all. To be equal in sin and innocence is not enough: One must be good.

Perestroika also switches the stress from dogmatic obedience to creativity and initiative, from passive expectation to the creation of a new life according to the laws of a new morality, from bowing to holy writ, which serves an authoritarian regime, to man's spiritual elevation.

I would also draw another analogy with the period of Roosevelt's "New Deal" in the United States. Essentially, we are dealing with a revolution in evolution in both cases. The New Deal broke the classical concepts of capitalism. In a crisis situation that raised the question of survival, the New Deal elevated the role and place of the state, which had not been allowed before. Previously, it was a sign of "hateful socialism" to accept the idea of government social programs. State monopoly regulation was previously considered incompatible with capitalism. All this was successfully done in a conservative political atmosphere.

I repeat, these analogies are conditional, especially since the current processes are taking place in a new material and spiritual environment, under new historical conditions.

In October 1917, the socialist idea was essentially only a hypothesis. It was bold and based on a scientific methodological foundation, but it was nonetheless a hypothesis, and had to be tested by life, both on the whole, as well as in every separate measurement. It should have had a natural future: practice, accumulation of experience, study, correction of original concepts, practice once more, and so on.

At first, everything took shape roughly so, regardless of the exceptional complexity of internal and external conditions. Only now are we beginning to thoroughly investigate the evolution of Leninist thought, its turn-around in the first post-revolutionary years. Only now are we asking ourselves: Did something more than previously imagined suddenly stand behind the words about changing our entire view toward socialism? We are coming to an understanding: Yes, something did. The first serious correction made in the hypothesis by life could have happened back in the mid-1920s.

Now, at the same time, we are faced with the need to restore the true, the original social hypothesis and its first Leninist corrections, undistorted by subsequent layers.

Furthermore, we should carefully investigate the subsequent evolution of the theory and practice of socialism. We need an impartial, objective analysis of the course that was taken, in full possession of all facts, under conditions of free, creative search, competence, and honesty. A mechanical replacement of the former enrap-tured assessments with new, destructive ones is harmful, for both lead equally to ignorance and dogmatism. We

should be more modest, remembering that the specific sciences of society and man are essentially at the very earliest stages of their establishment today.

Finally, a third point. We should advance the socialist idea itself on the basis of interpreting the entire experience of the 20th century, ours as well as the world's, both socialist and nonsocialist. We should include everything new that has been created in the world: in social processes, in the sphere of science, in culture—everywhere. The contemporary socialist idea should also absorb and incorporate the Western practice of social protection of the individual, as well as the interpretation of the experience of social democracy and the dynamics of interrelations of development processes; new phenomena in capitalism; contemporary understanding of the difficulties of converting to a higher historical and socioeconomic degree of progress; a study of what in fact, and not according to standard concepts, is real socialism, and what kind of laws or probabilities move it.

However, first we must read anew the genuine and complete Marx, we must creatively evaluate the full depth of Lenin's methodology. In my opinion, dogmatic canonization of the teachings of Marx and of Lenin has done significantly more harm than all direct propaganda against them. A thought was established, and the movement of thought is the main thing in the socialist social idea. Isolation of the study of revolutionary theory from other social teachings doomed it to a sectarian position, which also led to the dogmatic interpretation that serves deception and absence of thought.

The Russian Marxists did not see certain obvious contradictions in Marxism, above all in the part concerning the prerequisites and conditions for a revolutionary explosion, especially under Russian conditions. Extensive literature on this, accessible to the reading public, was created in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia itself. Marx is not to blame here. His works reflected the level of social thinking of his time and the insight of personal talent.

Essentially, only Lenin, who interpreted the economic lessons of war communism and the reasons for the crisis in early 1921 in his article "On Cooperatives," began to doubt the reliability of the concept of combining personal with public interests. Lenin wrote that the answer to this question, which was a stumbling-block for all socialist thought, must be sought in the teachings of old cooperative workers. The meaning of Lenin's article becomes obvious, as soon as one notes that Marx and Engels opposed the concepts of the old cooperative workers, the teachings of Fourier, Considerant, and the Saint-Simonists.

After Lenin's death, especially after Stalin's political turn in April 1929, there were in practice no longer either political or ideological conditions for any serious scientific and critical reflections whatsoever on the individual original positions of Marxism. The greater became the human losses caused by annihilation of the old Russian

world, the stronger became the aspiration to forcibly introduce blind faith and the sacredness of dogma.

Therefore, in proportion to the accumulation of practical experience with a dictatorship of the proletariat and collectivization of all means of production, increasingly higher barriers were erected across the path of serious research on the correlation of scientific socialism with real socialism and the study of the economic and social efficiency of collective and planned production, especially in agriculture. However, social contradictions thus became deeper and, accumulating, caused the country's lag.

Among communists and socialists in the West, active interpretation of the first lessons of building socialism in the USSR began during this period. Here, we formed all the ideological subterfuges, with the help of which for decades, for virtually 60 years, we postponed the discussion of the correlation between the scientific and the utopian in the socialist ideas and concepts, from which our earlier practice directly stemmed.

The opinion, existing among many theoreticians on socialism, that the abstract (in this case, theoretical knowledge of the future) is a replica, i.e., full knowledge of the most important features of future specific experience, seems wrong to me. Such treatment of the scientific vision of the Future, as a rule, significantly simplifies the interaction between theory and practice and, above all, underestimates the differences revealed by Lenin between the "abstract theoretical" and "specific historical" questions of socialism.

Most often, the identification of these two questions expresses itself in attempts to implement the theoretical design of socialism in direct form, to foist a new pattern for contemplating the past, which in the final account introduces unnatural forms and structures into the fabric of social existence.

The experience of renovating socialism and overcoming dogma is acquiring an increasingly universal nature. Right now, it is already hard and, really, there is no need to conceal or shade the fact that the democratic transformations which have started in a number of socialist countries essentially reject many theses of orthodoxy. It is a question of the universal rejection of the idea of organizing agricultural production on a national scale, according to a type of nationwide factory. It is a question of debating against the negative attitude toward economic competition, toward alternative production, and toward the institutions and values of a commodity-oriented civilization. It is a question of debates against universalism and unitarism, against the 19th century utopia regarding the possibility of abolishing all middle classes, all religious and ethnic feelings, and all traditional incentives for life and labor.

The original, in many ways simplified model of socialism, theoretically emasculated by the costs of its implementation, and the system of values forming its basis no longer have the former attractive force, and do

not ensure society's spiritual consolidation. It is hard to entice our contemporaries with the prospect of a classless society, complete social homogeneity and, especially, with the prospect of eliminating the market, money, and commodity-monetary relations, and the prospect of equality in poverty.

It seemed that the ideals of a classless society only "work" in the first stages of revolution, when qualitative social differences are being overcome, when an opportunity appears for a significant part of the working class to escape its previous low status, when a way opens up for many of them to participate in production management, to take part actively in sociopolitical life.

In the last half-century, the method of perceiving reality has undergone qualitative changes. The concepts of social well-being and the essence of progress have changed considerably. That is why today, when previous class differences and antagonisms have been eliminated and the former estate barriers and prejudices have been broken, it is hard for people to understand why we must mandatorily overcome the differences between workers and peasants, why a society which will have no craftsmen or small merchants is better than a society where they do exist.

The original concepts of the new society, i.e., those we inherited from the past, were heavily burdened by narrow policy. Consequences were related to causes directly, according to the classical, mechanical view of the world. Probabilistic thinking, relativity, and the principle of multiple dependencies—all this is already 20th century. The 19th century tended to view progress as the simplification, straightening, and removal of everything "superfluous" or "unnecessary." That is why the founders of socialism dreamed of simplifying society's economic and political structure and represented the transitional period as the time for abolishing the multistructural nature of the economy and pluralism in politics and social consciousness.

Contemporary man in any country, including a socialist one, not only does not strive for uniformity, but, conversely, prefers diversity. Above all, here the lessons of the 20th century, including the achievements of the modern natural sciences, are having an effect. The realization that there is no life, no development, without diversity, that the struggle against differentiation is, at the same time, a struggle against a prerequisite for progress, is becoming universal.

As is now clear, it is precisely the diversity of institutions and their properties that ensures the stability of life. Despite the expectations of past philosophers, society's organization and the nature and conditions of its activity are continually becoming more complicated, and the diversity of all social structures, in the framework of which a person's life occurs, is increasing. The varied nature of civilization's development is evident as never before. Along with the already-customary coexistence

and interaction of two sociopolitical systems, the diversity of forms of both modern capitalism and socialism is becoming historical reality.

Standardization is a qualitative feature of the original theoretical model of socialism, which took shape in a capitalist society. This aspect of it is usually not felt in the first stages of building, since it was simply impossible under those conditions to think of the future other than in terms of standards. The maximalism of a revolutionary situation, the aspiration, which Lenin noted, to achieve a future, in which there will not be "a single vestige of the old" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 401), is telling. In this situation, the beauty of the ideal, its purity and even maximalism are an entirely sufficient argument to convince the working people of the need for one transformation or another. The less experience with the development of socialism on its own basis, the less the need for economic substantiation of structural changes and the more rapidly directives concerning the transitional period are put into practice.

However, in proportion to the accumulation of real socialist experience, the instructions of standard theory, which appeared in the framework of a capitalist society, in many ways lose this quality of exhaustive persuasiveness, even under conditions in which socialist building could have occurred without mistakes and deformations.

Unquestionably, there are certain internal, natural mechanisms both for the origin, as well as for the gradual self-exhaustion of the mobilizing and integrating potentials of various ideas. In this case, it is a question of the original concepts of socialism. They cannot help but have the transient nature of preliminary remarks. They reflected not so much the internal laws of a new society, as the ideological and moral aspirations of the people of that time.

That is why, sooner or later, the time should come for the self-exhaustion of dream-socialism and comprehension of reality-socialism. Today, the crisis on hand is that of the previous naive, romantic concepts about the ability of the new social order to develop at exceptionally rapid rates, to overcome a lag of centuries in a short time. The concept of the automatic development of socialism, related to absolutizing the place and role of nationalization and of the statification of one and all, has not justified itself.

I would like to emphasize that today the discussion is about only one thing: the fact that the contemporary stage of our life requires both new interpretations of the legacy of great teachers, as well as creative breakthroughs in the social sciences. If we must criticize anyone, we should criticize only ourselves, our lack of desire to understand and, moreover, accept that the classics themselves were intolerant of dogmas, of mortification. They themselves believed that practice and real life are criteria for theory. Revolutionary theory only becomes more convincing, if we actively undertake the scientific study

of life and its profound processes, based on the idea of development, discarding ignorant prejudices.

In other words, socialism should re-acquaint itself with the achievements and values of all civilization, both ours, domestic (I am referring not only to Russian, but also to the history, culture, and achievements of all peoples of our country), as well as world civilization; both past civilization, as well as contemporary, from which we still continue to be left out to a significant extent. It is especially important to not farm out the process of this re-acquaintance and its results to forces which continue to speculate on dogmatic stereotypes, ethnic sentiments, and common human values for base purposes.

Life itself has raised the question: should socialism be turned, as people sometimes say, into something like a Union-wide social security department? Where is the limit, beyond which the socioeconomic protection needed by man and society starts turning into dependency, undermining incentives for labor, giving rise to laziness, laxity, deprofessionalization, and many other things that are now obstructing the work of perestroika, preventing us from liberating social imagination, creativity, and initiative? Clearly, such a limit exists and we have not only overstepped it, but have gone far beyond it, so far, that returning will be painful. Yet we must return, or we will be unable even to keep that which we have.

We have realized the need for a new sociophilosophical view of the economy of a socialist society. The dispute with capitalism still dominates our thinking. One approach dominates, the essence of which is what classes end up in the position of exploiters, and what—the exploited. In our society, this argument is objectively long behind us, and the understanding of the economy as **a system for supporting the life of society** should take first priority. The criterion for evaluating this system in reality is very simple: does it or does it not fulfill its own functions? How does it fulfill them?

The problem of interpreting the **real social structure** of society arises. It should no longer be contrasted to the structure of bourgeois society, generally pre-socialist: they say, class antagonisms exist over there, we do not have them; there, the classes are preserved, while here they are disappearing, etc. Even if all this is true, in and of itself it is of little use for practical work. It is important to interpret precisely our own, actually existing social structure, its laws, tendencies, dynamics, its healthy and unhealthy processes. Only then will we be able to predict with certainty how to get out of many current dead-ends and how to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Meanwhile, we are forced to act intuitively in many ways, relying on common sense more than theory.

Perestroika has revealed another problem. It could be called the **econocratic approach**. We know about the technocratic approach and, it seems, have begun to

overcome it. The following threat, however, hangs on the near horizon: the exaggerated, in my opinion, concept that the solution to all problems depends only on the state of the economy. It is easy to believe this now, when store shelves are empty, a crazy mass of money is wandering around the country and, no matter where you look, there are massive shortcomings everywhere. However, we basically cannot move the economy forward, if we do not devote ourselves in earnest to man and society, both in practice as well as in theory. In the end, sufficiently high economic results in the West were achieved not only thanks to the scientific and technical revolution. This revolution itself, in the socioeconomic application of its achievements, became possible because it included **mechanisms for the social motivation of the person, collective, and society**. We must look to this.

The contemporary world, breakthroughs in the socialist sphere and in science, and the interpretation of mankind's entire experience on this basis are now calling into doubt and in many ways cancelling the initial positions and components, which established the foundation of our overall culture more than 2,000 years ago. These systems, based on private ownership and authoritarianism, are being crowded out by different ones, based on diverse forms of ownership and popular power. The relatively few societies with a high proportion of intrapersonal interaction are giant communities, inconceivable without mediated forms of mass interaction. The primitive nature of means of production, tools of labor, and production relations is their ever growing complexity. Consciousness, which relies on faith, instincts, and religious forms of logic and rationalization, is a consciousness ever more scientific in terms of the content and methodology of perception.

In my opinion, these are the basic trends of the changes that are still being detected rather intuitively. However, they are being detected over the course of a long time: It is no accident that we can still find an analogy and discussion of this topic in Engels. It is also a question not only of crowding out of the former consciousness, but precisely of rejecting it in the philosophical sense, i.e., rejection-progress, rejection-development and rejection-dash forward. Such components of consciousness are fading into the historical past, yielding to the new. However, for example, certain ages-old human moral standards and values assert their own intransient significance.

Our society must still face the insight of truth. That which we have discovered and understood in the years of perestroika and glasnost is not yet the whole truth. For the time being, it is only the sharp pain from the light that has rushed into our eyes, the desire at the same time both to squint one's eyes and to understand the world that has opened up for us. The truth will come when we get used to the light, when we learn to see all its shades, when we know the full richness of life.

Right now, the main thing is to preserve the ability to see, not try to outwit history, not replace politics with

intrigue. We must not yield to the temptation to break into a devil-may-care dance, which might push aside the opportunities that have opened up or give rise to naive self-deception, as though the first rays of light and knowledge were already **all light and all knowledge**. However, we must also not shut ourselves off from the light, not seek, like a mole, opportunities to scamper more rapidly away into some social and spiritual burrow.

This is the sociohistorical background of contradictions which still grips Soviet society, but out of which perestroika has sprung. New political structures must be created and new production relations must be shaped on the basis of the platform. This is its meaning.

Answers to Questions

Speaking at Moscow State University more than 2 years ago, you named the social sciences as one of the bastions of conservatism. Have changes occurred since that time? If so, how radical are they?

After calling the social sciences a bastion of conservatism, I then stipulated that this is not an accusation, but a verification of an objective state of affairs. Of course, changes are occurring. The events of the last 2 years have far advanced us in social knowledge. Social journals have become significantly more profound and intellectually more cheerful. Many articles have become simply readable, which they were not even in a few years ago. This is already an achievement. I am sure that recent discussions will move us forward in many issues: both in economics, as well as in philosophy, social problems, etc. In my opinion, for now it is too early to speak of a certain abrupt turn-around in social knowledge, but there are also no grounds for blind pessimism.

What is your opinion on the de-ideologization of the sociopolitical sciences?

There is not a single sociopolitical science that could be de-ideologized, even if it is done artificially.

Is it possible to claim that today we already have an integral ideology for perestroika?

In my opinion, it is possible, but with some reservations. First, with a clear understanding that pluralism is normal and even necessary in this ideology. If we perceive the ideology of perestroika, the concept of it as something frozen, the same thing that occurred in the past will happen, when every line and every word was considered untouchable. We cannot approach the ideology of perestroika, the concept of restructuring this way. Let us look at it from creative positions: It should not only be studied, but also developed, and developed creatively at that.

Second, as I already said, we call our time a transitional period. I do not know how apt this is theoretically, but it is true in practice. I refer to a transitional period in the sense that we must reckon with the sins of the past and move onward along a different path. Perestroika

requires opponents for its own development. For example, I consider it normal when perestroika is criticized both by the right, as well as the left. The main thing is not to fall into ideological enmity, as well as not to create grounds for a new ideological fundamentalism from one or another position of perestroika.

Does today's ideological debate help perestroika? Is it possible to consider the achievement of society's ideological and political unity under conditions of pluralism a strategic task?

Any debate is useful, if carried out in the proper forms, with mutual respect and good arguments. We must learn this. We do not have enough experience with scientific and social discussions.

About unity: First, in the name of what? Can there be unity in political and scientific life in general? Maybe not. A world united and integral in its contradictions is, after all, upon us as well. In what should there be unity? In the understanding that we want to live freely in a democratic and humane society? Let us debate and discuss everything else, while we work together on this free, humane, democratic world.

Is Stalinism an integral and relatively independent policy or does it have doctrinal roots in Marxism-Leninism?

I will express only my own opinion. I hope you will understand: the question is very sharp and painful, for it is built on the life of many generations. Opinions here are most diverse. However, it seems to me, in terms of doctrine, Stalinism is one of the directions of revision of Leninism. The worst direction, but nonetheless one of them... In this sense, in my opinion, the following claim is correct: in terms of doctrine, Stalinism always parasitized Leninism, both in its sources, as well as in its later forms. While borrowing individual positions from Leninism, Stalinism emasculated the main thing, its essence, and smothered the spirit itself—its method, development, and creativity. Ideologically, I believe, Stalinism is the rudiment and outcome of a unique religious consciousness, still strong in the process of historical replacement of the first principles of consciousness.

Is the modern vision of socialism a newly created a priori model or an attempt to attach itself to the generally civilized bases of society?

From my point of view, both the one and the other simultaneously. We cannot avoid a priori models. Remember Marx: the worst architect is distinguished from the best bee by the fact that he builds a picture of the future honeycombs in his head beforehand. The point lies not in socialism itself, nor in some model of it. The consciousness of man is simply built thus; such are the interconnections of his consciousness and behavior, that he needs an a priori model, in order to begin to act. This is how we are. Is it another matter, how this model arises? Is it the outcome of a single person, a small group, or does it integrate the practical experience of society

within itself? How this model is really implemented is another question: do we squeeze life into it, urging results on as desirable, committing acts of violence on society, deceiving ourselves and others, or do we act with reasoned will and purpose, correcting our theory and idea through life?

Is the idea of communism itself utopian, and is a pragmatic approach our society as toward a socialist society more expedient?

First, what do we mean by communism? For Marx, communism, you may recall, is the opportunity, unrestricted for anyone and by anything, for the development and self-improvement of man in society. For development, which will not prevent backwardness or the primitive nature of knowledge and morals, or class antagonism, which translates into enmity and violence. A "communism," deduced from the vulgar "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," is utopian. Its illusory economic nature and unfeasibility was shown in works by Soviet economists of the late 1960s on the problems of the economy's optimum functioning. Heated, but interesting arguments developed at that time.

Second, what are the criteria for the proposed pragmatic approach? If it is immediate, present-day, and narrowly utilitarian, we are up to our necks in such pragmatism. "The plan at any cost," "evaluation according to the gross," "departmental ambitions"—these are pragmatism too. If we replace the plan with a kind of economic irresponsibility, with the departmental egotism of the collective, we will not obtain anything fundamentally new. Will the life of the person, that most important criterion, become better or richer? What should we call all this? Let us live and see...

Your thesis on the market as the economic basis for democracy evoked sharp criticism on the part of some social scientists. Can you give a more elaborate argument for it?

The criticism, apparently, was sparked mainly by two things. The first: non-acceptance of the idea of the market itself as applied to our society. I believe that we have a market and cannot get by without it. However, through ideological non-acceptance of it and bureaucratic persecution, we have driven the market into such a position, that it works not for society and the person, but against them. It works for the shadow economy and shadow politics. The market is one of the ways to regulate economic life. Capitalism did not contrive it. It has always existed. It is only a means, not an ideological platform and not a political principle. We must legalize it and establish it under natural conditions (political, legal, economic, and social).

Another reason for the criticism: they saw the thesis as a direct calque with orthodox bourgeois doctrine, which reads that private enterprise, implemented through a free market, is the foundation of democracy. Meanwhile, it is only seemingly a calque. The real picture is more

complex and profound. Authoritarianism, totalitarianism and Stalinism were possible here because all sources for the support of a person, all means for his existence were in the hands of the state. The economic harmfulness of such a situation is indisputable. The task of destatification of property has already been raised and included in the party's draft platform for the 28th Congress.

However, we are not limited to this. Democracy cannot exist for long, if it maintains the full dependence of the person, the collective, or even a region on the state. Their independence in fact depends on whether or not they have their own sources for existence. If not, the economy suppresses any feeble impulses toward independence. Without it, only the outer shell of democracy remains, as happened after the 20th Party Congress.

However, if economic independence is in fact granted, it simply cannot be implemented without a market. Who will take into account the hundreds of millions of specific interests and needs, and how? The state? Gosplan? A ministry? A scientific institution? No. In the end, democracy itself is a market, not just an economic, but a political market of interests, will, ideas, and concepts. There is nothing here that is incompatible with socialism, humiliating or inimical to it. We cannot get by without a normal, healthy market, regulated, of course, by the state and society. Otherwise, forward movement is impossible. Precisely in a market, economic or political, by purchasing or refusing to purchase, by influencing prices, by voting "for" or "against," a person implements his own interests and will, and practices the freedom of choice that is the main thing for us today and tomorrow.

Do you worry that there are no wise and far-seeing conservatives in the country's leadership?

Far-seeing conservatives? This formulation is new to me. I personally think that there is no such thing. If a person is far-seeing, he is no longer conservative. Conservatism is the past, far-sightedness is the future.

Can you identify, for yourself, the internal, anti-restructuring forces of our society today? Who are they? What is their ideological and organizational content?

I can, but I do not want to. Let me say just one thing. In the struggle that surrounds perestroika, it is impossible to distribute everything by shelves. I regard debates or discussions without prejudice. Although personally, many things are unpleasant for me at times. It is unpleasant to receive various leaflets and accusations of every mortal sin. We have not yet learned conscientiousness and charity, we do not always treat people like people, and that is our problem.

What is the basic threat to perestroika? Before the platform, I saw it in conservatism. Why? I will tell you. Some comrades did not agree with me, and gave an identically negative assessment both to conservatism, as well as to left radicalism. I do not put these phenomena

on the same level. Here is why: conservatism has something to lose. Left radicalism has not yet acquired anything. This does not mean that I am justifying leftism or extremism. No, I am decisively against them. However, that is not the point. Restructuring itself is a leftist movement. If someone wants to pass perestroika on the left, it means that perestroika must be even more to the left.

It is a fact that conservatism stubbornly does not want to leave the stage. Do not consider this an accusation. Life itself and social conditions have shaped the ideals with which they grew up, as well as the personal interests which force them to act precisely as though they are acting. We must understand this. A person has devoted, let us say, 40 years to serving one ideal. He is used to his position, style and conditions of life, and used to power, the most corrupting phenomenon in history. Nothing corrupts a person more than power. It is difficult for him, simply humanly difficult. No matter how paradoxical this may sound, I would be kind to such people. It is a question of mentality, nothing more.

Nonetheless, whom do you identify with these forces?

Take offense at me or not, but I will tell you that back in 1985 I promised myself never to name names. Why? Because the processes that are occurring in our country are far more profound than their identification with one person or another. I am more inclined to judge phenomena, than the people who present them. In 5 years, I violated this personal ethical rule only at the last plenum. However, in this case, it was not a question of a person, but the fact that part of our society, including the leadership, still carries a greater burden of old ideas, old habits and old concepts.

However, I want to add one more thing. What is this desire of ours to blame someone, to hunt for individuals? Do you understand why I do not want to name names? Let the phenomena and conditions change, and then people will change. Of course, with the overcoming of one position or another, the people who represent these positions should leave the stage.

What is your interpretation of events in Eastern Europe, and what conclusions here are useful for us?

I tried to explain this at the plenum. In my opinion, everything that has happened in Eastern Europe is the result of the unfree appearance of one or another social system. If social development in these countries had been free and independent, I think we would have a completely different picture today. The later changes occur in these countries, the more tormenting they are. And, at times, more tragic. Were there alarms for us? Of course, there were. These happened in 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and 1980 in Poland. However, we ourselves were in such a state, that we were unable to react adequately to these alarms. We imagined everything in a confrontational form, and believed that we, and only we were right.

The conclusions for us? Of course, there are questions of security and we will keep these questions in mind. There are other aspects here as well. Let me say one thing: no matter how much or how we may be accused, our soldiers should no longer participate in the arrangement of social life in a single country in the world.

Is there an opportunity for the convergence of the Communist Party and social democracy?

One of the errors of our political line in the past was the sharply hostile demarcation away from social democracy. This did great harm to the workers' movement and the general democratic movement. As far as contacts with social democracy are concerned, we have had them for a long time. Yet, if we speak of common human values, of the start of the era of mankind's peaceful development, what divides us? Of course, ideological disagreements remain and we argue about them, but we must cooperate.

In your opinion, is our society's movement toward a multi-party system inevitable?

Yes, I think so.

Does the threat of military overthrow or fascist dictatorship exist in our country?

I doubt it.

According to Marxism-Leninism, socialism and private ownership are incompatible. What can you say against such an assertion by science?

I personally permit the existence of individual ownership in a socialist society, including ownership of means of production, and I do not see anything terrible or nonsocialist about the fact that, for instance, a farmer who owns the means of production, might appear here. Let us be frank. We have confused the criteria of a socialist or nonsocialist nature. We are proceeding from books, from old postulates. Perhaps, we should approach it differently: That which is good for the person, which brings him benefit, well-being, happiness, and raises his dignity is socialist. In the end, a person living in a society of freedom—this is the most socialist.

What will distinguish the future socialism from capitalism, if private ownership starts to flourish?

Why have you decided that private ownership will flourish? Does anyone really intend to convert factories and banks to private ownership? There are no such intentions. However, why shouldn't a peasant or his family own the land, why shouldn't there be a private watch shop or private restaurant? Private ownership property in the basic sectors, in the railroads, banks... indeed, excuse me, but such classical private ownership has not existed anywhere for a long time, not even in the United States of America. Incidentally, this is also a serious scientific problem. For the time being, private

ownership, its functions and position, and its transformation in the world of capitalism has not yet been sufficiently studied.

There are supporters of the Democratic Platform in the hall. What is your attitude and the Politburo's attitude toward this structure?

The attitude is complex. A great deal in this platform is correct. Something else is alarming. Perhaps, in naivete, it seems to me, that we are now searching for some kind of opposition: "Us" versus "them." Who "we" are is unknown, who "they" are is even more unknown. There is no use in artificially complicating everything. We should not replace politics with intrigue. I believe in the honesty of many people who support the Democratic Platform. I believe that many of them want renovation of the party. We should combine efforts, we should find a common language and convince each other, because at the critical moment, which we are now experiencing, we need nation-wide harmony as never before for the sake of our common good. I am speaking of those healthy forces in the party and the country that can find a common viewpoint, common opinions on that which is occurring. We do not intend to reject alternative platforms. If someone suggests them to the 28th Congress, they are welcome. Let the communists decide which is better. If the Communist Party is rejecting the monopoly on power, it should especially reject monopoly on thought.

What is your attitude toward the idea of a parliamentary party as applied to the CPSU? Is the implementation of this idea promising?

I am a communist and do not plan to create opposition to my own party. No ruling party yearns for this. However, a democratic process is a democratic process. If other parties appear and are able to represent the Soviet people in parliament more effectively, what can we do? We communists should recognize the naturalness of the democratic process. However, it should in no case be a forced or artificially forced process.

What is your assessment of the very critical speech at the plenum by Academician Shatalin?

I liked this speech. It was honest.

How do you relate to the events that have occurred in Volgograd and a number of other cities in the country?

I regard it as a normal phenomenon in the process of renovating the party.

One gets the impression that some sort of immunity to any criticism exists at the top. Really, from time to time does the Politburo ever have doubts that its opponents, albeit few, might be right, that other people could cope with the problem better?

If it is a question of me, I am quite sure there are people in our 300-million population who are smarter and more talented than I am and capable of handling life's most

difficult problems. The 28th Congress will be held, and it is called upon, besides everything else, specifically to answer such questions.

How did you begin your political career and what helped you with this?

Everything happened by accident. It was a long time ago, after the war. I had returned from the front on two crutches. It was an unusual moment in my life, when I, a young lad on crutches, was appointed to head the Department of Military and Physical Training. After a while, the selection of candidates for the higher party school began. I was invited to the obkom. I did not know why. At that time, everything was done in secret. I took the exams, passed them and was sent to the Higher Party School. That is what happened. There was no one to help me. I was born in a small, now-vanished village of Korolevo in Yaroslavl Oblast. Until 1953, I lived and worked in Yaroslavl.

How do you relate to Lenin and Leninism? Do you believe that a great deal in the assessments of the work of Lenin and his colleagues must be re-examined?

I relate to Lenin very well, if not to say more. He was a man of highest culture, the highest degree of intelligence and, in particular, ability for analysis. Yet, the main thing which for me personally is very high in Lenin's nature is his ability to re-examine a position when life requires this. That is dialectics, it is also Marxism. That is what is most worthy about Lenin.

What, in your opinion, is the basic content of the contemporary historical era?

To be brief, from an international viewpoint, we are starting a period of lengthy peaceful development, and this should restructure both our mentality, as well as our consciousness. Second, all mankind, including us, is approaching closer and closer to implementing the principle of the freedom of man. These are the two factors that will, in my opinion, determine the arrival of a new era. Personally, I think it has already begun. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

Are Arguments Necessary at a Rally?

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[Article by V. Kutasov, RSFSR honored worker in culture, Moscow. We continue to publish items submitted for discussion (see *KOMMUNIST*, Nos 12-18, 1989; Nos 1-3, 1990)]

[Text] Under conditions of perestroika, old words on the "growth of the role of propaganda" have turned from a speculative formula into an especially practical, unusually sharp question. After all, what exactly is socialist pluralism of opinions and glasnost? This, in particular, is the opportunity to publicly express one's own thoughts,

at times not coinciding with the official viewpoint, and stand up for them, i.e., to engage in propaganda, and not at all mandatorily that which comes "from above." It is precisely propaganda, both official, as well as that opposing it, so to speak, the intersection of which in many ways determined the nature and path of development of events surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, the Baltic, and certain other regions. Yet the strikes? Let us be frank: those who defended the party positions were far from everywhere and always able to persuade not only obvious opponents, but even people who were undecided of their rightness.

In many ways, this related to an inability to carry out propaganda under the new conditions. Indeed, this is also understandable: some now working leaders of ideological units were chosen, as a rule, according to quite different criteria. Moreover, in the years of stagnation it was instilled in them that "the ability to speak," to "convince" was not at all mandatory, the main thing was to give the right "assessment." What is the result? Many party activists and ideological workers, while participating in open discussions in our time, which lack the "authority of force," are unable to utilize the "strength of authority," to persuade, and not command.

What is propaganda under contemporary conditions, what are its functions? Historical analysis shows: the need for management existed in society from the moment of its birth. Convincing people of the need for one or another joint action was one of the first methods of management, the most democratic and humane. V.I. Lenin wrote: "It goes without saying that for any democratic government the task of convincing the popular masses can never be set aside entirely. Conversely, it will always be among the important problems of management" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 127).

I think several comments would be appropriate here. First, "management" is not at all mandatorily a violence against the individual. It can also be totalitarian or command-administrative, including in the field of ideology. However, it can also be genuinely democratic. Therefore, today, as in other spheres of social life, it is important to determine the conditions that guarantee precisely such a democratic, respectful attitude toward the rights of the individual, excluding violence against a person's consciousness in the process of management.

Second, a state, class, party, or social group, as well as various social movements, including religious, and informal associations may act in the role of propagandist.

Third, the specific nature of propaganda, above all, lies in the fact that it participates in management by influencing people with specially organized information. It can use any information, but it really includes only those ideas, theories, views, facts, etc., which, from the viewpoint of the propagandist, promote achievement of a set goal.

Fourth, propaganda should achieve the conversion of the ideas, theories and views (i.e., contents) of propaganda into convictions, faith, and opinion, into the individual's system of value orientations, in the final account into his world outlook.

Finally: for propaganda, like a method of management as a result, above all, convictions, opinions, etc., themselves are not important, but deeds and actions (not all, but those determined by these convictions) are.

The treatment of propaganda as a method for the management of society requires a radical change of attitude toward ideological cadres. Really, if we recognized that ideological and propaganda cadres really and daily participate in the management of society, we must apply different requirements toward them and create different conditions, right now. Indeed, we must promote people into this work not according to "demographic" traits, but proceeding from ideological tempering, professional abilities, and training. It is a strange matter, indeed: No one would question that writers, journalists, artists, and all other specialists in their field need talent. Yet, often the decision of a party bureau suffices to make a person a lecturer or propagandist.

What is the "effectiveness of propaganda?" In our opinion, in a most general form it can be defined as the degree of achievement of the goals set for propaganda. Such an understanding of effectiveness makes it possible, in particular, to set entirely specific goals for propagandists and ideological workers ("to strive, so that precisely these amendments to the Constitution obtain support;" "to ensure support for this candidate deputy"), as well as future goals—the upbringing of a materialistic world outlook, high moral qualities, civic activeness, etc. However, we should see manifestations of them not in assurances, but in specific human actions.

Which factors influence the effectiveness of propaganda more than others? We have often said that the effectiveness of propaganda is directly related to its scientific nature, veracity, party nature, etc., i.e., to that which is called the principles of propaganda in the literature. Is this so? Really, can only propaganda, scientific in terms of content, influence the consciousness of people? Alas, no: The scientific nature of propaganda's content and its degree of influence on the consciousness of people are not strictly interrelated. For example, from the viewpoint of an atheist, religious propaganda is unscientific. However, although we cannot prove this today, it strongly influences the consciousness of many people. Is veracity mandatory in order to ensure the efficacy of propaganda? Also no. Incidentally, in previous years while accusing all Western propaganda of falseness, we did not make ends meet: Why do they, the liars, have so many supporters, and sincere, convinced ones? Must we prove the untruthful nature of our propaganda of the periods of the cult of personality and of stagnation? We will not re-open old wounds...

When we say that propaganda in those years was effective, it is a question, naturally, not of the purposes that were officially proclaimed, but of those that the leaders of propaganda in those periods really set. For example, in the 1920s-1940s, the following tasks were officially proclaimed: the development of democracy, of initiative of popular masses, and the upbringing of a communist world outlook. They were not solved, yet it is wrong to speak of the ineffectiveness of propaganda: In fact, everything was done in order to strengthen the regime of Stalin's personal power, and precisely this goal was achieved "brilliantly." In the years of stagnation, the gradual introduction of reports "personally," the appropriation of an ever greater number of titles, are the requirement for the constant transferring of state monopolies were "specially organized information," aimed at creating a "cult without personality." True, the leaders of this era were "modest" people, they did not set the goal that people would only "speak," but also "think" according to the propagandistic clichés of that time. In order to achieve their true goal—preservation of personal power—the first condition turned out to be sufficient. However, the contradiction between the real and the declared purposes (along, of course, with other factors) in the final account gave terrible results: the splitting of consciousness into "required" and "true," the skepticism of youth, the disillusionment of millions of people with our ideals...

So, principles determine the direction of movement. What determines, so to speak, the speed of movement, the force of influence? Most likely, the laws of propaganda, which are supposedly the quintessence of more general laws of philosophy, logic, psychology, information science, and other sciences of man and society. Let us consider, for example, a law such as the dependence of the effectiveness of propaganda on its source: the higher the authority of the source of propaganda among a specific audience, the greater its effectiveness. This law also reveals the correlation between formal and informal authority: The former sometimes not only does not help, but also harms, while the latter is always helpful.

Another law establishes the dependence of effectiveness of propaganda on its forms and channels: oral, graphic, or printed propaganda, as well as propaganda and information through technical means, including radio, television, cinema, video and audio recordings, personal computers, fax machines, etc. It is claimed that the strength of influence of propaganda depends directly on the proper choice and intelligent combination of its content and form or methods for its presentation. How is this dependency taken into account?

Recently, the entirely correct difference in forms of propaganda, necessary in order in their totality to reach every person, in fact turned into a slogan: Every form should reach everyone! Everyone at a lecture, even weekly, everyone in the "network" of political education, economic education... True, in fact, it did not at all reach everyone. In fact, native wit clearly determined whom it reached and where, and, of course, this was not

on free time... In reports!.. The ideological aktiv had no defense against any inspector, who could always find "cooked facts" and thunder against literally any party organization for shortcomings, if not in one, then in another direction of ideological work.

This approach of directing attention only to the requirements of inspectors destroyed graphic agitation, having converted it into decoration. By the way, it is uncomfortable to speak of this subject, for it has become customary to curse "non-graphic" agitation. However, here is another example: During the recently held elections of USSR people's deputies, posters that obviously influenced the outcome of voting played an enormous role. Why is the difference between "this" graphic agitation and "that" so great? The answer is simple: The unofficial agitation was used to achieve a real goal, the official—for the report! Consequently, the principles and laws are two sides of the same problem, which determines the effectiveness of propaganda.

There are many unsolved problems in contemporary propaganda work, but there is also a great deal that is positive and new. For example, the development of glasnost and socialist pluralism of opinions, the sharp reduction of zones, previously closed for discussion, and a great deal else. The method of bilateral presentation of information is being used more extensively: For example, the press is often printing articles by a Western author, along with one of our authors, on the same question. That is, the reader gets an opportunity independently to compare points of view. The efficacy of such a method, as studies show, is significantly higher, than relying on only one source of information. Unfortunately, speakers rarely use this method in oral propaganda, especially at rallies. The speakers of informal groups, conversely, use it extensively, comparing viewpoints right before people's eyes.

The problems of propaganda of the official viewpoint in many ways are stipulated by the fact that, beginning in the 1930s, propaganda was released from of the need to convince anyone, and only an appearance of proof existed. The main and sometimes only "argument" was a reference to authority (in quotes, or without them). One need not think that such an approach took shape spontaneously. Thus, in the corresponding period reviewers were required to indicate how many times the lecturer "referred to the statements of the party and state leader." Given an absence of references, the lecture was deemed insufficiently "consistent with the party." Today, have all propagandists realized the need to reject this "method?"

In the past, we always recognized the importance of the choice of methods of proof, depending on the nature of the audience, which was reduced to considering its level of education, age, nationality and certain other features of the audience, basically demographic. Of ideological factors, only religious "vestiges" were remembered. Today, it is necessary to take into account the specific features of the audience—above all, a knowledge of its

political views. It is simply impossible to take the rostrum without this! Or without knowledge of the methodology and an ability to use it.

Above all, this is unusual for speakers who were trained in the period of stagnation. One must be able to make people even begin to listen. It has always been hard to secure real attention, but at the modern rally, where a segment of the audience in many cases has planned beforehand to ruin precisely your speech, only a genuine tribune can achieve this. At a rally, as a rule, it is impossible to count on logical arguments, sequence of disclosure of the theme, and a smooth transition from point to point, especially at the beginning of a speech. Really, can we expect a calm, well-considered analysis from rally participants of the arguments made for comparison of the orators' positions? In no case whatsoever! Rally-goers in their majority are excited by the unusual nature of the situation, by the unpredictability of development of events. Yet, we must speak to them today, right now, not tomorrow, when they have calmed down.

Incidentally, all this was known and analyzed long ago. Some sociologists claim that the basic arguments aimed at a crowd should be assertion, exaggeration, and repetition, but never proof in the form of debates. The more definite the assertion, the freer it is from proofs and conclusions, the more agreement it will arouse. An assertion has real influence when it is constantly repeated as much as possible in the very same expressions, in one and the same voice. In this case, the so-called infection mechanism is formed. Today, dozens of "informal" propagandists are already working, actively using these methods. To whom will an even initially neutral audience listen? To these orators, or to those who speak correctly in terms of content, but do not take into account the rally nature of the speech?

Of course, I would like to attract people only through force of conviction, for it is hardly worthy for a communist speaker to win supporters by the use of inspiration alone. However, a good speaker (regardless of personal desire) evokes from the listeners a need to imitate himself, and his speech, if it is true and passionate, has the ability to inspire, and a positive reaction from part of the audience draws the rest of the listeners into it. Not just the speech, but also the specific nature of the speaker's behavior (gestures, mimicry, pose, intonation, etc.) help (or hinder!) the perception of his idea. In our opinion, the unity of the principles and laws of propaganda lies in this. However, how come our party aktiv and ideological workers, in their majority, do not know the rudiments of the theory of propaganda?

Today, the question of the effectiveness of propaganda is very important. A great deal concerning the fate of perestroika depends on its solution. Either people will believe that the bodies of mass information, propagandists, and lecturers are speaking the truth and showing the right paths for movement ahead, or they will reject us out of distrust. In short, there are no alternatives. We

must learn to speak frankly and directly with the people. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

The Political Leader: Duty Rather Than Office

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[Article by V. Maslov, candidate of philosophical sciences, Leningrad]

[Text] In the course of the discussions on ways to renovate the party, which has developed in the journal *KOMMUNIST*, many comrades justifiably speak of the need to extensively utilize political methods of work. What seems most topical among the imminent problems?

The more complex and confused economic life has become, the more deeply the "machine" of political leadership has become bogged down in the thick of current economic problems. In such a situation, the efforts of local committees tend to be limited to these tasks (in the most narrow understanding of them), since strength no longer remains for anything else. The unbalanced nature of economic relations was displayed especially keenly in solving the problems of material support for plan assignments. The "winning" of supplies, eliminating the consequences of their disruption by organizing the usual "assault," and revealing local reserves for equalizing the situation with material support for the plan: all this gradually became the main activity of party committees.

Under such conditions, the politics of local party committees has acquired, in my opinion, a distinct "boss" nature in the course of time: The specific interests of large groups of the population are not taken into account in practice, vanishing in the face of the common interests embodied in the plan. Today, this is often displayed in a form, such as the lack of glasnost on problems concerning the interests of the population of one region or another. Instead of the purposeful satisfaction of people's legitimate interests, the practice of keeping silent about truly existing acute and complex problems has become noticeably widespread. Conversely, the interests of subjects of politics at the upper, or rather, higher levels of management were cultivated to the utmost, since the solution of the tasks assigned for a region depended significantly on the consideration and use of precisely these interests.

Management is structured this way to a varying degree, but quite naturally gravitates toward various forms of protectionism as a method, vitally important for every leader, for organizing his activity. The demoralizing influence of this practice on party workers and, really, on the apparatus as a whole, in my opinion, is obvious. For years, almost all aspects of apparatus work, including cadre policy and ideological work, has been deformed. In short, the reign of administrative pressure methods in management, the inability and lack of desire to use the

self-regulating force of commodity-monetary relations under conditions of socialism, and the extraordinary centralization of management have contributed decisively to the replacement of soviet and economic bodies by party bodies, to the development in the management apparatus of an atmosphere of distrust in all kinds of "unplanned" initiatives from below, i.e., in the final account, an increased alienation of the apparatus from rank-and-file party members and the working people.

So, the need for changes in leadership methods has become imminent. New approaches are needed, including, perhaps, mainly precisely at the level of local party committees. The restructuring of their work under the present conditions is also aimed at this. The gradual elimination of direct interference by committees in the production activity of enterprises and organizations, and the elimination of petty supervision of economic managers should increase the proportion of strictly political functions of the party.

It is also clear that, in implementing the new approach to performing the party's role as a political force, it is necessary to take into account contemporary social processes, which have distinct general features, but are nonetheless specific for each region. However, not only the changes that have already occurred must be taken into account, but also tendencies now just being noted, so to speak, an advanced reflection of reality, only on the basis of which is initiative-minded action possible.

For example, with the development of the economic independence of enterprises and organizations, a real opportunity appears for overcoming the emasculation of socialist ownership relations that took shape in the past. However, these relations, like ownership itself, cannot simply be "transferred." No matter what good laws have been passed on this account, one must be able to "take" them. Meanwhile, the basic mass of working people has ended up, in my opinion, in a rather difficult position: For the time being, broad strata of the population have not formed many well-developed habits for constructive participation in the management of economic affairs or disposition of socialist property. Under these conditions, the passivity of party organizations may create fertile ground for arbitrariness on the part of unconscientious administrators, as well as for the manifestation of anarcho-syndicalist moods among a segment of the working people.

The main guideline in the work of committees under such conditions should be political support for the economic interests of labor collectives, and one of the important directions of their activity is to caution against the possible corporate exclusivity of these collectives, examples of manifestation of which for the present time are, unfortunately, multiplying. A great deal of explanatory work remains to be done, taking into account the fact that raising the role of commodity-monetary relations lead rather definitively to a growth of social differentiation, accompanied by the more or less painful breaking of established equalization concepts of

social justice, by the formation of interest groups remote from each other and diverse habits for expressing and supporting them, and by the growth of the population's social mobility.

However, the liberation of the people's economic energy is picking up pace and, while creating new problems and difficulties, also brings to life powerful forces for solving them: mass "unplanned" initiative, and the search, unsanctioned from above, for constructive methods of solving them from the view of the goals of restructuring. In my opinion, the "Charity" Movement and societies similar to it serve as an example. To the extent of the further strengthening and development of the cooperative movement and enterprises' economic independence, these and many other public initiatives may become far more stable and influential factors for social life than they are now. Interrelations with diverse alternative social movements is also a sphere for the application of political methods of work, since all other methods of interrelation with them cannot yield the proper effect.

A no less important consequence of the development of economic independence of direct producers, sometimes overlooked by local party bodies, is the formation of favorable conditions for the appearance and strengthening of that which could quite conditionally be called the "community life" of a rayon or city. The full-fledged feeling of a "little homeland" in every person might have a powerful neutralizing influence on the social instability caused by the zig-zags of economic life under conditions of a socialist market which is, moreover, still in the stage of formation.

In short, under contemporary conditions the local party committees are faced with a fairly complex task: How, without deviating into the usual administrative style or using the levers of power still accessible to them, do they avoid becoming one of the insignificant social organizations of a region? Apparently, a committee can reinforce its role as the political leader of a region, without deforming the process of natural development of social initiative, if communists play the leading role in these initiatives, if the population sees a strength, capable of offering decisive cooperation for progressive ideas, precisely in them. In my opinion, the party's social strategy will acquire the strength needed for its implementation only given this position on the part of party committees and all communists.

Today, the intensely developing process of differentiation and the subsequent cohesion of various groups of the population, which realize the specific nature and proximity of their interests, as well as the appearance of broad opportunities for their expression and defense, are highly significant political trends in the life of probably every region. Under conditions of democratizing all aspects of our society, various group interests which seek political support, as well as channels for influencing local and state authorities, will clash ever more often. Socio-politically oriented informal associations will become

more active, and their interest in direct influence on the bodies of power, not to mention participation in their formation, will grow.

Understandably, the degree of influence of informal associations on the life of a given region cannot be constant: the dynamics of these groups' influence on people's moods will be determined to a significant extent by the ability of the corresponding party committee to correctly and promptly react to the situation taking shape in the region. For example, the residents of an ecologically unfavorable rayon feel with their own lungs, so to speak, the seriousness of the consequences of irresponsible decisions made by certain departments and, not finding understanding in the raykom, naturally accept the help of informal "ecologists" with gratitude. If these, in turn, utilizing fairly strong methods that we are not used to—demonstrations, strikes, etc.—nonetheless obtain from the departments that, which the raykom was unable to get, the political influence of the latter will drop even lower. In the course of shaping a renovated system of political relations and a rule-of-law state, a similar logic for the development of events, i.e., turning to alternative forces for assistance, is quite likely. To phrase it differently, the interests of the working people and residents of a region should now be a real, specific, and not abstract political goal for party committees, requiring daily attention and prompt action.

Today, as everyone knows, local party committees are faced with the task of learning to organize a genuine, alternative election campaign. It is important to keep in mind that the informal associations have fairly broad possibilities and experience in this sphere. The organizational flexibility of many informal groups, their tendency to use untraditional methods, their dynamic political reaction to changing circumstances, and the effect of novelty are all attractive to a definite part of the population, especially youth. The absence, at least at first, of an obvious connection between political activity and personal interests, as well as the absence of a burden of errors, since, as a rule, they have not yet accomplished any work, may also make them a serious force in the election struggle.

The outcome of elections of USSR people's deputies convincingly showed that the play of "organizational muscles" and the utilization of purely counter-propaganda methods are unpromising, if they do not rely on political leadership of the party committee and its apparatus among the population of a region. It is a question of leadership, based on the people's recognition of a certain party committee's ability to solve their problems, to help them satisfy vital needs.

In proportion to the development of the economic possibilities of local soviets of people's deputies, their political significance will also increase. The reform of the election system should "wash out" the "showpiece generals from the nomenclature" and casual people in political life, prepared to fulfill only the role of a "cog" in the political machine. Taking into account the trend

toward intensified social differentiation, the growth of competitive relations, and real possibilities for the appearance of corporate moods in a number of labor collectives, we can predict that the pressure of various interests on the soviets will occur to a significant extent in the form of a struggle among the most active groups for influence on them. The most important condition for the success of party committees under these conditions is the ability to establish themselves within the system of these interests, to support and encourage the most constructive of them, and not to attempt, as has often happened in the past, to "reserve" all initiatives for themselves. In other words, they must switch from dialogue to cooperation with social groups that support the goals and ideals of perestroika and socialism.

The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform "orients local party committees toward politics as though toward the rivalry of different population groups for influence on the bodies of power, and turns away from office politics toward politics, directly aimed at satisfying the vital interests and needs of the people. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

SPIRITUAL LIFE

The Ideas of K. Marx at the Turning Point of Human Civilization

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[Article by Igor Konstantinovich Pantin, editor-in-chief of RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR, doctor of philosophical sciences, and Yevgeniy Grigoryevich Plimak, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for the International Workers' Movement, doctor of historical sciences. The article uses materials prepared for the first issue of OCHERKOV ISTORII KPSS. In the future as well, the editors will acquaint readers with items from this publication for purposes of public discussion]

[Text] "...Marx so far exceeds us all in his genius, in his almost extraordinary scientific conscientiousness and legendary erudition, that if anyone tried to criticize Marx's discoveries, he would only hurt himself with this. This will be possible only for people of a more advanced era." (F. Engels)

In studying the history of Russian social thought for many years, the authors of this article fully realize with what difficulty the great changes in society's mental life are occurring, how many "spiritual dramas" and human tragedies accompany the birth of a new world outlook, especially attempts to implement it. In the years of perestroika and renovation of socialism, the elimination of many stereotypes that have outlived themselves is inevitable. However, one thing greatly disturbs us: the very easy way to settle accounts with one's own theoretical conscience that is becoming widespread among part of our "perestroika" intelligentsia, who are thoughtlessly

replacing the former blind, uncritical belief in the Marx's teachings with the current complete and unconcealed nihilism regarding said teachings.

The failure of illusory forms of our social awareness was inevitable and natural, and the fact that it adopted the nature of an all-destroying ideological avalanche is also quite explainable: for decades, our words have differed from our actions, society's real development from its ideology, while at the same time the "leaders" swore to the rightness of Marxism ever more loudly from their rostrums.

We by no means sympathize with the fate of a king who is nearly naked and, moreover, we think that since he is not yet completely undressed, we should pitilessly tear the rest of his clothes from him, for the benefit of subjects who are opening their eyes. It is appropriate for us to make all our social relations truly transparent, without which real socialism is inconceivable. Yet, we are also firmly convinced that the time has come to erect a sturdy barrier in the path of this ideological avalanche, since it threatens to bury the thoroughfare of our road, to deprive us both of guidelines and of life itself.

In our social sciences and scientific journalism, there are clearly marked tendencies to seek the roots of the deformations in socialism not only in Stalin's crimes, not in the one particular path of a backwards Russia where the proletarian revolution, under Lenin's guidance, adopted a strict proletarian-Jacobinic nature in order to win, but above all in "doctrinal flaws" or even in the complete unsuitability of Marxism, the "harmfulness" of the "Plan for the Future" (we use a term introduced in the literature) drafted by Marx and Engels. A unique "body of accusations" has been determined and brought against them. Above all, these include their cancellation of the significance of the law of value, the market, and commodity-monetary relations for socialism; their rejection of the values of democracy as a universal institution, although necessary for socialism; their age-long mistrust of the small peasant and irrepressible desire to drive the "muzhik" onto a collectivized farm, onto "big industrial" farms; their preaching of bloody revolutionary cataclysms and catastrophes as a way to transform bourgeois society, etc., etc. We must also remember that the irreversible processes of convergence of different sociopolitical systems have begun in the modern world, making the strict Marxist dichotomy (capitalism—socialism) of the late 19th and early 20th centuries meaningless in a number of points.

To properly formulate the question of the historical context of 19th-century Marxism and its "responsibility" for that which happened in the 20th century, we must not err in our choice of position. It goes without saying, the past (in our case, Marx's teachings) cannot be understood beyond the coordinates of that which ensued, of all that was accomplished "later." However, we must still be able to use the criteria of that which ensued in order to evaluate the past, and we must remember that our claims against the great creators of

socialism are only the result of comparing their positions and ways of understanding to contemporary positions and views. In this respect, let us remember that it is not so much different **answers**, as different **questions** which sometimes separate Marx and Engels from us. That is why a purely pedantic arrogance toward predecessors is both false, as well as harmful: it only complicates the development of an understanding of the past, the present, and even the future.

Now, to the essence of the problems.

Marx's Theory: Historical Context and Contradictions

Marx and Engels studied an enormously complex, extremely dynamic, constantly evolving subject, European capitalism in interaction with the rest of the world. So far as capitalism changed and developed and the amount of knowledge about it increased, with one delay or another the directions and generalizations of Marx and Engels also changed, for all their clearly expressed aspiration to maintain a stable methodological backbone in their teaching. In this sense, one can claim that Marx and Engels during the European revolutions of 1848-1849 and Marx and Engels during the "redigestion" of the experience of these revolutions (1850-1852) are "different." Precisely so, the views of Marx and Engels in the period of "revolutions from above" in the first phase, which began in Western Europe in the 1860s, differ from those in the more developed phase. Let us repeat A. Gramsci: "The study of the developmental leitmotif and rhythm of thought is more important than separate, incidental assertions and uncoordinated aphorisms."

In adhering to the viewpoint of historicism, we should, for example, overlook all accusations aimed at Marx and Engels concerning their underestimation of certain "universal values of democracy." Even in advanced West European countries, the institutions of this democracy were undeveloped at that time. The working class was still very weak, the process of integrating it into the framework of bourgeois democracy and, consequently, the process of changing the nature of said democracy had only just begun and was encountering rigid opposition both on the part of the monarchy (in Germany), as well as on the part of the bourgeoisie (in England). K. Kautsky, who vehemently protested Lenin's underestimation of the merits of "democracy" in 1918, was forced to admit in his book, *Materialistic Understanding of History*: "England... at the time of Marx's death was still far from having universal suffrage. Consequently, we can find no instructions whatsoever from Marx regarding the form of class struggle under the conditions of a fully developed democracy." Such instructions were formulated by Engels in the mid-1890s, and even then with caution.

In this case, the problem lies elsewhere: was Marx's and Engels' most sharp and unappealable opposition to "proletarian democracy" and "bourgeois democracy" hasty and unjust? After all, the Paris Commune of 1871,

having replaced Bonapartism, was a rather fleeting phenomenon in European history in general. It goes without saying, the wars of the bourgeois states among themselves could and did cause revolutionary situations in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but in not a single bourgeois country did the government abandon the capital, as in Paris of 1871, yielding power in the center of the country to an astounded proletariat, entirely unprepared either ideologically or practically to possess this power or, even more so, to retain it.

Furthermore, the especially exploratory nature of Marx's model sometimes stipulated its striking contradictions. Speaking of his predecessor Ricardo, Marx wrote about "the wealth of a vital foundation, from which theory grows" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.* [Works], vol 26, part 3, p 82. Future references to this publication will indicate volume and page only). To an even greater extent, that said of Ricardo also relates to the theoretical structures of Marx himself, who had taken an incomparably broader stratum of most complex problems into the orbit of his own search. Let us add: a theory that cannot absorb and retain the contradictions of the subject matter is generally incapable of self-development. This also relates to sciences far more precise than Marxism. "For example, it is well known," noted W. Heisenberg, "that the concept of infinity leads to contradictions. In practice, however, it would be impossible to construct the most important parts of mathematics without this concept."

We will try to single out the basic sources of Marxist contradictions.

Let us start from the **moment of absolutization** of the principally true directions of Marx's theoretical exploration. The nature, in no way controllable by anyone, of economic bourgeois relations (both Marx and Engels were entirely right about this) inevitably gives rise to anarchy in industry, economic crises and poverty (at first both absolute and relative, and later relative) of the proletarian masses exploited by the bourgeoisie. Neither Marx nor Engels denied the significance of the struggle of organized trade unions in European countries (in England since 1822) or of various workers' associations and cooperatives, which restricted the insatiable desires of the bourgeoisie. However, the concessions extorted from the bourgeoisie for the proletariat seemed like rather pitiful palliatives to them, not changing the logic of capitalist development or, therefore, their directives. They saw social revolution, the elimination of private property, the establishment of planned organization of industry and distribution, as a result of the proletariat coming to power, with the complete elimination of the law of value, commodity-monetary relations, competition and the market, which seemed to them the main root of evil, as the answer to the problem. This is despite the fact that Marx himself defined the market as a rather unique tool, created by history, for determining the amount of socially necessary labor embodied in one commodity or another!

A mistake by Marx (and Engels)? Unquestionably. However, is this just a mistake? Current practice of capitalism, which is rapidly evolving, shows that the market is an excellent regulator, under the condition that it itself is placed in a fairly strict framework of non-market regulation. The practice of "real socialism" has also confirmed this "unity of opposites" from another direction: in and of itself, state planning and a state-departmental monopoly, which dominates industry and distribution, by reducing market self-regulation mechanisms to virtually nothing, inevitably dooms society to stagnation, deprives the direct producer, alienated from state means of production, of incentives for labor, and deprives industry itself of the ability to absorb technical innovations.

In truth, the development of society does not lie in the difference between fair and unfair, progress and regression or even, to a lesser degree, in the abstract opposition of good and evil. The market cannot exist on one side and regulation, on the other: they comprise two halves of one economic whole.

Another source of the contradictory nature of Marx's and Engels' ideological legacy was the inadequate factual base for definitive answers to a number of problems during their lives or the influence of various attendant circumstances on these answers. So, in Marx's and Engels' answer to the problem of the future peasant, it seems to us, they were dominated by considerations of a two-part nature. The political considerations reduced to the fact that the peasantry in the mid-19th century (and even later) was the basic social support for the absolutist and Bonapartist regimes in Western Europe (although Marx did not rule out a union of the working class and the peasantry). The economic considerations reduced to doubts as to whether or not the small peasant farm would be able to grasp the achievements of science and new forms of industry in the 19th century.

The third volume of "*Das Kapital*" draws, essentially, an alternative developmental path for rational **non-capitalist** farming and, in Marx's opinion, "it requires either the hands of the **small peasant, living by his own labor**, or control by **associated producers**" (boldface is ours—authors). However, a certain split occurs in Marx's thoughts. On the one hand, he talks rather definitely about the unpromising nature of existence of "small land ownership" in the future (from the viewpoint of the possibility of developing adequate production forces for society's needs, developing animal husbandry "on broad scales," the "progressive application of science," etc., in its framework). On the other hand, in the same "*Das Kapital*," he definitely states that "large land ownership undermines the work force in the latter, where its natural energy finds refuge and where it is preserved as a reserve fund for reviving a nation's vital strength—in the countryside itself" (vol 25, part 1, p 135; vol 25, part 2, pp 327, 378-379). At the same time, Engels, having just finished preparing the third volume of "*Das Kapital*" for publication, for some reason does not note these contradictions of Marx's and, in his own

final works, claims that the destruction of the small peasant is inevitable, although his especially voluntary switch to collectivized labor must be guaranteed.

In "*Theories of Added Value*," for example, Marx shares an idea of A. Smith, who emphasized the especially specific nature of peasant labor, which to a far greater degree requires "quick-wittedness and prudence," is "mental in nature," as opposed to the labor of the "divided" manufacturing worker and, "in depending on every change of the weather and a number of other circumstances," by its very nature cannot be mechanically based on the models of large-scale industrial production (vol 26, part 2, p 253). Yet, the same Marx, discussing the problem of nationalizing land in the First International (1872), quite categorically speaks out against small land ownership, which cannot provide for growing social needs, since it allows a "handful of people" to regulate production "according to their own desires and private interests, or to ignorantly exhaust the soil!" In his critique of Caesar De Paepe's alternative draft, the outlines of the "state socialism" familiar to us show clearly: "**National centralization of the means of production** will become the national basis of society, consisting of an association of free and equal producers, engaging in social labor according to an overall and rational plan" (vol 18, pp 55-57).

Having stumbled on this statement, one can proclaim victoriously: yes, the "anti-state" Bakunin was right in his debate with Marx, that the socialist-state Marx is an enemy of the small peasant! However, judging the nature of Bakunin's argument against Marx, "the statist and enemy of the peasantry," one must not overlook the following: first, Bakunin, of course, also did not suspect the gigantic scattering and lack of coordination of Marx's postulates in the "*Economic Manuscript*" written by him or in the second and third volumes of "*Das Kapital*" (he simply did not know of these works). Second, having fiercely exposed the "statist" Marx, he did not investigate the theory, known to the reading public, of the "dying off" or "withering" of the state under socialism, or the numerous ideas of Marx and Engels about the need for popular self-management as applied to the political, as well as economic structures of the future social system. Bakunin also said absolutely nothing about the fact that in the first volume of "*Das Kapital*," Marx himself supports the annihilation (overthrow) of capitalist private ownership in the form of a sort of dialectic removal, giving us "individual ownership" (!) as a result, based on achievements of the capitalist era, "on the basis of cooperation and common ownership of the land and through the means of production produced by labor itself" (vol 23, p 773). (Incidentally, the "individual" farmer of the modern West has been integrated into a powerful system of cooperative supply, and industrial processing associations, which follows the track of Marx's visions.)

So there, Bakunin! How many of our contemporary social scientists or journalists, today decisively taking Bakunin's side against Marx, "forgot" this key formula

in the first volume of "*Das Kapital*," a definition that has a certain important prognostic meaning. Repeating the "doctrinal flaws" of the Marxist "Plan for the Future" to us, they abstracted from Marx's thoughts, now accessible to everyone, for example, on "free self-management" as the "best weapon for transforming the method of production," or on the use, when converting to "full communist economic management," of cooperative production as an "intermediate link" in preserving state ownership of the means of production, so that the "special interests of a cooperative fellowship cannot prevail over the interests of society on the whole." They also unfairly ignore Marx's thoughts on the broad use of a system of lease relations when converting to socialism, from the leasing and processing of "state property and other land holdings" based on cooperative principles to the acquisition of entire factories by the working people at their own expense or at the "state's expense," in order to "operate them on cooperative principles, thus preparing the gradual conversion of all production to cooperative tracks;" on the fact that the "method of distribution" itself in a gradually changing and progressing society will change substantially in proportion to the "progress of industry and organization of society," etc., etc.

It goes without saying, the Marxist legacy included unclear and underdeveloped elements and obvious mistakes. However, we still have the right to speak of serious underestimation by many of our social scientists of the system of Marx's and Engels' views on communism, taken on the whole, in its development and its contradictoriness.

Let us look at another important factor in the contradictoriness of Marx's and Engels' world outlook. Speaking of Marxism in its historical context, we must not neglect the following circumstance: the logic of scientific analysis and the logic of building a political theory based on it differ substantially. After all, paradoxical though this may be, the chain of transformations of the theory of Marxism among the founders themselves and among their followers begins exactly in its most active link, where theoretical thought acts as a guide for action. M. Gefer was the first to note this in Soviet literature in the 1960s. For him, the "need to encompass all ties and relations of the most dynamic object in the universe" (i.e., human society) is organic for the theory of Marxism and the need, contradicting it, "for simplification, for reduction to a clear and unambiguous tactical plan, directives and slogans, accessible to the masses and rousing millions to the struggle" is a condition for the existence and development of Marxism. This contradiction is resolved in struggle, through conflict, "which also has its dramatic side." To a great extent, dramatics also lay behind the need for Marx and Engels to grant ideological "completeness" to their own unfinished theoretical and methodological structures.

Beginning with 1842-1843, Marx and Engels tirelessly emphasize in their letters and works: we, as opposed to the utopians, are not thinking up any systems or plans

whatsoever to make mankind happy; we do not include any "ideals" whatsoever from without in the movement; we lay claim only to critical examination of a given bourgeois society for the purpose of revealing the forces arising in its depths, capable, firstly, of eliminating the antagonisms inherent in capitalism and, secondly, of qualitatively transforming this inhumane society on the basis of the economic, social and cultural prerequisites created by it itself; we "wish to find a new world only by criticizing the old world" (vol 1, p 379). There is more: communism is "not an ideal, to which reality should be adapted," but a "real movement, which is destroying the status quo" (vol 3, p 34). F. Engels, having agreed in June 1847 that writing and discussion concerning the ideas of a "communist symbol of faith" would be useful in supporting the "awakening life" in the League of Communists, formulates his own critical attitude toward his utopian predecessors as follows: "We have tried, on the one hand, to restrain ourselves further from any invention of systems and any barracks communism, but on the other hand, we have tried to distance ourselves from the pathetic and vulgar talk of love and the tearful emotion of certain communists" (vol 42, p 411). But alas! The authors of the "*Communist Manifesto*," even after abolishing the term "symbol of faith," preserve something of this "faith" in the "Manifesto," regardless of its previously proclaimed directives, and add their own details of, we would say, a barracks future. For the "most advanced countries," they recommend "expropriation of land ownership" (large, small—which?); abolition of the right of inheritance (a thesis, which Marx will expose as Bakunistic 20 years later); the identically mandatory nature of labor for everyone; the institution of industrial armies, particularly (!) for farming, etc. (see vol 4, pp 446-447).

As a consequence, in the works of the 1850s and 1860s, Marx and Engels display an enviable self-critical nature in assessing the level of their own knowledge and their attempts to guide revolutionary processes. In a letter to Engels on 13 February 1863, Marx recalls their past "naive illusions" and "almost child-like enthusiasm" of the 1848 era, their misunderstanding of what sort of role in revolution "foolishness plays and how scoundrels know how to exploit it" (vol 30, p 266). However, the decades go by one after another. So what? Even passing the stage of self-critical "cleansing," relying on a far more developed foundation, once again Marx and Engels, pressured by the needs of the political struggle (the debate with critics of scientific communism, a desire to "retouch" one or another program directive of the fledgling social democracy, their promises aimed at voters, etc.) will be forced to change their own principle of not drawing any "plans for the future" whatsoever. They work to manufacture them, express a mass of sensible ideas, and (it now becomes clear) make a number of obvious mistakes in their most "classical" works.

Marxism and "Near-Marxism"

So, we can see the sources of the contradictory nature of the legacy of the founders of Marxism. However, the matter is greatly complicated by the fact that, besides the Marxism that existed in the head of Marx himself, another "Marxism" existed in the heads of his followers, who had very, very contradictory, confused concepts about the essence of his teaching. We would add: already during the lifetime of Marx and Engels, a certain strata of vulgar peddlers of Marxism had begun to take shape in the workers' movement. Already the Marxism of Marx was not entirely identical to the Marxism of Engels, yet the Marxism of the one and the other differed sharply from the Marxism of K. Kautsky, who propagandized their views, or the Marxism of P. Lafargue, A. Bebel, or W. Leibknecht. This gap was revealed in the process of disseminating Marxism extensively, becoming a true abyss in proportion to the involvement in the revolutionary struggle of ever new strata of "simple people," who had confessed holy faith in "communism," as much an ardent and pure faith, as an unconscious one.

In the last years of his life, Marx begins to be troubled by the appearance of a narrow, simplistic and wretched "scientific communism," which was (under a shell of Marxist phrases) a variety of secular "faith," essentially religious "dogma." Encountering such "Marxism," which flourished in France, Marx once told P. Lafargue: "One thing is clear: I myself am not a Marxist" (vol 35, p 324). Engels sounds the alarm at the end of his life, having noted that "separate parts of the works and notes of Marx" are being interpreted by Russian emigrant revolutionaries in a "most contradictory manner, as though these were dicta of the classics or texts from the New Testament." Engels notes the same tendency to convert the "ideas of our movement into strict dogma," which workers should follow "without pausing for breath and without judgments, as a symbol of faith," in 19th-century European social democracy (see vol 38, p 82, 94, 360; vol 39, pp 65, 207, 352). In this sense, Engels' article "On the History of Original Christianity" (1894) is also curious. Sharply bringing Christianity together with socialism, Engels essentially called the former the early ideology of the proletariat, and the second—a later edition of Christian dogma. He also notes the similarity of both historical phenomena in their organizational structures, as well as their "intra-party" life: both here and there, various sects waged war not for life, but to the death, differing only in the fact that a belief in heaven in the sky was inherent in early Christianity, but socialist structures depicted a heaven on earth.

However, let us be frank: having established the appearance of a certain ideological formation whose representatives, as Engels admitted, were "in no condition to understand this vital theory of reality, of operating together with the working class in all possible stages of its development" (vol 38, p 82), the founders of Marxism, or at least Engels, saw it as a "childhood illness" that accompanies the assimilation of any new theory, rather

than a dangerous trend to which independent life in the proletarian movement was sentenced.

True, Marx had already tried to create a mechanism in the mid-1860s, directing the highly undeveloped proletariat toward the desired goals. In starting the International Fellowship of Workers, Marx sought to overcome all difficulties rather simply, following the principle: "...numbers will solve the problem, only when the mass is encompassed by an organization and guided by knowledge" (vol 16, p 10). However, this mechanism rapidly revealed its unsuitability. For instance, the knowledge of leaders of the First International, such as Marx himself and Bakunin, turned out to be so dissimilar that a very severe struggle, burdened by personal motives, flared up between them. As a result, both Marx and Engels considered it good in general to hold back from formal membership in the Social Democratic Party that appeared in Europe under the influence of their teaching, preferring to criticize "from the sidelines."

Really, we would designate the situation that took shape with late 19th-century Marxism as follows: in excluding the leaders of the then social democracy, apparently, one simply should not speak of any kind of mastery of Marxism in the lower links of the party. Individual essays by Marx and Engels and popular statements by Bebel, Kautsky, W. Leibknecht, and Bernstein, who had more or less mastered the ideas of Marxism, were unquestionably read by party functionaries, but it is hard to say how they transformed these in their heads. In the mass of workers, excerpts from Marxism were diluted in traditional bourgeois or proletarian-plebeian views.

This situation with the layer of rank-and-file propagandists of the Marxist viewpoint, who filled the pages of the social democratic press with their articles, was far worse. The correspondence of Marx and Engels shows: they were extremely alarmed by the penetration into the ranks of Marxist propagandists of a multitude of half-educated teachers, "the basic principle of whom is to instruct others in that which they themselves have not studied." They speak directly of the "pseudo-scientific arrogance of our so-called educated." Unfortunately, the situation did not become improve when one newspaper or another ended up in the hands of workers gripped by the "urge to write," moved by a dull Weitlingist envy of the "educated" (see vol 19, pp 172-173, 174; vol 34, pp 85, 235, 320-321; vol 35, pp 186, 217; vol 37, pp 380-381).

Apparently, there is an inalienable contradiction between the original all-embracing nature and depth of the ideas of Marxism as "explaining" and "directing" the original theory, for all its shortcomings, and the pathetic political culture of lower functionaries and, especially, of the masses who were called on to "put" theory into practice. Of course, what kind of changes and losses of the values of Marxist theory will accompany the activity of a real practical movement, guided by the ideas of scientific socialism, depends on many circumstances. In any case, a very sharp change of form and simplified

application of the general truths of Marxist theory to a given reality is inevitable in practice. In speaking of Marxist politicians, we should not overlook the fact that the transformation of Marxism in this process into a concept for revolutionary action was not just a "regression" of theory. The implementation is not at all indifferent to the theory being implemented; deviations, additions, and corrections of it are not the "exception," not a "quirk," not "renegadism." They are methods for correcting theory as applied to life, without which it threatens an inevitable flight from reality, the conversion into the "personal" opinion of one or another leader or scientist. Backwards movement from the limited-specific toward the specific-universal is, therefore, just as necessary a condition for retaining theory at its peak, as is the conquest of new fields of history by theory, its expansion into the sphere of practical and political activity of the masses.

Of course, we must also remember relativity, the limitation of the initial "model" that is being put into practice. "Indeed, Marx and Engels made many mistakes and were often mistaken," Lenin admits in 1907, "in determining the proximity of revolution, in their hopes for the victory of revolution (for example, in 1848 in Germany)... They were mistaken in 1871..." However, instead of formulating the problem of the sources of errors by the founders of Marxism, Lenin in fact tries to justify them. He says: "...Such mistakes by the giants of revolutionary thought, who elevated the proletariat of the whole world above the level of petty, everyday, insignificant tasks, are a thousand times more noble, more majestic and **historically more valuable, more correct**, than the popular wisdom of conventional liberalism, which sings, clamors, appeals and verbalizes about the revolutionary vanity of vanities, about the futility of revolutionary struggle, about the charm of counter-revolutionary "constitutional" fantasies... The Russian working class will win freedom for itself and give a forward impetus to Europe through its own revolutionary actions, full of mistakes, and let common people boast of their error-free revolutionary inaction" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 15, p 249).

A mistake is always a mistake, no matter how "noble" and "majestic" it may be. Mainly, though, so long as the gnosiological mechanism of delusion is not understood or revealed, thought is in no condition to argue with itself or correct itself, which means that it is in no condition to overcome the perpetuation of a given line, a given limited form.

For the sake of fairness, let us note that in their teaching Marx and Engels, as we saw above, carefully studied the experience of the historic movement and revolutionary struggle of the masses who influenced European history in the past decade, coming closer to the realization that transferring the proletarian socialist idea into the world of events and actions inevitably detonated a chain reaction of changes which, being related to socialism, were aspects and elements of the movement and development

of the bourgeois system. The real form of 19th-century historic progress had little in common with the simplicity of the climb from one level to another, from capitalism to socialism. So, in the famous statement by the author of "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," concerning the constant self-criticism of 19th-century revolutions, at least two mutually exclusive elements can be singled out. On the one hand, there is a sober recognition that the opponent of the proletariat, being thrown down, absorbs "fresh forces" and becomes even more powerful "than before" (why?—Marx does not give us an answer), and on the other, there is a certainty that the retreat of the proletariat "in the face of the indeterminate immensity of their own ideas" is only a temporary phenomenon, a kind of re-grouping of forces, accumulation of experience, and gradual creation of a state of affairs "that cuts off any path to retreat." For Marx, the solution of the conflict between these tendencies is simple: in the end, historic development leads to the appearance of conditions, under which the revolution can only take on a "serious nature" (see vol 8, p 123, and others). The possibility of a different turn of events (for instance, the change of conditions for existence of the proletariat under the influence of higher stages of industrial revolution and the political lessons of 1848-1849, perceived by the bourgeois class) does not enter Marx's head, not just because this was hard to do in the mid-19th century but, above all, because the boundary separating the interests of the bourgeoisie from the interests of society and the working class, seemed fundamental to him for understanding the entire course of history at that time.

At the end of the 19th century, Bernstein decided to cross that boundary. Why? Obviously, not because he stood above Marx in terms of theory (rather, conversely), but because under the new conditions that had formed along with the development of industrial capitalism and the workers' movement the opposition between bourgeois society and the proletariat, which is the basic idea of the "*Communist Manifesto*," had ceased to be absolute, fixed and all-consuming. Incidentally, in the 1860s Marx also approached in earnest the idea that capitalism was capable of changing under the influence of the workers' movement. However, for all this the contradiction between his (and Engels') scientifically substantiated communist future and the progressing bourgeois society seemed so absolute and irreconcilable to them, that capitalism ought to die off so that socialism could be put into practice.

History subsequently shows that the power of the bourgeoisie can be overthrown by the working class, by the people, and that bourgeois society can be eliminated with the help of Jacobinic measures, but the contradiction nonetheless will not be resolved or eliminated, but rather, driven into the organism. History shows that violence is by no means its blameless "midwife:" society, having revealed contradictions long restrained by Jacobinism, will convert to democratic and humane procedures with great difficulty.

However, let us return to Marx and Engels.

The "late" Engels, having felt that monolithic Marxist theory was clearly eroded in attempts to apply it to past, present, and even future situations, tries (unfortunately, almost always in personal letters and scattered form) to determine the context for **the cognitive capability** of Marxism. So, on 27 January 1886, Engels writes to E. Piz: "In any case, it should be stated that the party to which I belong does not promote any suggestions prepared once and for all. Our views on the future, which distinguish the future noncapitalist society from contemporary society, are accurate conclusions from historical facts and the processes of development and **have no practical or theoretical value whatsoever beyond association with these facts and processes**" (vol 36, p 363-364; boldface is ours—authors). This position, it seems to us, rightly banning the absolutization of specific conclusions in the theory of Marxism, at the same time too severely cuts short the possibility of extrapolating trends in the future development of society. In our opinion, Engels made the most profound conclusion about the cognitive limits of Marxist theory in his letter to W. Sombart on 11 March 1895: "However, Marx's entire world outlook (Auffassungsweise) is not a doctrine, but a method. It does not give ready-made dogmas, but points of departure for further study and a method for this study" (vol 39, p 352).

In evaluating the works of Marx and his colleague Engels on the whole, we can conclude: in general, they did not sin against the facts or their scientific conscience. As 20th-century realities show, Marx, of course, considerably underestimated the vitality of capitalism, the possibilities for effective use of the achievements of science and technology by it in its own interests, as well as the likelihood of its further transformation. However, the fact remains that Marx penetrated more deeply than anyone in the 19th century into the profound mechanisms and structures of an antagonistic and exploitative social organism. Another thing is also important. While remaining a convinced revolutionary, since the mid-1860s Marx began to grope for an alternative variant of development. In his "Constituent Manifesto of the International Fellowship of Workers" (1864), he deemed the winning by the English proletariat of a 10-hour working day, wrenched from the ruling classes via a legal parliamentary struggle, not only a "practical success," but also a "victory of principle"—the open capitulation of a bourgeois political economy in the face of the political economy of the proletariat (see vol 16, pp 8-9). In the "Preface to the First Issue" of the first volume of *Das Kapital* (1867), Marx made the very important conclusion (underestimated both then and later) that progress in bourgeois society is indisputable: the **ruling classes** themselves in England and the United States have begun "radical changes" (!) in the relations between "capital and labor," "capital and land ownership relations," anticipating a similar course of affairs in Germany and France, having felt, although with confusion, that "present-day society is not a hard crystal, but an

organism capable of transformations and found in a constant process of transformation" (vol 23, pp 10-11). True, Marx and even Engels did not make fundamental methodological conclusions from these important statements of theirs at that time. In a certain sense, this can be understood and justified.

The entire Marxist concept almost from the mid-19th century prepared Marxists for the era of tempestuous cataclysms and upheavals, which marked the current century. In the mid-19th century, Marx and Engels ascertained and emphasized the unusual dynamism of the bourgeois formation (see vol 4, pp 427-430), and they noted that in a capitalist society, "on the one hand, industrial and scientific forces are brought into being, which not one of the previous eras in the history of mankind could have suspected. On the other hand, there are visible signs of a collapse, far exceeding all known historical horrors of the last days of the Roman Empire;" every success, every achievement by bourgeois civilization in the socioeconomic, scientific, intellectual and moral sphere "is fraught with its own opposition" (see vol 12, pp 3-5). Engels, passionately wishing at the end of his life to "glance into the new century," gives the proletariat a timely warning about the "great future crisis" that is maturing in the depths of the capitalist world economy, about the cataclysms of a forthcoming unprecedented "world war," the outcome of which "is entirely unpredictable" (vol 39, p 303; vol 25, part 2, p 32; vol 22, p 538, and others). For this reason precisely, speaking of the preferability both of the real successes of the legal parliamentary struggle of the proletariat in Europe and even of possible shifts of a **socialist orientation** in the awareness of the ruling classes, Engels does not remove the slogan of a "great revolution" from the agenda of the proletariat (vol 22, pp 546-548, p 543).

As we have seen, Marx and Engels often made mistakes, at times of a fundamental nature. However, the Marxist "Plan for the Future" was essentially an **exploratory** model, not containing any criteria whatsoever for the truthfulness or untruthfulness of its prediction. Only the real historical practice of socialism, which in practice did not exist in the 19th century, if we do not count the brief experiment of the 1871 Paris Commune, the unconscious activity of which did not, in Marx's expression, have "anything socialist" "except their tendencies" (vol 36, p 70; vol 17, p 562), could be such a criterion.

As far as the activity of 20th-century proletarian revolutionaries are concerned, we would say the following: in developing their theory, Marx and Engels tried to preserve both the diversity, as well as the common canvas of the problems being solved and the goal of movement. Their followers, setting the same goal, in fact try to eliminate the inherent contradictions of their teachers' doctrine. Each of them nearly always chose one of the previous formulas, one of the former decisions, and they altogether lost the multifaceted nature and richness of the original theoretical exploration. Of course, Marx and Engels do not and cannot have any responsibility whatsoever for the result of applying such theory in practice,

for the success, failure, cause and, especially, the criminal actions of some of their 20th-century followers. The only thing that Engels demanded of them, in "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," was this understanding of the inevitability of forthcoming great shifts in the development of natural science, not to mention social development, which entails a review of the entire philosophy of Marxism. Lenin, having embraced this thought, elaborates in "Materialism and Empiriocriticism," that there will be "nothing 'revisionistic' in the established meaning of the term" in this natural revision of Marxism, but that, inevitably sacrificing "one letter or another" of Marxism, we must try not to sacrifice its "method" (see V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 18, pp 265-266).

Some communist parties in the West started this natural revision of Marxism in the 1950s-1960s. We have had the opportunity to participate in it only since 1985. From the viewpoint of renovated Marxism, how do we assess the realities of the late 20th century?

Marxism and 20th-Century Realities

Any person, having compared the world at the beginning and end of this century, ought to admit: the 20th century really was a truly revolutionary era. A tremendous turn has occurred in the development of mankind's production forces. At the start of the century, people had barely raised themselves above the land, and at its end they are working to master space. Instead of primitive counting devices, they now use computers which perform millions and billions of operations per second.

The political look of the world has changed most radically. At the start of the century, Russia opened up an era of sociopolitical changes, in the final account having prompted capitalism and even the entire world community to transform itself. The features of the new world order began to appear with particular clarity when the state, born in October, and its people, in union with other countries and peoples, won a universal historical victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism. The consequence of this victory was, on the one hand, the ruin (although prolonged) of totalitarian regimes, and on the other, the liberation of former colonies and subcolonies. Although capitalism managed to renovate economic dependency relations and the old world order, the basis of which was formed by the mother country-colony relation, the failure of the colonial system of imperialism was achieved in it, so to speak, in classical form. Hundreds of peoples, literally all mankind, were included in the gradual movement of history.

Nonetheless, only part of the historical path has been crossed. The second part is not only immeasurably more complex. The main point is that this part is **substantially different**. The problems of the new stage relate to the coexistence, within the context of the contemporary universal-historical process, of qualitatively different methods of production and forms of activity (economic,

political, spiritual), and not simply to coexistence, but also to the interaction of varied types of elements, included in peaceful unity. The **type** of diversity in world-wide history is changing substantially. It is intrinsically related to the internationalization of production forces and interaction, and to the formation of an international division of labor, as a result of which each country or group of countries acts as a nationally special yet integral part of the world-wide historical process. In this regard, economic, political, and spiritual diversity is the most important **prerequisite** for progress itself and the struggle for it. To clarify the meaning of this struggle, its new conditions, methods and even the goal itself, it is important to understand the following:

The common feature of changes in the late 20th century is the globalization of social, economic and political life of peoples, and along with it, the globalization of the dangers that threaten the human race. It is a question, above all, of the possibility of the universal annihilation of world civilization as a result of nuclear catastrophe or the catastrophically rapidly advancing violation of the previous more or less harmonious relationship between the person, his production forces, and the prerequisites for his natural, ecological existence. This leads directly to a need to coordinate the activity of the whole world community, to change the form of the most important aspects of its development, and to harmoniously develop the most diverse regions, countries and peoples.

The category of "mankind," which contemporary international practice and political philosophy has promoted to first priority, expresses an ancient attitude that also has force for past social forms. However, it really becomes true only as a category of the **contemporary** stage of historical development. As Marx emphasized, "even the most abstract categories, regardless of the fact that they, precisely thanks to their own abstract nature, have force for all epochs, in the very definiteness of this abstraction are to a certain extent also the product of historical conditions and possess full significance only for these conditions and within their limits" (vol 46, part 1, p 42).

When it is a question of the existence of civilization itself, of the extensive connections of generations of people now living, the category of "mankind" ceases to be the product of a secondary "redundant" interpretation. It begins to reproduce the meaning of a new problem: the preservation and continuation of the human race and, moreover, it carries new meanings which appear as a result of the clash among a number of essentially world problems. Their nature is such that, despite their world-wide nature, they require not one, universal solution for the whole planet, but a search for a model for the **"integral"** development of mankind, a model that would be oriented toward differences, different approaches, specific conditions, dissimilar circumstances and traditions, and differences in the shaping of civilizations, not to mention local specific features with regard to labor, ownership and culture. All

this requires a comprehensive model of development which would include all these differences on the basis of consensus.

The world changed tremendously by the end of the 20th century. Today, the most urgent task of the entire contemporary world is preserving life itself on the planet. In this regard, progress itself is acquiring a new meaning, qualitatively richer and more diverse: not only the elimination of oppression, the exploitation of man by man or of some countries by others, but also ensuring the primacy in the international arena of mankind's common, combined interests over the egotistical interests of special (and often still mutually antagonistic) classes and nations that oppose world-wide development. Mankind has reached the point where his viability is being tested: will it or will it not begin a new type of evolution. The interests of the world-wide historical whole, the highest criterion of human activity, urgently require a predominant orientation not only toward diverse, local interests or tasks, but also toward the requirements and needs of long-term and universal order. Moreover, the existence of mankind itself will constantly depend on whether or not it manages to change the course of events and affairs in favor of the combined interests of the entire human race, of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among different regions, countries and peoples.

In this connection, let us examine the most important dichotomy, capitalism and socialism. The course of events in the 20th century, as we can see, has not (indeed, and could not) become just an implementation of the paths for civilization's historical course, previously outlined by the classics of Marxism. Thanks to the development of capitalism's internal potentials and the progress of science and technology, the 20th-century world turned out to be quite different, than anyone analyzing 19th-century social evolution would have predicted or assumed.

World history in the 20th century did not leave the problem of capitalism and socialism in its previous form, but elevated it to a higher level. The radical change in views on socialism lies, apparently, not only and not so much in the impossibility of a forcible struggle for socialism or in the successes of reformist democratic socialism, although this is also extremely important in the atomic age. That which was revisionist utopia in general and on the whole at the start of this century, on the eve of the cataclysms of World War I and revolutionary upheavals, became a necessity in the second half of this century and, moreover, the only promising form for the working class's struggle for social progress. We repeat: change is not limited by recognition of the rightness of the path of reform. Apparently, the main thing is the radical replacement of reference points, the switch from the views and logic of industrialism to the concept of post-industrial multi-stage development of both man and society. Before, Marxists asked: how ready is the working class of the capitalist world to win political power and thereby master all social production?

Replacement of the owner (of ownership proper) was considered the main factor in converting to socialism. In our day, this view of socialism, with its acknowledgment of the primacy of material factors of labor over all else—natural, social, or spiritual—should be surpassed. Today, it is not the principles of economic organization (or rather, not just or so much them), but man's position in society, the removal of any and all forms of alienation in his work, the possibility for his development as a personality, and his participation in all areas of social life which are becoming the main directions of socialism's program and theoretical orientation. As never before, the words of Marx and Engels serve as a motto for socialism: social antagonism will be annihilated "only under conditions of the comprehensive development of individuals, because comprehensively, and only comprehensively developing individuals can appropriate the available forms of interaction and production forces, i.e., convert them into their own free life activity" (vol 3, p 441).

Historical development in the 20th century has shown: at the cost of huge social crises and cataclysms and gigantic turns, capitalism has not only managed to wrench itself away from a historical phase dangerous to itself, within the framework of which its contradictions could be solved forcibly both "from the right," as well as "from the left," but has also begun rapidly implementing a conversion to a different **scientific and technical** phase of its own development. At the same time, the old, pre-scientific-technical revolution "socialism," which solved (we now realize by what methods and at what cost) the problem in the USSR of industrializing the country and eliminating the most glaring contradictions of undeveloped capitalism, pregnant with vestiges of feudalism and various Asianisms (as well as having promoted the command-administrative system in a number of countries), has entered a dangerous, critical stage of historical development. Under these conditions, perestroika, renovation and, of course, the humanization and democratization of socialism became absolutely inevitable.

Speaking of perestroika, we would specially like to emphasize one important element. Communism, even at its birth, was a "extract" of the best, greatest results of then-scientific thought. The renovated, essentially almost entirely rebuilt socialism ought to be an extract, concentrate and fusion of the entire wealth of human practice and culture. In this regard, we mean human culture in the broadest, all-embracing meaning of the term, not excluding but including, which, unfortunately, Marx and Lenin were unable to do because of the narrow contexts of their day and the spiritual-moral layers of consciousness, including religious. No matter how science may have finally solved the problem of Christ, we believe that F.M. Dostoyevskiy, who remarked that "not a single atheist, having disputed the godly origin of Christ, can deny the fact that He is the ideal of mankind," was right in his own way.

Incidentally, recently Yu. Karyakin in his book, "*Dostoyevskiy and the Eve of the 21st Century*" (Moscow, 1989), offered us a wealth of the great writer's insights, topical to the utmost for our time. Yu. Karyakin formulated one of these quite clearly, the second ambiguously and incompletely; we will quote both. The first is: Violating the human precept "Thou Shalt Not Kill!" inevitably leads to the suicide of the human race (true, "existence only begins, when one is threatened by non-existence"). The second, no less brilliant comment of Dostoyevskiy's was the idea of the anarchistic self-willed riff-raff, the "underground man" who not only opposed socialism, but also penetrated it in its various hypostases, beginning with the "scoundrel" Peter the Great and ending with certain, as the writer called them, socialist "romantics" who wanted "to understand everything, to see everything and see incomparably more clearly than our most positive minds can see, to be reconciled neither to the one nor the other, but at the same time to balk at nothing... to constantly keep in sight the useful, practical goal, to examine this goal through the enthusiasm and volume of lyrical verses and, at the same time, to preserve "the excellent and lofty" undestroyed in the coffin of one's life, and even fully to preserve oneself thus." Precisely the broad spread of such "romantics" in socialism (Dostoyevskiy concluded that "considerable ceremonies occur as a consequence of them") contributed in many ways to the present political, spiritual and moral crisis of the socialist system, from which we sometimes try to save ourselves through the sermons of priests in the revived Orthodox Church. Their good intentions and profound understanding of Christ's sermons, as well as their spiritual and philanthropic work scarcely cause doubts in most of us. We just do not want to allow shades of cunning in our relations with them: Christianity promises a final transformation of the person's life in the Kingdom of Heaven (in general, leaving everything under the Heavens to Caesar), while atheistic communism fights for the radical transformation of man's life in our sinful land, for the complete elimination of the "romantic Caesars," not to mention the "scoundrel Caesars," so zealously "concerned" about us, from the political arena.

Marxism at the Turn of the Millennia

The problem that the authors of this article are solving, and we hope the reader has realized this, is not, of course, the "rehabilitation" of Marx and his teachings. Marxism's contribution to the development of social knowledge and practice is so great, that it is not easy for anyone to smash the "specter" of communism now. For this, one need merely "re-emphasize" mankind's history over the last half-century, all of its (let us not deviate from fact) very difficult, tortured and often bloody development.

It is important to define something else: in what way is it appropriate for Marxism to enter into a dialogue with reality on the eve of the 21st century? Has it become diluted entirely in the latest political teachings (for instance, it cannot be an active element of the "new

political thinking" which appeared in the second half of the 20th century), or does it act as a renovated, **strict Marxism**, having radically re-examined the set of problems and their solutions? We think the second variant is the most likely and fruitful.

Indeed, the Marxists must change and re-interpret a great deal: the "heart of dialectics" itself, having developed the problem of alleviating contradictions, of constantly mitigating and eliminating the antagonisms that irritate the world (which, essentially, the participants in the November 1987 Moscow conference of parties and movements called for); having given genuine priority (in theory and, especially, in practice) to common human principles above the class principle, giving the idea of humanized socialism (and the practice of socialism) a qualitatively new content, studying it and "extracting" (despite the cries of some narrow "patriots" about the destructiveness of "foreign demons") all achievements of human civilization at its present stage of development: the achievements of the West, our own achievements, as well as the experience of "third world" peoples who have begun to rapidly familiarize themselves with civilization, in this connection reviewing the roots of negative developmental phenomena of this civilization and eradicating these roots through the joint efforts of the broadest masses, which are awakening to creative independence and changing, as Marxism constantly did, the very logic of their own creative movement.

Indeed, we must admit: traditional Marxism did not lay bare the fundamental category, "mankind," either so meaningfully and precisely, or so tragically, as the "new political thinking." However, traditional Marxism, perhaps, shares the main point with it, declaring that man should master all his social relations and **consciously** design the entire world of his connections: both man's ties to man, as well as to nature. The modern "new political thinking," switching social awareness to a qualitatively new level, gives this postulate a far more imperative and tragic meaning: either man confirms his species definition—*homo sapiens* (reasoning man)—or he disappears from the face of the earth.

Let us add the following: Marxist teaching still has a layer of specific, **strictly Marxist**, but essentially generally human problems, the solution of which has just begun to appear at the present stage of the scientific and technical revolution. These problems relate to the "liberation of labor." In the third volume of "*Das Kapital*," Marx wrote that the future "collective man" and the "associated producers" will rationally regulate their own exchange of material with nature, not submitting to this exchange slavishly and blindly, but putting it "under their common control," accomplishing it "with the least expenditure of forces and under conditions, most worthy of their human nature." He added: "However, nonetheless, this all remains in the realm of necessity. In this aspect, the development of human strengths begins, which is a goal in itself, the true realm of freedom which can only flourish within this realm of necessity, in its own base" (vol 25, part 2, p 387). In stressing this,

Marx was not at all entertaining readers with a kind of "Tales of Scheherazade," as it sometimes seems to our social scientists, who discard the **mass** of Marx's richest **specific developments** on building communism and all his arguments, which have really only now become topical (the conversion of science into a direct production force, reducing the working day as the basis for the development of the individual, different forms of associated property and their relation to the development of self-management of the working people, and the working person leaving the framework of direct production: in short, eliminating all forms of alienation of a person's work and all forms of false, illusory awareness of it).

In "*Das Kapital*" and in other works, Marx defined the parameters and sketched the direction, the vector for the movement of mankind **for a century**, in this regard interpreting communism not as the simple "redistribution" of accumulated riches, but as a "highly difficult and lengthy process" of creation both of the person, as well as of mankind, fully realizing that this process "will again and again be slowed down and restrained by the resistance of traditional interests and class egotisms" and that, strictly speaking, it will not even be a "process," but a "whole series of historical processes, that will entirely change both circumstances and people" (vol 42, p 136; vol 17, pp 553-554, 347). Of course, the interpretation of communism as a certain beneficial eudemonic "religion of progress," as well as the understanding of communism, shown at the level of ordinary awareness as a sort of "near and final" goal, were utterly alien to Marx. Marx treated communism not at all in the "definitive meaning of the term," but essentially as the endless movement of mankind, as the "possibility of the universal development of the individual," implemented on a qualitatively new socioeconomic basis, as the "ceaseless elimination of the **limit** to this development, a limit that is perceived as a limit, not as some kind of **sacred boundary**" (vol 46, part 2, p 35).

It is precisely the existence of the enormous stratum of problems, designated by the phrases "elimination of labor" and "liberation of labor" (our country has still far from eliminated even the most primitive and heaviest forms of physical labor), as well as the very complex problem of "the withering of the state," we think, which allows the theory of communism, within the limits of a tremendous time span, to remain precisely a theory of communism, not being confused with other sociopolitical theories, fertilizing the "new political thinking," but not being diluted within it.

We remain firm supporters of the basic values of Marxism and the ideal of communism with its intransigent and all-embracing motto: the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. The authors do not thrust their views on anyone, since they respect the freedom of thought, conscience and speech. The only thing we call for is the joint struggle against evil; the struggle against evil in our earthly life; the

struggle against evil in all its open and concealed manifestations; the struggle against all pretexts and prevarications; a most decisive, but carefully considered struggle. We call for a struggle against evil, such that the person will remain a person, not forgetting his human face, and will help his fellow men become people.

Will ecological dangers be removed in time? Will the plague of the 20th-21st centuries, AIDS, be conquered? Will a truly radical and final reduction of nuclear arms begin? It is still hard to speak of all this with certainty. However, let us try to reinterpret the most important Marxist vision of the middle of last century.

On 8 August 1853, Marx wrote in the NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE: "Only after the great social revolution masters the achievements of the bourgeois era, the world market, and contemporary production forces and submits them to the common control of the most advanced peoples, only then will human progress cease to be like that repulsive heathen idol, which desires to drink no other nectar than that from the corpses of the slain" (vol 9, p 230). Unquestionably, that which the United States, England and France (now the USSR, China and India as well) are experiencing is, in its own way, a great social revolution. The question lies elsewhere: Has this revolution gone so far and deep, that the people together will be able to overcome the "heathen idol" which, at the turn of the II and III millennia, has thought of something quite monstrous: draining the nectar from their own corpses, to put it simply, cutting human progress short! We would still like to add: If God is slow to smash this "idol," the people should smash it themselves. However, besides everything else, believing in God or not, people should remove the inordinate evil hanging over the human race: the direct threat of its destruction.

It will not be easy for mankind to accomplish his transition, to use Marx's broadest definition, from his "prehistory" to his genuine "history"... COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES

The Renovation of Ideology and Ideology of Renovation

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[Article by Georgiy Khosroyevich Shakhnazarov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member]

[Text]

I.

In discussions on perestroika, the question often arises of which to give priority: to the economy or to policy, ideology or the problem of ethnic relations, the urgent concerns of the present or the questions of long-term strategy and historical perspective.

Some assume that all this must be built in a chain and drawn out link by link, or else one might overstrain oneself. Conversely, in the opinion of others, such a "gradual" tactic is useless: since various spheres of social life are tightly intertwined, they can only be moved from a standstill all at once. There are also the "pure" pragmatists who appeal for concentration on practical matters, putting off the solution of theoretical problems until better days: before this, they say, we must work right now, in the revolutionary perestroika struggle!

In reality, the very course and outcome of perestroika depend exclusively on how well we succeed precisely now, in parallel and together with revolutionary action, in defining its ideological meaning as deeply and accurately as possible. While fully acknowledging the fundamental role of the economy and policy in human affairs, I presume that ideology precisely now has gone to the forefront of social life. This is because the political regime in our country is not simply changing. We are experiencing a historical turning point, a switch from one system of social coordinates to another.

Intelligently organized power and management are always necessary. However, neither the one nor the other can be effective, if society has lost or even starts questioning the value of the ideals on which it operated, and looks for them in its past or future, glancing to the sides.

There is also a debate, although not always obvious, surrounding the following: renovation of ideology or ideology of renovation? Should we limit ourselves to a major repair of the existing ideology, to bringing it into conformity with contemporary realities and needs, or is it necessary to create a new one that meets the current level of scientific and social awareness, the spirit of the times. It is a fundamental question, and the answer to it (if, of course, one does not engage in scholasticism, alienated from life) cannot be obtained without critical study of the situation that has taken shape in our ideological management, or without discovering the essential nature and scale of imminent transformations.

However, one must make some stipulations about the concept itself beforehand. The author of an article in BSE interprets ideology as a system of views and ideas, in which people's relations to reality and to each other and social problems and conflicts are realized and evaluated, and which also contains the goals (programs) of social activity, aimed at reinforcing or changing (developing) these social relations. In a class society, ideology is always of a class nature.

Let us elaborate: the very nature and purpose of ideology predetermine its "social involvement," but do not mandatorily reflect the interests of classes. These include ethnic and religious ideologies, etc. Therefore, it is more appropriate to speak of its **social** nature. The interests of the stratum that it serves become its starting point, its criterion for assessing any phenomenon. Any idea which serves one or another specific interest, willy-nilly views the world with prejudice. It favors everything capable of

helping to substantiate the claims of this interest, and rejects that which opposes them.

The most complete expression of such self-justification and self-assertion of interest lies in its claim of universality. We have endlessly quoted a phrase from the "holy family:" an "idea" inevitably disgraces itself, as soon as it is separated from "interest." Attention is almost never given to the profound thought which follows this: "On the other hand, it is easy to understand that any mass "interest," which achieves historical recognition, goes far into the "idea" or "concept," beyond its real limits, when it first appears on the world stage, and easily confuses itself with **human** interest in general" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 2, p 89).

This property of any ideology must be kept in mind, in order clearly to see its difference from science. Ideology is always biased, and science, conversely, is impartial, or it at least ought to be. Its purpose is to look for truth beyond any consideration of who will profit from the results of this activity. It has no right to adapt itself to someone's tastes and moods: this is a law of its existence, the violation of which entails the degeneration of scientific knowledge. Many times in history, people have tried to corrupt science, to put it in the service of private, mercenary interests. The attempts end badly. A scientist can be a courtier—to a certain extent, Aristotle, Newton and Lomonosov were—but unconditional submission to earthly or spiritual power is destructive to science. Science should exist sovereignly, expressing only the truly common human needs.

One may object: what about the principle of the party nature of science? Does this presume an inevitable ideologization of scientific knowledge? Indisputably, a person's mentality tends to perceive and evaluate reality through the prism of his own interests. This is not necessarily the property of egotistical natures, but rather the organism's biopsychologically predetermined defense function, which is also displayed at the subconscious level. In short, a certain degree of ideological bias is inevitable. There cannot be "pure science," devoid of everything human, including self-love, pride and envy. However, this is not an insuperable obstacle to comprehension of the truth. There is as much proof of this as one could wish. Many great Russian scientists, who supported the positions of bolshevism, did not consider it possible for themselves to sin against the truth when one or another ideological dogma was not confirmed in practice. V.I. Lenin himself, as everyone knows, re-examined a number of postulates which had been considered irrefragable in a Marxist environment: he was guided not by a false understanding of party nature, but by a sober assessment of the situation and of the urgent needs of the working people.

Looking at the matter from the historical viewpoint, one could say that the 19th century left the 20th a legacy of ideology as a system of views, which lay claim to integrity, completeness, and unconditional truthfulness. Since all ideologies yearn for implementation, their first

goal is to unite with the social mind. Those who succeed in this acquire strength which, at the same time, becomes the source of their subsequent decline. The broader the circle of people, whose minds are possessed by an ideology, the less capable it is of developing: since it masters the average mentality of the masses, it gradually loses the scientific meaning that it originally contained. It can be claimed that the general trend in ideologies is from the highest (for a given set of ideas) level of scientific-ness through averaging, dissolution and processing by a dissimilar intellect to the highest degree of "religiousness." Most likely, all ideologies take the path from science to faith, in other words, their vector is one of diminishing value, the entropy of scientific knowledge. This process could be called the progressive "ideologization of ideology."

Another law can also be deduced: the more an ideology loses its scientific nature, the less tolerant it becomes toward dissidence and the more closed it becomes, served by a caste of priests, who make this a profitable undertaking for themselves. Any ideology creates its own bureaucracy, which exists at its expense, and that is why it strives at any price to prolong its life, conceal its faults and extol its own achievements. The circle of social interests which it serves, as a rule, is fairly broad at first, but gradually diminishes. The degree of bias placed on it grows accordingly, and more or less isolated faults in its perception of the surrounding world turn into a complete distortion of it. An illusory picture is fabricated, which they attempt to foist on reality, yet the main thing is to instill it in people's minds.

What led our society into a state of profound crisis and put the need for revolutionary restructuring on the agenda? In answering this question, people speak of the complex internal and foreign conditions for founding the new social order, of the struggle for power in the post-Leninist period, of mistakes made at one or another stage of the building of socialism, of distortions related to the authoritarian bureaucratic system and the cult of Stalin's personality, etc. In my opinion, that which was the main source of negative phenomena is mentioned more rarely. This is the utopian awareness that had possessed the minds of the people who shaped our party and headed it after the revolution. At the foundation of all theoretical and practical works, there was a conviction in the possibility of building a new social formation according to a ready-made drawing. However, as everyone knows, there is nothing more dangerous than fanatic certainty of the rightness of dogma, no matter how many proofs to the contrary reality may offer.

Marxist theory itself cannot be accused of such fanaticism. Its founders in no way believed that a revolutionary idea in and of itself was capable of creating a new world. Their theory was based, which gave grounds for speaking of it as of science, not a utopia, precisely on the concept of an objective ripening of conditions for the victory of socialism. Indeed, a careful sobriety and an ability to build strategy and tactics on the basis of studying the changing social reality, not based on

abstract theoretical schemes and computations, were inherent in the social democratic current of the workers' movement. The First International stood precisely on such grounds, deflecting attempts by anarchists to attract the working class to the adventurist path of seizing power when conditions were not ripe for this, silencing the ultra-revolutionaries, who promised to bring mankind from a capitalist hell to a communist heaven in one fell swoop.

At the same time, one must admit that Marxism contained the seeds of its own subsequent dogmatic ossification. There was reason in the opinions of Western neo- and post-Marxists concerning the lack of coincidence and the contradictory nature of the views of the young Marx and the older Marx, which we perceived with indignation. In "German Ideology" and a number of Marx's other early works, he criticizes the claim of a sum of ideas, reflecting the interests of a definite social stratum, to have nation-wide or even human-wide meaning. Later on, such doubts disappear: having created their own system of ideas, expressing the interests of the industrial proletariat, the founders of Marxism grant it universal significance on the grounds that the historical mission of this class is to free all society from the fetters of capital. The first assertion of this is found in the Paris Commune, but October 1917 is taken as definitive proof of the faultlessness of Marxist theory in all its volume.

True, the course of events rapidly revealed the utopian nature of plans to immediately introduce direct commodity exchange or to reject a professional army. Having encountered reality, V.I. Lenin decisively rid himself of illusions and literally forces his colleagues, with the full force of his authority, to re-examine their entire view of socialism.

Unfortunately, this was insufficient. The inertia of utopianism was so great that, with the tragic inflexibility of a rock, it drew the party and its leadership toward the mandatory introduction of many obviously faulty ideas, regardless of the enormous resistance of the living material. True, the attempts by some journalists and artists to see the cause of all our problems in Stalin's indisputable evil-doing alone are not serious. Of course, the character of rulers plays a tremendous role in world history. However, the fact that Stalin was a fanatic of a distorted, pseudosocialist idea is far more important. Really, did not the same thing happen with Mao Ze Dong, when he tried to make Chinese society happy by way of the cultural revolution?!

The ossification of social consciousness was a consequence of the fanatic stubbornness with which utopian ideas were implemented. Essentially, the total ideologization of all aspects of social life occurred, and every word, every action was measured on the scale not of practicality, but of "ideological purity." Theory itself turned into catechism and, incidentally, fell under the auspices of Agitprop. It set itself up with the traditional accoutrements of all religions: its own "holy writ," canonical works and apocrypha, which included the

works of associates of the classics (and even some of their own works), as well as their own holy men, sinners, heretics, etc.

Ideology diluted not only science, but also art, the basic task of which became not to artistically portray the world, but to serve an abstract idea. In the distorted system of values, A. Platonov's brilliant "*Chevengur*" and M. Bulgakov's "*The Master and Margarita*" were considered an infringement on ideological purity, if not practically crimes against morality; the road to publication was always closed for them. Yet the works of hacks were heaped with awards, since they conformed to ideological criteria.

As far as morals are concerned, ideology not only swallowed them, but apparently cancelled them out of existing regulators of social life. The whole system of moral values developed by mankind was declared hypocritical and sanctimonious, and slogans were advanced to replace it. "Anything that serves the victory of communism is moral." One can understand the motive for this: after all, communism was considered a social order perfect in all respects. In practice, it turned out that the jesuitical principle of "the end justifies the means" became the basis for society's entire moral way of life.

Ideology dealt with policy no less harshly. True, it can be claimed with equal grounds that policy submitted to ideology. After all, the distortion of the essence of Marxist theory and hypertrophy of ideology's place in society was born precisely of the struggle for power and the aspiration to retain it at any cost. On the other hand, precisely an ideological principle, blind faith in one idea or another, and the resolve to implement it at any cost, as everyone knows, is a powerful source of love of power.

In any case, it is obvious that ideological goals were mainly always set above political goals. Consider security: for ages it had been intended for securing the integrity and inviolability of the country, but here it took on a form in many ways mythologized. The protection not of national interests, but of the "gains of the revolution" began to take priority. At first, when it was a question of rebuffing the intervention, these goals, naturally, were seen as one. Later on, the motives for revolutionary messianism were, essentially, used to ensure Stalin's personal power and the model of socialism introduced by him.

During the Patriotic War, priority was given out of necessity to the slogan "The Homeland is in Danger!" Heroic commanders were remembered and people began to relate more favorably to the church, having allowed it to incite patriotic feelings. After the war, everything gradually returned to its previous condition. Many foreign policy decisions were dictated not by the genuine needs of the country's security, but by all conceivable ideological postulates, above all, the concept that the world is split into two camps, one of which personifies good and progress, and the other—evil and reaction. The entire strategy of confrontation proceeded from this

concept, which found mirror reflection in the same ideological intolerance and irreconcilability on the part of the U.S.

It should be noted that even economics was absorbed by ideology or, rather, confused by it. This thesis does not require special proof. After all, until recently we all are still unable to renounce the persistent stereotype, by which every innovation in the economy ought to be, in the first place, rated on the socialist—nonsocialist scale, and only then could we consider of what real benefit could be expected from it for the economy. To this day, so long as we do not abandon such ideological tenets, so long as we do not finish learning to set the benefit (interest itself!) before the idea, we should not count on any serious breakthroughs whatsoever in the economic situation.

To put it briefly, ideology has taken all spheres captive and has crept into corners where it, perhaps, it had never visited before in all of world history. Ours was, in the full meaning of the term, a mindlessly ideologized society, half-blind, having lost its ability to understand its own condition. Perestroika, democratization and glasnost have brought us out of this. As always happens in such cases, a powerful reaction appeared to removing ideology. Today, we hear voices from both the right and the left, calling for doing that, which normal people throughout the world do: sowing, harvesting crops, creating machines, and living our lives—all this, without uttering sacramental ideological incantations before every action. The appeal for total de-ideologization is now finding a response from a broad segment of social awareness. People are tired of the endless sermons, and those who express this mood assume that it is enough for us "simply to work," to reject unattainable goals and, as things settle down, the country will overcome the crisis and spring up as a great power.

There is a great flaw in these arguments. Above all, the opinion that "everyone but us" is free of the ideological syndrome is erroneous. The truth is that the extent of ideology is not identical, but no one makes do without it. Ideological ferment is especially great in such countries as Iran; it is fairly strong in the U.S., and is felt to the least degree in Western Europe. However, it exists even there, and national self-awareness is based on this spiritual foundation. Not to mention that universal ideologies are preserved throughout the world: Christianity and Islam, conservative or liberal-democratic, socialist or communist. Every people has its own ideology—German, French, English, etc. It is common knowledge what role Japan's ideology, which is sometimes called paternalistic, has played in its "economic miracle."

Let us add: no changes whatsoever in the social system or in the international order, including radical changes related to the appearance of nuclear arms and other global threats to the human race, are capable of abolishing that which is part of man's nature—the need for ideology as a conscious goal of his social activity. Neither

science nor art can satisfy this inescapable gravitation toward the **Idea as an Ideal**.

In short, ideology is a necessary and constructive element of social development. It is important to understand this, regardless of the "anti-ideological allergy," which is explainable in a society that has scarcely escaped ideological stupefaction. The whole point is that it should occupy the place allocated to it by the nature of things, that it should return to traditional "duties." The following can be considered a general rule: acting in a "legitimate" context, it can play a highly fruitful role in the life of society, but going beyond this, it can become an insuperable obstacle on the path of progress.

Today we are successfully developing the matter of de-ideologizing inter-state relations under contemporary conditions. It is also fair to speak of a need for deideologizing social relations precisely in the sense of limiting ideology's influence, above all, rejecting the habit of measuring all phenomena with an ideological yardstick. Let me give an example. We often use the concept of social justice. It has been a long time since this was mentioned in a report and accompanied by an explanatory commentary. However, after all, in official documents and legislative acts the formula "in accordance with the requirements of social justice" is often used. Meanwhile, justice is not interpreted identically by different social strata. It has no commonly significant criterion, and even under conditions of one social stratum, this criterion changes, sometimes radically. The concept of justice, accessible under capitalism, was quite different at the start of the 19th century than at the end of the 20th. Really, does our present ideal of social justice correspond to that which existed in the first post-October years? If a norm based on such an ambiguous concept is put into law, it will become a source for all kinds of legal misunderstandings.

II.

So, our first conclusion lies in the decision to liberate other spheres of social consciousness and activity from the total control of ideology, to return it to its traditional place and its related functions, very important for the viability of society. Now, when the country is at a crucial stage in restructuring, we especially need an ideology that accurately reflects reality, responding to popular expectations and inspiring not an attack on windmills, but initiative-minded and efficient labor. What can and should be its heart, what kind of general idea do we need?

Society's need to answer to this question had scarcely appeared, when the whole array of ideological systems known to the world, from anarchy to monarchy, unfolded before its eyes. Confusion was displayed in the rapidity with which, seemingly spontaneously, hundreds of groups suddenly appeared in ready-made form (with their own programs and statutes), preaching whatever they pleased, right up to racist and neofascist views (this is payment for fake "ideological unity!"), in our sterile

ideological atmosphere, which for a half-century had fiercely fenced itself off from all "alien" trends. However, the basic contenders for filling the ideological vacuum that had formed were relatively well-considered and solid concepts, rooted in the traditional division of Russian social thought into Western and Slavophilic wings. Of course, the present-day followers of Aksakov and Gertsen are waging debate on a radically different ideological basis, now that both our country and the world around us is different, now that the West and East, despite Kipling, have reached agreement. The national ideas of many of our peoples were included in the search for a new ideology.

Our social and intellectual potential has already grown tremendously thanks to the publication of works by Russian philosophers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and since the works of many historians have become accessible to the public. This "gold vein" has not been exhausted. In particular, the books of Maksim Kovalevskiy and other leading lights of domestic political science await their turn. The fact that now, when we have realized the priority of common human values, the limited assimilation of the entire positive content of Western European social thought is becoming not only useful, but simply necessary, is also indisputable. And we need not only European, but world thought. It is impossible to lay claim to attractiveness without having a breadth of view, an ability to look at oneself and organically re-work other world-outlook and value formulations.

All this is true. However, a question arises: is it possible to bring the country out of the crisis, having offered a pieced-together ideology, made up of thoughts chosen from everywhere, for its leadership? Eclecticism is always grows poorly in its original native soil, the more so one like ours, with its diversity and powerful historic tradition. Borrowing can mean enrichment, not pathetic copying and dilution, but only on the condition that one preserves the "root of the ideological tree," that has grown deeply into native soil, nourished by native juices. Only the idea of socialism can be such a root for our country.

It is not easy to consider this theme now, when the world of socialism is undergoing a critical moment, since it is easy to take the random turn of events for an axial line, or a certain transient feature for a long-term law. However, this is what is surprising: precisely today, when socialism is undergoing a profound crisis, scientists, politicians and broad society throughout the world are striving to answer the question of what exactly is a society, what are its principles and its future?

Perhaps, it is easier to study this in the debate with an outstanding theoretician such as Z. Brezhinsky. His last work, *"The Great Collapse. Birth and Death of Communism in the 20th Century,"* was interpreted everywhere as a requiem for our system, as a unique antithesis to the *"Communist Manifesto."*

Brezhinsky tries to prove that Soviet socialism was a detrimental undertaking from the very start, a kind of huge deception and self-deception. In his words, many intellectuals succumbed to the fascination of the socialist idea, supposedly embodied in the USSR, not recognizing the bloody meaning of Stalinist despotism. Feuchtwanger and Shaw, Rolland and Txakyr praised our system as the highest achievement of civilization.

A great deal here is pure truth. People inherently mislead themselves in the direction of the ruling spiritual currents of an era, and geniuses in this sense are no exception. However, while agreeing with Brezhinsky when he names the names of the deceived and the deceiving, one suddenly catches oneself thinking: "Yet, after all, obvious arguments existed that forced people to believe in the idea of socialism. So it is not a legend, but an extremely complex, contradictory state of society, when it splits and exists in two forms, increasingly divergent from each other.

Brezhinsky was concerned with only one thing: proving the complete failure of the communist experiment. Therefore, he ignores the genuine, real life of the socialist idea and focuses attention entirely on its other, distorted, although maybe just as natural existence. This prevents one from properly evaluating the past, and in particular, from understanding: why does this system find supporters to this day, and a great many? However, even worse, such an approach prevents one from properly assessing the prospects, for it buries the socialist idea along with traditional, dogmatic communism and thus, at the same time, perestroika, based on the idea of renovating socialism, is doomed to failure.

It is easy to see that Brezhinsky extolled Stalin in approximately the same way that Hugo in his day, not actually wanting to do so, extolled Napoleon. Really, one would have to be a great con artist to deceive the literally entire flower of the intelligentsia of one's day. Of course, this is foolishness. These people were really not so easily swayed as to fall onto the hook of the communist autocrat. There is no doubt that they clearly saw the difficulties and weak spots, the poverty of life in the countryside and villages, the grayness of the cities, the absence of many conveniences that had been ordinary for European countries since almost the Middle Ages: even their roads, which were made in Europe by the Romans. Yet in the 1930s, ours were in a rudimentary state. Indeed, even now this problem is still unsolved.

What is the matter? Why, for all that, did they not only praise the soviets for one or another "individual" achievement, but sincerely admired everything seen? They saw in the life of our society at that time the obviously weak and, in many ways, awkward start of a new socialist civilization.

The answer is obvious. First, one must recall that capitalism at that historic time had suffered a profound crisis. Famous intellectual guests had visited us from Germany, where fascism raged; from India—all still on

their knees and dreaming of throwing off the chains of colonialism, like the peoples on the borders of the former Russian Empire who gained freedom after October; from the United States, which had just experienced a crisis unprecedented in strength, when it was still far from clear what Roosevelt's "New Deal" would lead to, etc. Moreover, Europe was gripped with a fear of an approaching military tornado, the distinct thunder of which had already shaken the entire atmosphere of international life. In this situation, many thinking people of the time saw the Red Army as a force, capable of protecting civilization from fascism and, in the final account, they were right.

The then admiration of Soviet experience is not only explained by a concern for the world and security. For supporters of various trends of socialist thought (Shaw and Wells), it was a unique laboratory. Kindergartens, vacation homes for workers, free hospitals, social security for all employees... It is understandable that, observing these upshoots of socialism, our friends allowed themselves to close their eyes to that which exasperated them or did not work out. Rather, they considered the negative aspects of Soviet reality to be inevitable satellites of a great social experiment in a relatively backwards country. Of course, one could say, they did not have enough perspicacity to study the processes of the 1930s, not to mention the earlier flouting of legality, the ominous signs of degeneration of the democratic meaning originally contained in the Soviet system. However, what is far more important, in this case they were right: the socialist forms tested in our laboratory were transplanted to Western soil through the efforts of the workers' and liberal reform movements and, in many ways, helped to create the viable model of which Brezhinsky is so proud today.

In short, we reject the view that cancels any positive content in the development of the USSR in the post-October period. The country's contribution to world civilization, related to its taking the path of socialism, is tremendous and incomparable to anything else. We were the first, and no one can take this from us.

Hence, another, more far-reaching conclusion: the incorrectness of asserting the collapse of socialism. There is no more widespread delusion than to take a certain transient state as eternal. Crisis is inherent in any phenomenon: only corpses are without crises. Any living organism is periodically subject to diseases. Precisely this is now occurring with the idea of socialism which, we should realize, is undergoing a difficult time.

Now we come, perhaps, to the most important thing, the substitution of the concepts on which Brezhinsky's whole idea is built. He explains the whole 20th century as the century of rise and fall of communism. Meanwhile, there has not been so much as even a trace of communism. For all that the goal of building a communist society was promoted, even narrow-minded dogmatists were not so bold as to claim that we had created said

society: in extreme cases, they spoke of individual upshoots of communism, and this is nothing more than a euphemism.

Brezhnevsky would have been entirely correct, if he had limited himself to claiming that the experience of the 20th century did not give sufficient proof of the feasibility of communism. Or rather, it indicated how much more complex in practice the task of creating such a society turned out to be, than it had seemed. Or even: it revealed the utopian nature of communist teachings. In other words, there are grounds for saying that communism was and for now still remains an unproven hypothesis. However, this does not mean that one should inseparably link socialism to it and send them in a clump it to the bottom as some kind of grandiose political adventure. Although, incidentally, it would be unfair to reproach the American political scientist for this: after all, the Marxists themselves gave grounds for this interpretation, having totally connected socialism to communism and having declared socialist society to be the first phase of a communist one.

Meanwhile, there is no proof that the principles of communist production and consumption are rooted in the conditions for development of modern society. At the same time, there are a great many arguments in favor of the fact that the socialist idea is rooted in these conditions. The tempestuous events of the 1980s both in the USSR, as well as in Eastern European countries, attests to a collapse not of the idea itself, but only of the attempts to "build" socialism without democracy, without a market, etc.

Perhaps, the reader will be curious to discover that in a personal conversation with Brezhnevsky (he visited Moscow last year), I presented these arguments to him and he basically agreed with them, having stressed that he had identified the idea of communism with the idea of socialism "not by ill intention," but simply because to this day this is the tradition of political thinking in the West, and once again reasonably noted the "two phases" of a united communist society.

While objecting to the basic theme, in renovating ideology we should now switch the basic emphasis to the socialist idea. First, it is sufficiently full-blooded and capacious to include the entire set of modern needs and aspirations—both of the individual person, as well as the social communities of entire countries, of all mankind on the whole. Precisely this idea, more than any other, answers the main appeal of modern times: the internationalization or globalization of all social life. The preservation of self-existence and self-manageability of separate communities or states during a simultaneous integration and unification of forces for solving global problems is the formula of the new political thinking, without which mankind is in no condition to pass through the dangerous phase of the nuclear age.

It is especially important that socialism remain the guiding idea of the workers' movement. Workers and the

working people will never reject the need to have social guarantees of employment, access to education, sufficient material support, social security, participation in decision-making, etc. The fact that practically all social classes and strata of the population can find their place in the system of democratic, humane socialism, which permits all forms of life activity, excluding the exploitation of another's labor, and not in the primitive, but in the contemporary interpretation, is also important. (It seems, in theory we are beginning to consider it incorrect to consider all hired labor in a private enterprise exploitation.)

In summarizing the results, we should repeat that the idea of socialism, now definitively established by world experience, is an entirely real sphere for present-day life. It is another question that a still very long search for the optimum models of a socialist social order and world structure continues and will, apparently, continue. Returning to the idea of communism, we will say the following: from the fact that it has turned out to be unfeasible at this stage of social development, for the time being only a hypothesis, it by no means follows that this utopia should once and for all be expunged from man's intellectual arsenal. Moreover, it is impossible to do this, since the idea of communism is nothing other than the highest level of the concept of social justice. As such, it is always included in social consciousness. It has played and, in all likelihood, will in the future play an important role in the development of mankind's spiritual and moral culture.

Communism is an inescapable dream. Yet, many dreams, not unlike Icarus' utopian dream of flight, often come true as the result of man's creative activity.

III.

In practice, the idea of socialism may be an acceptable basis for social progress in our time, but only after we subject our entire set of concepts about society to revolutionary transformation. The first act of this transformation should be to return to the Marxist theory of its "legitimate" place in the sum total of social knowledge.

One of the basic causes of the extraordinary hypertrophy of ideology lies precisely in the fact that the exact same thing happened to Marxism before this. This was expressed most clearly in the classification of the social sciences. Sociology and political science here simply ceased to exist, yet the epithet "Marxist" mandatorily preceded all other social disciplines.

Darwin accomplished a breakthrough in biology, but no one decided to re-name all biology as Darwinology, thereby ignoring or simply discarding the contribution of many outstanding scientists in this sector of knowledge. Galileo and Newton accomplished breakthroughs in physics, but it does not follow that we should name this science Galileo-Newtonism and reduce its content to the discoveries of two geniuses. Why should we call all social studies Marxism and Leninism, and not just the teaching of these two thinkers?

I will let myself be sidetracked: even in my youth, studying the works of Marx and Engels and admiring their profound and brilliant style, I caught myself thinking: Is it not strange that C. Fourier and R. Owen, who lived at almost the same time, were called utopians, O. Comte and M. Weber were not recognized by us as scientists at all, yet everything that the founders of Marxism wrote was declared strictly and solely scientific? I think many others have also asked themselves this question. However, only today are we publicly, while not denigrating the greatness of the creators of Marxism, saying that there was a share, and no small one, of utopian views in their works.

On the other hand, it would also be fair to remove the artificial denigration to which other thinkers were subjected. This is one of the functions of ideology: if it elevates one, then it must hide the others in shadows. Meanwhile, there were men no less brilliant than Marx on the horizon of social thought. This can be said of Plato and Aristotle, Locke and Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. Yet, after all, the highest praise permitted of them was reduced to the fact that there were "individual conjectures" in the works of these thinkers. They were given the right to exist in our consciousness only to the extent to and in the manner in which they had the honor to be mentioned by the classics of Marxism. This has unbelievably impoverished our social thinking, has made it one-dimensional, and has deprived us of an entire wealth of knowledge, the need to possess which V.I. Lenin noted. Fairness also requires the confession that turning Marxist and later, Leninist theory too, into a variant of "holy writ" did not occur at the fault of their creators. They themselves respectfully referred to their great predecessors and did not at all claim the sole possession of truth.

Renovation of our ideology requires, for a start, the restoration of the full rights of all traditional scientific disciplines, of their, if you wish, sovereignty. We should have sociology, history, political economy, political science, philosophy, and other sciences, and in each of them, naturally, a section reflecting the contribution of Marxism.

The definition of this place in socialist theory has special significance. Socialism is the richest "tree of knowledge," and it is at the very least self-sufficient to cut off all its other branches, except the Marxist one, as being unscientific. Consequently, we must reject the identification of the concept of "scientific socialism" with Marxism. The latter is only one of the socialist teachings and should be viewed in that context. This will not only be correct from the viewpoint of the strictly scientific, but also will break us of looking at the classics as though they were icons. It is a question of a revolution in our theoretical consciousness, without which we will never free ourselves from the fetters of dogmatism and mechanical interpretation. Honestly, no one would approve of such a revolution more than Marx, Engels and Lenin—these are the titans of free thinking!

I want to stress that all this does not mean belittling the role of Marxism and the Leninist legacy in our theoretical consciousness: they are one of the peak achievements of human reason, an irreplaceable tool for comprehending the essence of social processes and the search for paths in the future. The tremendous, inestimable contribution of Marxist methodology in studying the laws of social development is recognized not only here, but throughout the world. Many trends of modern philosophical and political thought acknowledge their connection to them, calling themselves neo-Marxist or post-Marxist. V.I. Lenin remains, unquestionably, the most authoritative political thinker of the 20th century.

No matter how important it is to study the problems of the genesis of socialist thought or the extent of continuity and renovation of its basic principles, all this nonetheless predominantly concerns the methodological aspect of the matter. Today, the definition of socialism itself has decisive significance. If we examine the debate that has unfolded right now in our press and science, in the countries of Eastern Europe, and even throughout the left-wing forces, its center is held by precisely this, it would seem, very simple question: what is meant by a socialist system?

The confusion can be explained. In the 19th century, when the idea of socialism was only theoretical in nature, it was possible without great risk to give it any form, to fashion from pure imagination, like a sculptor from an obedient piece of clay. What is it like for us now, with 72 years of experience behind us in implementing this idea with all its real and imaginary achievements, its successes and failures? The main point is that this mind-boggling task must be solved along the burning track of powerful criticism through word and action, which literally dared the model of a social system, that had been considered socialist, and in fact declared it dead-end and even anti-socialist.

Evidently, we should start with this strange antonym. The fact is that most writers who have sharply and justly criticized the Stalinist model generally do not consider it socialist. They exclaim with indignation that it is impossible to consider socialist any arrangement of society and the state, where the requirement of liberalism and the legitimacy of power is not ensured, where authoritarian or even totalitarian dictators trample civil rights, and where the worker is alienated from the means of production and receives a somewhat smaller part of the product produced by him than under capitalist industry, etc..

On these grounds, a categorical verdict is made: this is not socialism. Then it is explained that "real" or "true" socialism should mandatorily presume such and such.

It must immediately be said that this system of opinions, unquestionably, has a right to exist, but only in the event that we look at the matter not from a realistic, but from a romantic viewpoint, and we see socialist society not as

a reality, growing out of objective conditions of social life, but an idea that we wish to assert in reality or foist upon it.

The merits of Marx and Engels lie in the fact that they avoided (or at least tried to avoid) an idealistic treatment of socialism, and were the first to consider it the result of natural development of production forces and production relations, a natural stage of elevation of civilization. Of course, the founders of Marxism and especially, their followers did not guard against idealization, which was later multiplied a thousandfold by ideologization.

Therefore, the first thing that we must do now is cleanse the concept of socialism from all subsequent distortions and, relying on the practical experience of nearly one-fourth of mankind in the course of half a century, speak of it not as we would like to see it, but as it has become in reality. However, in this respect, once again we need not erase the concept from our heads, but try to see it in history. Essentially, we have the right to say that to this day two models of the socialist system have more or less been clearly designated (leaving aside the question that in each country societies of one type may have and mandatorily have a great number of various specific features). They appeared one after another out of specific circumstances.

The following treatment of this process can be considered more or less commonly recognized: on the threshold of October, V.I. Lenin preceded from the possibility of a relatively fast (up to 10 years) assertion of that which was meant by the principles of communism: complete nationalization of the means of production, the introduction of direct commodity exchange, elimination of the army and police, i.e., the start of the withering of the state, etc. Having very rapidly become convinced of the utopianism of these ideas, he changed his entire view of socialism and, in fact breaking the resistance of his surroundings, insisted on practical implementation of a new model of socialism, the basic elements of which were the NEP and integration into the world economy, instead of requisitioning farm produce and national autarchy, peaceful coexistence instead of exporting revolution, and federation instead of "autonomization."

It seems to me that the struggle precisely surrounding the last question has finally exhausted its forces, undermined by illness. Two cardinal problems still remained unsolved, which required the then restructuring. First, this is democratization of the political system, the rejection of the monopoly position of the Communist Party, as an uncontrolled power which therefore will inevitably degenerate into totalitarian power. Second, it is a reverse "re-orientation" of ideology from communism to socialism.

It goes without saying, there is no direct proof that Lenin intended to solve these two problems as well, but it is possible to assume that he would have recognized their necessity, since the entire logic of his "revolution in a revolution" demanded it. A political genius such as V.I.

Lenin could not help but understand that the NEP, peaceful coexistence, and all other elements of his new course would inevitably be threatened, if they did not find guarantees in a democratic political system and rational ideology conforming to the realities of the time.

It is not worth wasting time on the characteristics of the Stalinist model, since our press is full of critical descriptions of it. What is important is this fact: is this model considered socialist or not? I share the opinion of those who answer this question affirmatively. One can argue which concept is more accurate—state socialism, barracks, totalitarian, nondemocratic, or even feudal, but there can be no doubt that in terms of many important features it is a question of a socialist society.

This is proven by no means only by the presence of public ownership—it is now sufficiently clear that no forms of ownership whatsoever are contra-indicated for a socialist system, including private, if it is set under certain social conditions and is not be used as the basic instrument for exploitation of hired labor; not by virtue of the planned nature of the economy—the possibility and even necessity of combining a market with the plan is now generally recognized; not by the dictatorship of the proletariat—now the opinion rules is that socialism is inconceivable without democracy, that it, like any democratic society, needs free competition of political forces, control over power, etc.

The growth of socialization of the social system, it seems to me, can be objectively measured on the following scale: by the predominance of organization over spontaneity, equality over freedom, management over self-management, collective over individual. The model that had existed here not only meets all these indicators: its basic flaw lies precisely in the colossal preponderance of the common over the private. Here, all rational proportions are violated. Perhaps, the most important lesson drawn by us and all mankind from the great socialist experiment lies in the need to **observe the strict degree of "socialization" of society**. As is now clear, our hyper-socialization canceled not only the negative elements, related to the nature of capital, but also infringed on a foundation of human life. Precisely this led to its failure.

At the same time, it would be the greatest folly to identify the failure of the model with the unfeasibility of the socialist idea itself. It is folly because many elements of social knowledge, which appeared after October and were retained to this day, have already entered the fund of world civilization, and the relative flourishing of the democratic states of the West, based both on liberal, as well as on socialist values, would have been inconceivable without them. Moreover, this relates to the entire contemporary world order, in which the socialist principle is finding multifaceted powerful manifestation.

Moreover, it is worth asking again: why is all modern social thought, not just left-wing, but also right, trying to study socialism and reveal its strong and weak sides? It

seems, because the majority of people, including politicians and scientists, consciously or subconsciously understand the **significance of socialism for the fate of civilization**. After all, there is a very simple conclusion here: the greater the number of the popular masses, the more actively it is involved in politics (an obvious phenomenon of our time) the more clear it becomes that the social system and world structure of society in the 21st century will be dictated by the majority, and this is also the predominance of the combined over the private.

I was and will remain convinced that a **socialist fate** and none other awaits mankind. It is a question only of what should and should not be done, so that the socialist era advances civilization further and does not shove it toward the past. In other words, as opposed to the primitively dogmatic and idealistic concept of socialism as a "golden age of universal well-being," we must treat it as a historically stipulated stage of social development and focus attention on strengthening the strong aspects inherent in it and weakening its negative properties.

One can endlessly argue about what is socialism, and what is not. However, a socialist society will be such as it emerges from the crucible of world history, from purposeful and spontaneous actions of all peoples. From this point of view, we inevitably arrive at the conclusion: we should reject attempts to measure our every step by the criterion of its socialist nature. Entirely specific, vital benefits and values, not abstract socialism as a kind of heaven on earth, should be set at the center of our ideology, which would be able to serve as a real basis for a political program and find lively response among the masses.

While thinking about the transformations that our ideology should undergo, in order to fully restore its attractiveness, one concludes the need to combine the two approaches. On the one hand, we must radically renovate our ideological property, having discarded everything that does not find confirmation and has compromised itself, preserving its positive core. On the other, we must shape a new ideology, organically combining national and international motives, the values of socialist thought with the values of liberalism and democracy.

Work in this direction is already proceeding, to which the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress attests. The sooner it is implemented, the greater the chances for the success of perestroika. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Economic Crisis. Where Is the Way Out?

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[Article by Konstantin Grigoryevich Kagalovskiy, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The economy and society are in a state of profound crisis. Why has this flared up precisely now and not, for instance, 10-20 years earlier or later? What is the specific nature of the current economic situation?

A command economy has two important features. The first is its inflexibility. We live in a changing world. Any economic system is forced constantly to adapt to the appearance of new technologies, the relative exhaustion of natural resources that can be successfully brought into circulation under existing methods of utilization, pollution of the surrounding environment, demographic shifts, reassessment of social values and needs, etc. However, the effectiveness of adaptation and the time needed for this are different in different systems. The administrative-command system is devoid of mechanisms for adapting to changes, like the market and political institutions that exist in a democratic society. Therefore, the mechanism for adaptation in an administrative-command economy is less flexible than in any market economy. Its level of disproportion, in which adaptation mechanisms are included, is close to the critical point, after which crisis phenomena appear in the economy and society. Only the realization of near danger encourages the redistribution of resources, changing the structure of production, and other actions needed to eliminate disproportions. Therefore, an administrative-command economy develops less smoothly than a market economy. It more strongly "skids on the turns." As practice shows, it is more difficult for it to cope with an energetic crisis, such as pollution of the surrounding environment, or to convert to a new stage of scientific and technical revolution.

The second feature of the administrative-command economy is its extremely low and, in recent times, apparently, even negative productivity, in which the growth of resources involved in economic circulation exceeds the growth of national income.

However, these properties have always distinguished the Soviet economy and their simple verification by no means explains the current situation. What has changed today? Under conditions in which it is practically impossible to maintaining the economy's existing pattern of functioning at the expense of involving additional production resources in circulation, the threat of an absolute reduction in national income is created.

Inflexibility not only complicates the adaptation of a command economy to changes, but also leads to the cyclical nature of its development. Indignation, having once appeared, does not quiet down and sparks new fluctuations after awhile. So, a massive influx of basic capital, if not renovated on time during its service life, leads at the same time to the extensive wearing-out and breakdown of production capacities. Roughly this process is happening in our economy right now. In the 1950s-1960s, rapid economic growth was observed in the USSR and a tempestuous process of urbanization occurred (since the 1960s, the share of urban residents

has exceeded 50 percent). These processes were accompanied by the intensive creation of production infrastructures (transportation, waterways, sewer systems, heating systems, etc.). The massive influx of production infrastructure projects at the same time led to a wave-like growth in their physical deterioration, a reduction in communications reliability, and an increased number of accidents and catastrophes. Apparently, the situation has been growing even worse in recent years.

A similar situation has taken shape in industry. The last 5-year period with a significant growth in the introduction of production capacities was the 8th (1966-1970), and later its stabilization and absolute reduction began. The massive influx of equipment in the 1960s has become an equally massive obsolescence of it today.

Matters are no better in the sociocultural sphere. True, the cycles here are not related to the introduction and obsolescence of inventories, but to management according to critical values of disproportions. The cyclical nature of sociocultural development is clearly reflected in the dynamics of the share of expenditures for its maintenance in all state budget outlays.

As a result of reducing the share of state budget outlays for a sphere, which seems of less priority to the country's leadership, the situation in it gradually worsens. After a certain limit, the situation becomes so aggravated that the country's leadership finds that it has become unacceptable (the population realizes this much earlier). Resources are then redistributed in favor of this sphere, and the situation is more or less normalized. However, as attention switches to other "holes," the share of expenditures for this sphere once again decreases. The cycle is repeated again. The first sharp drop in the share of state outlays for sociocultural measures was caused by the "great breakthrough" (industrialization, collectivization, and the measures related to them). In 1928-1932, their share in the budget decreased by 10 percentage points. Later, after being smoothly increased, it approached the 1928-1929 levels in 1937. The next reduction was the sharp drop during the war years (in 1941-1942, expenditures for sociocultural measures were reduced absolutely). Since 1943, their share began to increase again and reached the 1932 level in 1944-1945. A new reduction began in 1948 and continued until 1953. After Stalin's death, the share of budget outlays for sociocultural measures went up again. During 1955-1965, it increased by 10 points. Yet in the late 1960s, it once again began to gradually drop (by 5 points from 1965 to 1985). By 1985, the share of outlays for education and health care was less than the 1940 level.

At the 27th CPSU Congress, the residual principle of allocating resources for social needs was sharply criticized. Nonetheless, during 1986-1988, the share of expenditures for sociocultural measures in practice did not change (its grew by 0.4 points). Today, regardless of the government's announcement regarding a social reorientation, the share of these outlays in 1990 will

increase only by 3.4 points and will make up 34.8 percent of all budget outlays. This is roughly the same as in 1977.

The former control according to critical values was combined with a goal-oriented economic policy. An example of this is forced industrialization. Today, the situation has changed. Under conditions of reduction in growth rates for the national income, the volume of available resources that could be used for economic maneuvering is decreasing. Moreover, the reduction of the center's power strengthens the real economic power of departments, whose expansion leads to the freezing of investment resources in ambitious projects. As a result, state economic policy increasingly becomes a flow of immediate decisions to eliminate critical disproportions. This is the method of working "from disaster to disaster." An economic problem has little chance of being resolved, as long as there is no threat of catastrophe. However, the longer it is neglected, the more time and resources will be needed to solve it.

This is the material basis for the economic crisis. Natural disproportions are inseparably linked to the commodity-monetary imbalance. A deficit and inflation are permanent satellites of the administrative-command economy, which has internal "built-in" mechanisms that constantly reproduce them. However, at various stages of our country's socioeconomic development, these processes have proceeded with a varying degree of intensity. Right now, they have been sharply aggravated. The expansion of enterprise independence under conditions of "partial" economic reform, in which most enterprises have a monopoly in their own market and lack real competition, has strengthened their aspiration to unload a cheap assortment of goods and raise prices. Despite increased prices, the shortage of goods is increasing. Whereas previously, as a rule, only different types of one or another commodity (for example, certain brands of tape players or refrigerators) were scarce, now whole groups of commodities are disappearing from the market.

We have already described the crisis in the financial sphere (KOMMUNIST, No 11, 1988). While not repeating ourselves, let us note the main point: the situation in this area continues to worsen. The state internal debt at the beginning of 1990 was about 400 billion rubles—more than 40 percent of the annual volume of the gross national product (GNP). The share of the budget deficit in the GNP increased by 6.9 percent in 1987 to 9.9 percent in 1989.

Recently, society has gradually begun to realize the significance of the financial problems which were previously kept in the shadows. Nonetheless, neither the realization of the seriousness of the situation, nor the decisions being made by the government are keeping pace with the rapidly deteriorating financial situation. The measures planned for 1990 are obviously inadequate. The budget deficit is planned for a size of 70 billion rubles, or 7.4 percent of the GNP. True, 50 billion

rubles were named for 1990 in the USSR Law on the State Budget, but in our opinion this does not conform to reality. The articles on "Treasury Obligations, Distributed Among the Population" and "State Special-Purpose Loans" (each about 5 billion rubles), written in the income part of the budget, cannot be included among the budget's real incomes. They are ways to conceal its deficit. Apparently, the USSR Ministry of Finances thus "found" 10 billion rubles, falling short in fulfilling the task raised by the state—reducing the deficit by a factor of 2 compared to the original 1989 plan, by which it was 120 billion rubles.

Our present problems did not appear overnight. The current state of the economy is the result of its development over many decades. Here, three stages can be singled out. The first is the Stalinist version of the administrative-command economy. The second stage relates to the start of its decay. The rejection of terrorist methods of management and a shift in the priorities of economic policy occurs at this time. In the economy, a structural shift was implemented: resources were redistributed in favor of the production of consumer goods. Here, this includes "Malenkov's program" and, in the European socialist countries, halting the policy of forced industrialization. The review of priorities in economic policy occurred without changing the economic mechanism. In society, an illusion reigned that it was enough just to make new, "correct" decisions, strictly pursue their implementation, and everything will be all right.

The gradual realization of the fundamental flaws in the administrative-command economic mechanism prepared the ground for the third stage. It is characterized by the implementation of internally contradictory, incomplete market reforms and subsequent recentralization.

The reforms were limited to attempts to create a commodity market. The problem of forming markets for money, labor and capital was usually not considered seriously. Therefore, even given the relative success of such reforms, there were no radical improvements. The system of direct bureaucratic management was replaced by a system of indirect bureaucratic management. The directive establishment of natural planned indicators for the amount and variety of produced output and for the resources being used was replaced by management with the aid of financial indicators. A market did not appear, and the economic mechanism remained administrative-command. Only the form of these "commands" changed. The only result of such transformations, if they are successful, could be a certain improvement in the consumer market situation and increased freedom of consumer choice.

The stage under consideration has a number of specific features. Above all, this includes the weakening of the center's real power and its ability to control the economy. The basic cause is the increasing complexity of the modern economy (differentiation of production, increase and complication of economic ties, etc.). The

decrease in rotation of cadres in the "stagnant" period and a decline in the work ethic, which encompassed all levels of management and industry, also influenced the decrease in controllability. With the weakening of central power, the power of lower links in the hierarchical system increases: ministries, regions, and large enterprises. Subordination relations between higher and lower links in the hierarchy turns into trade relations among them.

With the appearance of self-management elements and the expanded independence of territorial bodies of power, the leading component of the administrative-command mechanism, the "nomenclature" system, the designation of administrative cadres from above, begins to spin its wheels.

At this stage, as a rule, foreign indebtedness in "hard" currency, which all the Eastern European countries encountered, increases inordinately. Thanks to favorable market prices for Soviet raw material exports, we managed to avoid this problem for a long time. Now, the situation has changed. When the remaining resources are exhausted, the receipt of funds from abroad is the last source for additional funds that can be brought into economic circulation. If the economic system remains unproductive, increased debt is inevitable. Aggravation of the economic situation forces us to resort to credit regardless of our desire. It is symptomatic that today any fault in the economy, be it a crisis in loading commodities for transport, in which loading and unloading equipment is immediately purchased, or meeting the demands of striking miners, is overcome with the help of imports.

People, consciously or unconsciously, put definite demands on society for the satisfaction of their economic, social and political interests. Their expectations regarding the satisfaction of a specific interest are characterized not by number, but by a value interval. The upper range of this interval is the desirable, but by no means mandatory level. The middle part is that which a person considers normal and fair. The lower part is the level of satisfaction of need which is already insufficient, but still tolerable. Unacceptable values are lower still.

If a worker believes the level of satisfaction of his needs is normal, he works with the usual degree of intensity. His economic and political behavior remain traditional. Untraditional behavior (reduced labor intensity, negligent attitude toward work, release from a given enterprise, appeals to higher economic and political bodies, turning to the press for help, participation in rallies, demonstrations and strikes, membership in non-ruling political organizations) begins when the person feels that his interests are being harmed.

Social tension appears when the expectations and actual satisfaction of economic, social, and political interests of many people do not coincide. A person's behavior depends on his degree of tolerance. If it is high, behavior remains within the traditional framework. If it is low, he

strives to eliminate or reduce the tension that has appeared. In this case, his actions, as a rule, do not fall into traditional forms.

The absence of significant (mass) manifestations of untraditional forms of economic and political behavior characterizes a state of socioeconomic balance in society, which can be guaranteed by various methods. Under Stalin, the main method was terror, supplemented by a well-developed agitation and propaganda system. Later, it began substituting for the system of distribution and redistribution of goods, with the help of which the state provided all participants in social production with an acceptable level of satisfaction of their social expectations. Now, it is becoming ever more difficult to achieve this. The use of "monetary illusion"—paying incomes according to social expectations without the production, needed to supply the quantity of goods and services—can only give a temporary effect.

However, this is not the point. We must keep in mind that, while the level of the population's standard of living grows relatively smoothly or even stagnates, social expectations are developing in leaps and bounds. After a certain limit, the growth in the actual level of satisfaction of needs evokes a progressive growth in expectations. This is related to the internal laws of development of human needs. The example of other countries or regions, raising the standard of living for individual social groups, promises by the leadership, and other factors also influence the growth of expectations.

The inertia of growth in the standard of living during the 1950s-1960s and the weakening of the "iron curtain" contributed to an increase in social expectations. As everyone knows, they are relatively higher for the urban population, than for rural. As a result, migration to the cities and the increase in urban population (from 1959 to 1989, its share increased by 18 percent) raised the average level of social expectations. Apparently, a turning point occurred in people's awareness in the 1970s, when a significant part of the population began to feel the need, at least in a material respect, to live according to the norms of civilized society. However, at the same time, these changes in social awareness were of a concealed nature. Perestroyka, glasnost and democratization brought this process to light. Moreover, the sharp changes in society, as well as the leadership's promises (for example, to provide a separate apartment for each family by the year 2000) have not only encouraged hopes for a better life, but have also raised the requirements for this better life. The social expectations of all population groups and strata have gone sharply upward. A "revolution of expectations" has occurred in the country.

Under these conditions, the struggle for redistribution of an already-divided national income intensifies, leading to a growth of inflation. In the process of establishing a civic society, each social group realizes its own economic interests, dictating its demands for the standard and quality of living: earnings, supply of consumer goods,

social security, housing, ecological state of the environment, etc. However, social expectations can only be met through material and financial resources. Meanwhile, the sum of requirements substantially exceeds the economy's real possibilities. At the same time, various social groups have learned to stand up for their interests.

Extreme forms of untraditional behavior, particularly strikes, are becoming an ordinary phenomenon, a social norm. According to USSR Goskomstat data, throughout the country as a result of strikes on the average about 30,000 people per day did not work in 1989, and during the September strikes—100,000 people. Meeting the demands of one social group means redistributing resources in its favor, at the expense of others which, in turn, pressuring the state, also strive to get their share. A vicious circle is formed. If a struggle occurs for increased earnings, sooner or later its overall increase upsets the balance in the consumer market. Shortages intensify and prices increase. Inflation "eats up" the increase in nominal incomes, and the process begins anew.

Open inflation (growth of prices) and suppressed (shortages) can substitute for each other within certain limits. The population's preference for increased prices or for the alternative intensified shortages is determined by how painfully it perceives the cost of the latter: time spent standing in line, searching for necessary goods, etc. Feeling the severity of a shortage is related to the cultural level of the population, especially to its assessment of free time. As the cultural level rises, the costs of shortages are perceived ever more painfully, making raising prices more acceptable. However, today most of the population prefers lines and ration-card distribution to an increase in prices. This is not obvious and is not always a conscious social choice. With the development of democratic institutions, it is becoming obvious. When the Supreme Soviet approves a state budget with a multibillion ruble deficit, it is choosing between the inflationary consequences of a budget deficit or the alternative economic decisions. The same thing occurred when the Supreme Soviet prohibited raising prices for scarce goods.

Attempts are periodically made to accelerate economic growth, and the investment process is becoming cyclical. Investment cycles—acceleration and declines in investment activity—to this day have occurred here in a relatively softened form. Decisions are periodically made, restricting capital investments, preserving some construction sites and cutting back on unfinished construction. Now for the first time, an absolute reduction in capital investments is outlined: their planned volume in 1990 is 96 percent of the plan for the previous year.

Latent lobbying mechanisms have a considerable influence on the economic and political decisions made by higher bodies of power. Strong and influential economic organizations (as a rule, these are the middle level of management—sectorial ministries) are obtaining decisions profitable for themselves and wasteful for society.

The economic crisis and increase in social tension are changing behavior stereotypes. Under crisis conditions, it deviates from the ordinary, approximately as the behavior of an ill and irritated person differs from that of a healthy, calm person. Rush demand is a typical example of the new stereotypes.

One result of the change in behavior is the reduced level of tolerance. As a consequence of the growth in social expectations and exhaustion of the "credit of trust," the population expects only "Pareto-style optimal" decisions from the country's leadership, such that something will improve as a result, but not a single parameter of standard of living can grow worse. The population no longer wants to make "temporary" sacrifices. A time of dead-end situations and unresolved problems, which cannot be solved without harming someone's interests, has now arrived. However, he whose interests are harmed is sufficiently strong to not permit this. Consider, for example, the situation with prices. It is clear to everyone that the current prices are in no way appropriate. It is also clear that the existing price system paralyzes the economic reform. However, it is nonetheless becoming evident that changing prices and the price-setting system in practice means raising them. Yet, under present-day conditions this is fraught with unpredictable consequences. A paradoxical situation takes shape: it is impossible to change them, but they also cannot remain the same.

The shift in behavior stereotypes sharply decreases society's adaptability to changes in external conditions. An excessively cold winter and breakdowns in the heat supply, or a summer drought, a crop failure, or disruptions in the supply of basic food products may provoke a social outburst. Obviously, it is impossible to predict them. It is only possible to assert that the probability of their appearance is sharply increasing in this phase of society's development.

An economic crisis cannot occur painlessly. Nonetheless, we should not fall into excessive pessimism. A crisis precedes improvement. It advances in proportion to the accumulation of positive prerequisites, which appear with a growth in the social maturity of all population strata.

Under the influence of aggravated economic processes and the favorable influence of democratization, an evolution of the concepts reigning in economic thinking is taking place. The orientation toward the direct planning model and the search for new ways to improve the plan are being replaced by an understanding of the need for market relations. At first, the market was seen only as a commodity market with a predominantly centralized distribution of investments. Later, an understanding of the role of the market for labor and capital and of the need for pluralism in forms of ownership appeared. The evolution of the population's concept of desirable forms of organization of economic life is beginning. Egalitarian directives are gradually weakening and tolerance toward

differentiated incomes and the second economy is increasing. The idea of a market economy is becoming increasingly popular.

In the purely theoretical respect, developing an economic policy for getting out of the crisis is not very difficult. It is well-known package of steps to restrict inflation and balance the market: liberalization of prices, strict limitation of the population's incomes, a sharp increase in the percentage rate for credit, reduction of state budget outlays, including by eliminating subsidized burdens, freezing capital investments, convertibility of the national currency, elimination of monopolistic structures, and so forth. The new government of the Republic of Poland began such a program on 1 January 1990. This country's experience is unquestionably of interest to us. A specific feature of the Polish program is the taking of an entire set of steps in a compressed time period. Therefore, it is sometimes called "shock therapy." As of January 1990, 90 percent of the prices in Poland became free: they are set by the market on the basis of supply and demand. At the same time, prices increased sharply, after which state control was preserved, primarily for energy (coal, gas, electrical power). A sharp jump in prices occurred. In the first week of January, they grew by 60 percent. Prices later stabilized and began to decrease for many goods. In particular, the prices for meat and other food items have dropped. A turn-about has occurred in the market. Lines have disappeared and the store shelves are filled with goods. The long-awaited market balancing has started.

The increase in prices was combined with a strict policy of income restriction. In January, the growth index for earnings was limited to 30 percent of the growth in inflation (in February—20 percent).

By sharply cutting subsidies, state budget outlays were substantially decreased. In Poland, these are mainly subsidies for food products and the coal industry. The small deficit that remained (2.5 percent of budget outlays) is being financed by issuing bonds. Percentage rates are not paid on these bonds, but their cost increases in accordance with the growth of inflation. They are a convenient form of savings, insured against devaluation.

Restriction of the monetary mass was achieved by sharply increasing the percentage rates. The National Bank's prime rate for credit was established in January at a level of 36 percent per month. The growth of percentage rates caused a noticeable reduction in the demand for credit and even an aspiration to pay back credit obtained earlier. The population's inclination to save increased. As a result, the credit market was successfully balanced and, for the first time, money became "expensive." A high percentage on investments and balance in the market have restored trust in the national currency. The "flight from the zloty" has been left in the past.

This "shock therapy" has led to a substantial decrease in the standard of living. The population's consumption,

according to various estimates, has decreased by 20-25 percent. Nonetheless, the people have accepted this policy. Strikes and other forms of social protest are not occurring in practice.

It is still early to make final conclusions. Many difficulties still await the Polish reform. It remains to implement the structural reorganization of the economy, to struggle against inevitably appearing unemployment, etc. Nonetheless, the success of "shock therapy" at the beginning of the year once again confirms the possibility of halting inflation and achieving market balance. This experience has also shown that in order for such a policy to succeed, the population's unconditional support of its government is needed.

Is our country ready to carry out a policy of economic stabilization and radical market reform? Is there a political force, capable of putting it into practice? Will the population be able to endure the inevitable difficulties in implementing it? It is hard to answer these questions. However, one thing is clear: the sooner society is ready to accept a reform, the more rapidly the economic crisis will end, and the less profound and painful it will be. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda". "Kommunist", 1990.

Constitutional Supervision—A Step to a Rule-of-Law State

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[Text] The establishment of a USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision—however much criticism this fact may have triggered on the part of several republics, under the conditions of stressed relations among nationalities—is an event of essential significance from the viewpoint of strengthening legality in the country and the establishment of a rule-of-law state. This is directly related to resolving the matter of the separation of powers, the definitive implementation of which is as yet to be achieved. The main thing is that the new authority will be an important element in the mechanism for the defense of human rights in the USSR.

These problems were discussed in a talk between our correspondent Yu. Kudryavtsev; and L. Baranov, chief of administration, USSR Prosecutor's Office; Professor B. Lazarev, deputy chairman of the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision, doctor of juridical sciences; and Yu. Reshetov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Administration for International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, doctor of juridical sciences.

Kudryavtsev: The first question which legitimately arises is that of the jurisdictional correlation between the new authority—the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision—and the traditional one, the prosecutor's office.

Lazarev: In no way does the Committee in this case replace the overall supervision exercised by the prosecutor's office. The prosecutor's supervision extends to standard and nonstandard legal acts promulgated by the state management authorities other than the USSR Council of Ministers and the councils of ministers of individual republics. The new authority has its own area of action, clearly demarcated with the USSR Law on Constitutional Supervision: the laws and other standard acts of the supreme authorities and administrations of the Union and of Union republics, with a view to their consistency with the constitution and the laws of the USSR. Prosecutorial supervision does not apply above the level of acts of ministries, state committees and departments. Furthermore, there are different reactions to illegal acts and their consequences. In a number of cases a negative conclusion issued by the Committee invalidates the results of a defective legal act. If such an act violates basic human rights and freedoms, as codified in the USSR Constitution and in international pacts, it becomes totally invalid the moment the Committee has issued its negative conclusion. All of these are rules which confirm the major powers granted to the Committee. Furthermore, unlike the prosecutor's office, the Committee does not deal with complaints filed by citizens. Court decisions remain outside its jurisdiction. Finally, we have the right to issue conclusions on the consistency between the USSR Constitution and not only laws but also draft bills. This makes the Committee something of a high legal expert council.

Baranov: The creation of the Committee and the passing of the Law on Constitutional Supervision are landmarks in the history of our political and legal systems. The supervisory functions of the prosecutor's office apply only to some governmental authorities. Acts passed by legislative authorities and the government are not supervised by the prosecutor's office. They may include some which restrict the constitutional rights of citizens. However, the prosecutors have no right to demand their revocation. The creation of the Committee also makes the supreme authorities subject to supervision and thus, finally, it becomes possible fully to ensure the supremacy of the constitution and the law and to implement one of the fundamental principles of a rule-of-law state: equalize the rights and obligations of the state and the citizens.

Therefore, the functions of the new Committee and the prosecutorial authorities do not conflict but rather complement each other. Furthermore, the Committee has the right to check on the legality of the guidelines issued by the USSR Supreme Court and the standard acts issued by the USSR Prosecutor General without, naturally, interfering in the administration of justice.

Reshetov: I concur with the view that the creation of this Committee is a revolutionary step. It leads us to a rule-of-law state and to the separation of powers, although the Law on Constitutional Supervision has, in my viewpoint, also weak points. We should have probably granted the Committee the right to check on the

consistency between our constitution and USSR laws, on the one hand, and, on the other, the international legal acts ratified by the Soviet Union and all international obligations of the country, above all pacts dealing with human rights. The constitution must meet contemporary international standards.

Lazarev: The address of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs to the UN secretary general stated that we accept the primacy of international over domestic law. This, obviously, will be stipulated in the new constitution as well. The enumeration of human rights and freedoms contained in international pacts must be included in it.

Reshetov: I am concerned with a broader problem as well. A strange situation has developed: the Constitutional Supervision Committee was established under the conditions stipulated in an essentially inoperative constitution. You are speaking of the need to ensure the supremacy of the constitution in our legal system. The question would be, what constitution precisely?

Kudryavtsev: I share Yuriy Aleksandrovich's doubt. The text of the oath which will be taken by the Committee members states that they pledge to observe the USSR Constitution and nothing else. Yet the old Fundamental Law is indeed becoming part of the past while there is no new one as yet. What are we to do?

Lazarev: I do not entirely agree with such an assessment of the 1977 Constitution or with the conclusion that the new Committee has, for the time being, nothing to supervise.

To begin with, nearly one-third of the articles in the Fundamental Law have already been updated. This applies to the supreme authorities of state power, the administration of the USSR and the individual republics, the local soviets, the electoral system, the courts and the prosecution, etc. Second, the new Committee will temporarily not supervise the consistency between the constitution and the laws of Union republics and the USSR Constitution and the Union laws until amendments and supplements have been introduced in the part of the USSR Constitution which deals with the national-state structure. Finally, the USSR Supreme Soviet was instructed by the Congress to pass laws on ownership, the land, the local economy and self-management, which will be enacted even if some of the articles they contain conflict with the constitution. As you can see, a great deal is being done not to obstruct the legal reform. Furthermore, the USSR Supreme Soviet has allowed republics which are converting to regional cost accounting to invalidate a number of stipulations of Union legislation should they be obstructing such a conversion. Consequently, the Union legislator himself creates conditions for Soviet legislation, including the constitutional one, to have during the transitional period the necessary flexibility and not to obstruct perestroika. Unfortunately, some republics adopted a packet of laws inconsistent with the Soviet Constitution and Soviet laws. Yet at the time of the conclusion of the 1922 Union

Treaty the republics agreed on the direct application of Union laws throughout the territory of the USSR and the primacy of the USSR Constitution and laws over republic constitutions and laws.

Baranov: Naturally, at a first glance it would seem logical to start by dismantling the old legal system and drafting a new Soviet Constitution, and only then, on its basis, to organize supervision over the new legislation. The difficulty, however, is that we must, so to say, repair the juridical superstructure as we go on. There is no time to wait. It is clear that misses and lack of coordination in such a case are inevitable. We shall probably have to make improvements also in the Law on Constitutional Supervision. I believe, however, that even now the Committee has a job to do particularly in the area of relations among nationalities, the country's national-state structure, etc.

Reshetov: Yes, many articles in the Fundamental Law have been updated. However, this does not apply to those which I consider of essential importance to us. The most important section on individual rights and freedoms, i.e., on the foundations of our democracy, is not entirely consistent with international requirements in this area. I believe that the Committee should actively influence the process of drafting the new constitution and should begin precisely with the section dealing with rights and freedoms.

There were no international standards in this area at the time that the classical constitutional acts were being promulgated, such as the American Bill of Rights. Furthermore, such standards developed precisely under the influence of classical Western constitutions and, subsequently, the decrees of the October Revolution. Currently some 70 basic standard stipulations dealing with human rights exist on the international level; each one of them could be divided into more specific standards. The most important of them should be incorporated in our new constitution. Incidentally, the constitutions of a number of countries include stipulations found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, or else refer to it.

Lazarev: A good new constitution cannot be formulated quickly. One must be realistic. It is no accident that currently two commissions are at work: one (headed by A.I. Lukyanov) deals with making urgent amendments to the current Fundamental Law; the second (headed by M.S. Gorbachev) must draft the text of the new constitution. The activities of the first have already provided us a foundation for supervisory work.

As to the section on the rights and freedoms of the 1977 USSR Constitution, the authors of its text included at that time virtually all the rights found in international pacts and other documents, with the exception of the freedom of movement and the choice of place of residence, leaving and returning to the USSR, the right to a healthy environment and the right to life.

Reshetov: What of it? It has so many stipulations as a result of which some of the rights and freedoms are simply reduced to naught.

Lazarev: I agree, the part dealing with rights and freedoms is far from perfect. However, even those rights and freedoms must be reliably protected.

Reshetov: Furthermore, as Lev Petrovich already mentioned, rights are being frequently violated via a large number of legal standard acts and there is no mechanism for checking their consistency with international standards. In Article 10, the Law on Constitutional Supervision is limited to the need for consistency between the constitution and our international obligations which are subject to ratification. This, however, is obviously insufficient! Our entire internal legislation must be consistent with the high international standards and the international obligations assumed by the USSR.

Baranov: As we know, the Soviet Union is a signatory to the Vienna Accords. A new legislation is being drafted on leaving and returning, the passport system, etc. This precisely is the process of making our legislation more consistent with our international obligations.

Reshetov: It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the fact that the Soviet leadership has extended the Vienna stipulations which, incidentally, are juridically nonbinding, to our country. Frequently, when such international obligations are assumed, the West does not change anything in its internal legislation, sometimes keeping in the books the most archaic and simply inadmissible standards. See for yourselves: in the United States, many states have broadened and made stricter the use of the death penalty; it can be administered through several methods. Even minors could be sentenced to death, something not found in a single European country. In a number of Western countries the freedom of conscience is understood only as the right to profess a religion but by no means as the freedom to be an atheist, and so on. Therefore, in a number of areas we are clearly ahead of the others.

Nonetheless, dozens and hundreds of laws which threaten the observance of human rights are being ignored. What is the use, for example, of the 1988 Regulation on Psychiatric Help or the existence of several different regulations allowing the use of firearms? All too frequently the rights of the individual, including the right to life and freedom, depend on ministerial instructions. I believe that the Committee should demand the elimination of anything that has long become obsolete.

Baranov: Let us not forget that there also are secret resolutions which violate human rights. Some of them were passed by the USSR Council of Ministers and the governments of the individual republics; such acts, as I pointed out, remain outside the reach of the prosecutor's office. In this case we are helpless. The creation of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision radically changes the situation.

Lazarev: Yes, we have a number of governmental acts and all kinds of instructions, including confidential ones, concerning citizens' rights and obligations. Why? In addition to everything else, the reason is that for decades the USSR Supreme Soviet met for 3 or 4 days twice or even once a year. That is why in the economic area we have essentially not laws but resolutions of the Council of Ministers and ministerial acts. Now, as N.I. Ryzhkov pointed out at the USSR Supreme Soviet Session, the Council of Ministers would be pleased for legislation be made where it should—by the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies—particularly on matters directly pertaining to human rights. Personally, I favor the broadened activeness of legislative authorities and a drastic curtailing of law-making by management authorities, even including the government. Its laws will be supervised by the new Committee. Departmental instructions will fall under the supervision of the prosecutor's office. As to resolutions passed by local soviets, which also frequently violate civil rights, we are currently discussing the question of including them within the jurisdiction of republic constitutional supervision authorities.

As to our international obligations, according to the law, in submitting them for ratification or approval, the Committee must make sure that they are consistent with our constitution. In this connection, it seems to me that in drafting international treaties, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs should consult with the Ministry of Justice, in order to be familiar in advance with the changes which will have to be made in the country's domestic legislation. Conversely, in the formulation of our standard acts pertaining to the rights, freedoms and obligations of man, the drafters should seek the advice of specialists in international affairs.

Reshetov: You are absolutely right. In this connection as well we cannot ignore the situation which prevailed in our country for many years. We would ratify an international accord or convention, proudly proclaiming that such ratification would not require changes in our domestic legislation. This was not because we had poorly studied it in its entirety but for an entirely different reason: allegedly, as it were, our legislation was the best in the world, the most advanced and most progressive. Incidentally, that is precisely the way we acted after the ratification of the international pacts on human rights in 1973.

Such lack of self-criticism led subsequently to some falsehoods, to put it mildly. For example, in ratifying the pacts, the departments thought long and hard on the concept of the right to strike, for this would have meant acknowledging the existence of this right in our country as well. Yet, by the irony of fate, this right had been included in one of the pacts, with the active participation of the socialist countries. At that time, however, we thought as follows: in their countries, in the West, let there be strikes; in the USSR there are none, for under socialism there simply can be no strikes. However, history followed its own course and our miners put

everything in its proper place. This is a clear example of the way erroneous ideological stereotypes hindered the broad understanding of problems pertaining to human rights.

Lazarev: Obviously, the new Soviet Constitution should codify a general standard concerning the correlation between our domestic rights and international pacts and treaties which we have signed and ratified.

Reshetov: The primacy of international over domestic law, which you mentioned, could also include its direct domestic impact, something existing in a number of countries. We have laws, for example, concerning labor legislation, which conflict with the conventions of the International Labor Organization. Had the standards of international law been directly applied on Soviet territory, it would have been easier to eliminate violations of human rights and, therefore, to advance faster toward a rule-of-law state.

Baranov: Obviously, there are a number of laws which could be described as universal, which exceed the framework of any individual country and its sociopolitical system. They include, above all, stipulations on individual rights and freedoms. Such standards could, obviously, have a direct effect in all countries, including the USSR. Therefore, I am impressed by the idea formulated by Yuriy Aleksandrovich. However, in this case much is obstructed by some remaining concepts relative to our theory of the state and law, which also should be put in order.

Kudryavtsev: It seems to me that today it is rather large numbers of private individuals, so to say, who point out to the Committee the unconstitutionality of a law, resolution or instruction. How would you act in such a case? Here is another question. It is no secret that, closely observing the work of the Congress of People's Deputies, many of us critically evaluate some of the laws and resolutions it has passed. Meanwhile, it is essentially the Law on Constitutional Supervision that puts the resolutions of the congress outside your jurisdiction. Let us assume that the congress passes an unconstitutional act. What will happen then?

Lazarev: Although the Committee has still not been established, it is receiving frequent mail. Essentially, the mail consists of complaints about specific problems. The Committee, as I pointed out, has no power to deal with complaints. Nonetheless, since the people will be writing anyway, it would be expedient, in my view, to set up within it a group which would not only answer letters but also select among them the most worthwhile from the viewpoint of our tasks, along with signals and suggestions. In general, in accordance with the law, if citizens find discrepancies between a law or any other standard act and the USSR Constitution, supervised by the Committee, they should turn to the authority which has been officially entrusted with submitting this matter to the Committee.

As to the second part of your question, matters here are more complicated. The Committee has the right to determine the consistency between the USSR Constitution and the laws, even those passed by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. However, any adverse conclusion formulated by the Committee does not invalidate the law. At the present stage of perestroika this, apparently, is correct: today we must not tie the hands of the supreme legislator. However, if we follow the classical variant of the separation of powers, constitutional supervision should be fully extended also to the laws passed by the supreme legislative authority.

Already now, however, the Committee has the right, in its conclusion, to direct the attention of the congress to the inconsistency between any given resolution it has passed and the USSR Constitution. Furthermore, it has the right to initiate legislation, i.e., it could suggest to the congress and to the Supreme Soviet a draft bill which would fill a gap in legislation or would correct an existing situation.

Reshetov: Let me point out that despite the entire significance of such intensive law-making, aimed at renovating our society, the deputies should not be hasty in this matter. Our new legislators will also require the expert aid of jurists. They must be well informed of processes occurring in the country and abroad. Many draft laws have simply not "become ripe enough." This applies to land and ownership. Nonetheless, public opinion is putting pressure on the legislator, urging him from within and from abroad. However, one must not yield to emotional pressure!

Baranov: The question of the quality of the laws is essential. Belatedly passed or substandard laws could cause tremendous harm to the country and to perestroika. By undermining the stability of the legislation, sooner or later such laws will have to be abrogated or amended. An untimely law leads to swinging from one extreme to another; this triggers uncertainty and stress in the public, which prevents the solution of many pressing problems.

Lazarev: The legislation as well as many other areas reflect the level of our political and legal standards. In his time, Lunacharskiy recalled that people who tried to draft legislative acts without the help of jurists would submit drafts to Vladimir Ilich who would dismiss us, demanding that we complete our drafts with the help of an experienced jurist, asking whether we had experienced codifiers. Meanwhile, Lunacharskiy wrote, at first we could simply not understand him. I am convinced that Lenin's appeal of "measuring seven times" in passing a law should be observed today as well.

Kudryavtsev: The Law on Constitutional Supervision stipulates a procedure for blocking the effect of unconstitutional acts, proclaiming them invalid, and so on. How realistic are such stipulations, particularly in the light of some of the laws which were passed in the Baltic republics and which, as I see it, are being applied there,

ignoring various resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the USSR? The more so, if we take into consideration that the republics will set up their own supervisory authorities.

Lazarev: Despite the creation of a Union committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium retains the right to indicate to republics disparities between the country's Fundamental Law and Union laws it may pass. On numerous occasions it has already done this of late, issuing corresponding resolutions. However, in frequent cases there have been no clear reactions to such resolutions on the part of the republics. I hope that the situation will change with the updating of the constitutional standards on the national-governmental structure. Currently numerous attempts are being made to interpret various principles of our governmental structure as though it is a confederation. Here is a characteristic example. Some Union republics have stipulated in their laws that Union laws can be valid on their territory only after their ratification by the supreme soviet presidium of the given republic. Ratification, however, is an institution dealing with international law! How can one ask for the ratification of a Union law within a federative state? The law applies directly to the entire Soviet territory. Or else, here is another example: some republics deem it possible subsequently to block the effect of a Union law they have ratified if, in their opinion, it is violating their rights and interests. However, the USSR has an area of absolute competence, within which it frequently promulgates laws. The nonrecognition of such laws is the equivalent of the nonrecognition of the USSR! The consistency between the laws promulgated by the members of the Federation and the laws of the Federation itself is a mandatory prerequisite, one of the basic postulates of any federative country. Furthermore, today it has become fashionable to abuse the "Union center" as being some kind of notoriously bureaucratic force. Yet this applies above all to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, which represents all republics.

Reshetov: The insufficient influence of Union authorities in such situations may be explained, in my view, precisely by the fact that today we are mainly relying on our obsolete constitution whereas we should rely on international treaties which stand above republic and Union laws, including fundamental ones. I am a member of the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which analyzes reports submitted by the governments of countries participating in this convention, from the viewpoint of its stipulated laws. I came across the requirement of residency, similar to the one recently promulgated in the Baltic republics, in only one or two underdeveloped countries and even there it was much milder. That is the standpoint one should adopt in discussions with our colleagues in the Baltic republics.

Lazarev: Let me continue with your thought in its purely juridical aspect, so to say. In ratifying international pacts and conventions on human rights, the USSR assumes the obligation of ensuring their enactment throughout the territory of our state and, therefore, within each of its

republics. Otherwise the international obligation assumed by the USSR will prove to be juridically invalid on some part of its territory, which is inadmissible from the standpoint of international law.

Kudryavtsev: Any legal obligation must stipulate also a responsibility for its violation. This is axiomatic in jurisprudence. Otherwise it would remain a mere declaration. If we are discussing improvements in contractual relations among members of a federation, all reciprocal obligations must be ensured through equally reciprocal sanctions in cases of their violation. We are considering the creation of a rule-of-law state, a rule-of-law society.

Lazarev: It is not a question of sending troops into an "unruly" republic!

Kudryavtsev: There should not be even a question of this! Obviously, there should be political and economic sanctions and it is that same Committee for Constitutional Supervision that should define them. I realize that this is an unpleasant topic but one should look at things realistically, for you and I are jurists.

Reshetov: Once again international law could be a proper guide in our internal Union affairs. When comrades from the Baltic republics assume that merely their wish would suffice for any all-Union enterprise to become republic property, they should remember above all the fact that in international law there is the institution of legal continuity. This means that one must define in detail what precisely today belongs to whom on a given territory. On an international scale such work is currently being done by the UN Commission on International Law. Legal continuity covers a wide range of problems concerning the rights and obligations of the cessionary state in terms of governmental property, debts, archives, and so on. Understanding all this will not be an easy matter.

Baranov: Nonetheless, obviously, we need an additional legal mechanism for ensuring uniformity of basic legislative stipulations throughout the territory of the Federation. In my view, sooner or later matters will reach the constitutional court. We need an authority which will not only have powers but also a mechanism for the mandatory implementation of its resolutions. This could fully apply to the institution of legal continuity as well as to many standards of international, including humanitarian, law.

Currently, we are at a stage at which we must, above all, gain practical experience in solving many and sometimes unexpected problems of ensuring uniformity between Union and republic laws. We are bound to realize the need for a constitutional court. Incidentally, Lithuania has already considered a draft resolution on creating such an authority within the republic.

Lazarev: Already now the Committee for Constitutional Supervision is able to perform some of the functions of a constitutional court: the law gives it the right to settle

disputes. True, the juridical force of such of its resolutions is not stipulated. If we speak of a constitutional court, its decisions must be mandatory, like a sentence or a resolution in a civil case. Considering that there is no clear legal stipulation to this effect, the Committee could, for instance, ask the parties to the conflict whether they assume the obligation of implementing its resolution, and if such is the case, the latter becomes legally more effective.

Reshetov: In my view, from the viewpoint of the general theory of law, the very fact that a given act has been declared unconstitutional already bears an element of obligation; it is a kind of verdict although not entailing any special penalty.

Kudryavtsev: This depends on the level of the political and legal standards of those affected by this verdict. In some cases, it is even a moral obligation to act. In other, sanctions and coercion become necessary. Unfortunately, our life is rich in examples of the second sort.

Nonetheless, if we are aspiring to achieve the classical model of the separation of powers, where is the supreme judicial authority which would determine the constitutionality of laws passed by the higher legislative authority? Is one of our readers, a jurist, not right by suggesting that we apply to the fullest extent constitutional supervision of laws passed by the congress of people's deputies, while adopting and amending the constitution only through referendums?

Baranov: Wherever the law operates mainly not as a system of prohibitions or penalties but as an autonomous social value, acknowledging that a law is illegal would suffice. Under our circumstances, naturally, this is not enough. That is why I also am in favor of broadening the range of powers of the Committee, extending such rights to laws passed by the Congress of People's Deputies and making its resolutions more mandatory. This would constitute a substantial step toward the separation of powers.

Lazarev: As to making constitutional amendments and the use of referendums, a great deal must be closely studied in this area, including the practices of other countries. I believe that we must not entirely deprive the parliament of the possibility of influencing the content of the constitution, and hold referendums any time that an amendment is needed. This would free the Committee from the need to issue conclusions on draft bills. We have to this effect the Ministry of Justice and the State-Legal Department of the Supreme Soviet Secretariat, as well as the Deputy Committee for Legislation. Otherwise, our committee would find itself with its hands tied in terms of supervising the laws, for it would be difficult for it to "oppose" a law which it had approved of earlier.

Reshetov: So far I have not come across convincing arguments to oppose the application of the classical theory of the separation of powers in our country. From the viewpoint of practical expedience, I believe that a

constitutional court is necessary and that it should deal with all acts without exception, promulgated by the authorities, including judicial resolutions on specific cases, should they pertain to the constitution. This becomes even more valid from the viewpoint of international law, for the state bears the international legal responsibility for improper actions on the part of any of its authorities, including the judiciary.

Lazarev: Justice must be administered only by the court and, in my view, it is inadmissible to interfere in this area. In order to appeal judicial decisions there are higher instances. One could create, as some jurists have suggested, a court of appeals. However, other authorities should not interfere in the judicial system.

The theory of the separation of powers includes a great deal of useful things which could be applied in our country. We are now solving the question of instituting in the USSR the position of president. This, however, should not affect the role of the legislative authorities, and the presidential acts (obviously, ukases) should fall within the area of constitutional supervision.

Reshetov: Naturally, the theory of the separation of power should not be brought to a point of absurdity, in such a way that one authority would totally block the activities of other. However, in the final account we cannot do without control by a supreme constitutional supervisory authority over judicial decisions. Otherwise, one nice day, we would be facing something similar to what is today taking place, in an exaggerated form, in the United States, in which a lower court has passed a sentence on a citizen of a neighboring sovereign country, someone who is not simply a citizen but the head of that state. I am referring to the case of General Noriega. It was on the basis of this resolution that a military invasion was launched against another country! This situation conflicts with the basic standards of international law, regardless of the reasons (the need to fight drug smuggling, etc.) that may have been cited.

Baranov: You are right. However, in our country as well, of late, one can hear with increasing frequency that in the struggle against organized crime, corruption, and so on, all means are good. This is a very dangerous trend! Let us hope that together with the prosecutor's office and other law enforcement authorities, the Committee for Constitutional Supervision will play a major role in strengthening legality and the establishment of a rule-of-law state in our country. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

The Content of the Form

905B00181 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 4,
Mar 90 (signed to press 22 Feb 90) pp 77-81

[Mail review by O. Latsis]

[Text] The editors have received a large number of responses to A. Ulyukayev's article "The New Story of the Pied Piper of Hamelin" (KOMMUNIST No 18, 1989),

with which we opened our new rubric "Marginal Notes." Following are two letters which reflect the most typical opinions of the readers.

For some time now the press has been mentioning the name of Professor A. Sergeyev, as opposing the process of economic reform implemented by the government and, allegedly, finding it impossible to express openly his view, which is being suppressed.

Yet on 22 December, at 9:15, the radio broadcast a talk between A. Salutskiy and the respected professor.

What did we find out?

Allegedly, we are being suppressed by capitalism, represented by the "second economy," and, it turns out, we have a reliable way for getting rid of it: the fiscal reform. This would be a panacea for all ills. In order for the capitalists not to defraud the government, they must declare their income. "For God's sake..." the professor exclaims, having found a solution.

What about the opposing arguments? They were not even mentioned by Salutskiy or Sergeyev. Yet these two are bound to know something which has been repeatedly stated by the opponents of the fiscal reform. Is this an honest way to conduct a discussion, particularly on the part of Salutskiy, who was the moderator?

I remember the 1947 reform. We were informed of it on the eve of the reform, when the savings banks were already closed. I almost lost my some 2,000 rubles which I had saved from the aid paid to my orphaned son. Now, however, for more than 2 years there has been talk about the forthcoming reform. Have those "shady" millionaires not been able so far to stash away their millions instead of keeping them in savings banks like the poor sinners that we are? Juggling figures is no argument.

What will happen? Both money and energy will be wasted on reform and the results will become the joke of those same "capitalists."

Justifiably, A. Sergeyev and others like him remind us of the old story of the Pied Piper of Hamelin, as convincingly described in A. Ulyukayev's article in KOMMUNIST No 18, 1989.

Respectfully yours, B.M. Volodarskaya, CPSU member since 1932, Moscow

Here is another response.

I was simply dumbfounded after reading A. Ulyukayev's article "The New Story of the Pied Piper of Hamelin." Was this possible? KOMMUNIST is the organ of the CPSU Central Committee and should be in the vanguard of perestroyka and set the example in how to conduct theoretical debates. The way I understood it from the preface to the article, the journal abstains from commenting on articles published in other journals in order to avoid being accused of tendentiousness and of using

clout, i.e., from ethical considerations. Are such considerations not being applied toward A. Sergeyev? Or else do the editors believe that the tone maintained in this article is a model of ethical behavior? I am not an economist and I will not undertake to judge the article in terms of its content. I did not read all the points raised by Sergeyev. I am familiar with some of them. I realize that his viewpoint does not coincide with the so-called "radical" and "interregional" viewpoints. So what? Could it be that in our difficult time of transition the grounds have already been prepared for asserting the adoption of a specific course? Should it be only commodity, private property, rivalry or individualism? It is quite noticeable that other viewpoints are not being mentioned in the press. In any case, opposing viewpoints are considered undesirable by the press. Pluralism and options within the framework of a single trend? We did have such a "pluralism" in the past as well: we had a struggle between "good" and "better," for instance. Where is here the word of true Marxism, which it is high time to promote and develop as a science? We must not dig into corrupt dogmas but truly develop this science. For decades we failed to develop it, for we cannot seriously consider as the development of Marxism the "masterpieces" consisting of a few lines which were gifted to us by the latest "outstanding theoretician" and "true Leninist," and which subsequently were described as the "theory of..." (developed socialism, shall we say, or the socialist way of life). Could we blame Marxism for the fact that it was debased, corrupted and distorted? In order for a science to develop, scientists must engage in research and creative thinking, make painstaking efforts, and provide analyses, arguments and proofs. However, all of this is possible when there is a real variety of viewpoints. Many more years shall have to pass before we can develop a true standard of debates. An example of this should be provided by strong authorities, as of now. One of the reasons for the stagnation in our social science was the peremptory tone, and the shrill and loose criticism. We were skillful enough to deal with dissidents, to boo them in our collectives and in the press. During the period of Stalinism political reprisals were applied as well. Anything that was alive and talented was killed, destroyed and uprooted. Talent in itself is not a mandate to tell the truth. One could go wrong with talent. The entire tonality in Ulyukayev's article is disrespectful and rude, although somewhat witty. Why use the example of the "Pied Piper of Hamelin," when it would be better to speak of "half-nuns and half-loose women?" We are well-familiar with all of this from our past. How many people were defeated by this tone, forcing them to keep silent or become sincerely mistaken and subsequently to "adjust."

We knew from the old classics that the world reaches universal human values through class awareness. It is hard to believe that a class-oriented view on the development of mankind has totally lost its strength. It is hard to believe that there are people who are indifferent to unemployment, inflation, greater poverty or greater wealth, who do not think in class terms.

More than ever before today we must thoroughly analyze everything and quite responsibly approach the assertion of true pluralism of opinions, which means comradeship and exigency, trust, respect and substantiation of arguments. If we are concerned only with how to hurt one another more painfully, we would quickly raise a new cohort of people who are "stable" and "viable" i.e., time servers with sharp elbows; it is not in vain that some people today assert that mankind can be classified into "strong" and "weak." In other words, the natural condition would be for the strong to prevail and for the weak to obey.

Is this our ideal today? Please take my opinion into consideration. I have never been a member of the "apparatus." I am a sincere enemy of Stalinism. I do not share N. Andreyeva's "principles." I have been a party member since 1948.

I would like to believe that we shall not see the time when communists are declared outside the law.

Galina Petrovna Kozar, labor veteran, 63, Dnepropetrovsk.

The majority of letter writers, who are dissatisfied with A. Ulyukayev's notes, do not refute the accuracy of the content of the article. They object to the form, which is indeed unusual for a theoretical journal. We shall return to this matter later. Let us begin with the few objections to the essence of the article.

In an extensive and sympathetic letter, M.I. Bubnov, candidate of historical sciences, Moscow, claims that A. Ulyukayev "accuses his opponent without proof," and that "instead of containing a scientific analysis, the article is full of emotional exclamations." Had such been truly the case, it would have been very sad. However, in this case emotional characterizations are provided not **instead of but together with** figures and arguments. Suffice it to put side-by-side the publications of the two opponents and compare the amount of work either one has invested in the study of the question of the fiscal reform. In support of his ideas, A. Sergeyev uses a few peremptory sentences, as though addressing a public meeting, and quotes two or three figures without indicating their source, or else figures based on his own estimates. A. Ulyukayev provides on this matter some three journal pages of analysis, including dozens of figures, indicating their sources and the source of the data used by A. Sergeyev, and analyzes the reliability of such sources.

It is true that A. Ulyukayev discusses in detail only this idea and does not analyze in detail other concepts formulated in Sergeyev's article. Both had its reasons. Why was it important to describe in detail the groundlessness of the suggested reform option? To begin with, because this was the only relatively new idea found in Sergeyev's publications. Second, because Sergeyev himself put the idea of fiscal reform in the center of a noisy propaganda campaign, making it an instrument of political struggle oriented toward populist slogans. Third, if

millions of honest holders of savings accounts would think that the government could follow Sergeyev's advice (luckily, the government rejects it), it is not excluded that panic would break out, which would create another dangerous threat to our already collapsed market.

As to why Ulyukayev (together with the editors) neglects to make as detailed an analysis of the remaining claims formulated by Sergeyev, this is a different matter. Were we absolutely correct? This is worth thinking about. No, we see no reason to doubt the substantiation of the scientific and political stance assumed by the journal on the basic problems of the economic reform, perestroika of all social life and the development of socialism. However, we also cannot ignore the views of the readers on whether or not we presented this position adequately.

We possibly underestimated the influence which the impetuous march of perestroika is having on social awareness. It has deprived scientists of the necessary time to settle the old disputes. For 60 years the supporters of the Stalinist anticommodity concept sang the same tune, with no scientific refutations, not because no such refutations existed but because people thinking differently were not allowed to participate in an equal discussion: they were either executed or simply kept their mouths shut. After April 1985 the unscientific concept crumbled not under the blows of science: it was refuted by life itself, by the fact of the failure of the anticommodity economic system which had been applied for 6 decades. There is no time to argue against the concept which A. Sergeyev is now trying to revive, for it has been necessary to look for solutions to pressing practical economic problems. It may have also seemed that there was nothing to argue about: the failure of the Talmudic political economy was obvious. Some of the letters indicate, however, that this is by no means the case: readers in different professions and of different age groups are not uniformly informed. The editors drew some conclusions. In issue No 1 of the journal for 1990 they published the article "The Second Economy: For a Realistic Assessment," which dealt with some problems of contemporary economic practices. Those interested in debates on economic history may find useful the article which is being drafted by the editors on the social essence of economic policy in the postwar years, part of which was the 1947 monetary reform, well remembered by the senior generation. We shall also try to provide an analysis of V.I. Lenin's economic views from the viewpoint of today's public debates.

We shall mention here a few typical facts of the recent past. While attacking Academicians A. Aganbegyan and T. Zaslavskaya, A. Sergeyev and A. Salutskiy are well-aware of the fact that as late as 1983 the party apparatus of the time of stagnation "rewarded" them for defending scientific truth by reprimanding them. In attacking G. Lisichkin in their works, A. Sergeyev and A. Salutskiy perhaps do not recall precisely the number of times that Lisichkin was deprived of work, not allowed to defend his dissertation and to publish his works. The very fact

that this now USSR people's deputy was persecuted by the Academy of Sciences for a period of 20 years for his principle-minded defense of the ideas of reform in the 1960s cannot be unfamiliar to them.

In this light, it is obvious that there is no need to answer in detail to authors of letters who believed that Sergeyev and his supporters are prevented from speaking out. Their views not only enjoyed the monopoly of propaganda for decades, but to this day are absolutely free. Ulyukayev's notes list four publications by Sergeyev, printed in editions substantially bigger than those of KOMMUNIST. However, this is only the small part. Let us add the big public meetings, television, radio appearances, and the rostrum of the All-Union Practical Science Conference.

Well, this is normal and is not a topic for complaining. The fact that Sergeyev is being extensively published and thus misleads the readers with the help of an elementary substitution of concepts is not the problem. One of those who believe him is Comrade Kulikov from Saratov, who angrily writes us: "Take into consideration the opinion of an ordinary person." We read: "Urged to 'earn,' they are earning. They charge us from 2,500 to 3,000 rubles for installing a telephone set and as much as 10,000 rubles for authorization for an apartment. The alcohol and drug businesses are generating even greater income. Are you encouraging such earnings?"

The fact that A. Ulyukayev does not claim anything of the sort is clear to anyone who has read his notes: he defends precisely the possibility to earn and not to steal. It is much more interesting, however, to determine what precisely does A. Sergeyev, whose logic has been trustingly repeated by our reader, claim? Initially, Sergeyev claims something unquestionable: there is theft! This, although painful, is no discovery: while the people are suffering, the thieves are getting richer. Such an analysis of the problem, which affects everyone, instills trust. After that, one can begin to preach one's own ideas: the entire trouble comes from private ownership, i.e., the cooperatives and economists who favor capitalism. These claims, however, are not accompanied by any proof whatsoever, in the hope that the readers will accept them on faith. Let us, nonetheless, try to understand them.

Do bribes have to be paid for having a telephone installed? Yes, these are facts known by many. Does this prove Sergeyev's views and can it be treated in accordance with his prescriptions? Is it cooperatives that install telephones? A telephone can be installed only by the state, by one of the most monopolistic systems in our state—the Ministry of Communications. Bribes are charged for apartments as well. Apartments are, however, also allocated by the state. It is the state that, for the past few years, has provided vodka income to moonshiners. Therefore, who should we fight: the cooperative, as Sergeyev demands, or state monopoly, as Ulyukayev suggests?

"Ulyukayev does not like even income declarations used in the capitalist countries," writes N. Radichuk, a retired teacher from Novovolynsk. Conversely, Sergeyev does not ask for such declarations while Ulyukayev does not reject them. KOMMUNIST has written textually the following: "Yes, the practice of income tax declarations has been adopted by all civilized countries and we should not lag behind them." However, A. Sergeyev calls not for income tax declarations, which are filled annually in the capitalist world and which citizens are required to file. He suggests that statements be filed justifying deposits in our savings accounts. What if a person makes deposits throughout his life not thinking that decades later he would have to justify them? Was he warned that he would have to file a declaration while entrusting his money to the state? Actually, we are familiar with this type of arguments which are included in Ulyukayev's notes as well. Here Sergeyev once again interestingly turns logic upside-down. If, for example, I am asked to shoot a wolf with a fountain pen and I refuse, this does not mean that I am against fountain pens. I simply believe that a fountain pen has a different purpose. Had Sergeyev merely said that an income tax declaration is useful, he would have told the truth. When he promises that with the help of such a simple instrument "several tens of billion rubles" of unearned income will be "cut off," and that this will "sharply reduce the pressure of the monetary mass and improve the situation of the less prosperous population strata," he is telling an obvious lie. Such a difficult problem cannot be solved that easily.

The idea of a monetary reform is being extensively discussed in society. Most of those who become involved in heated discussions on this topic which closely affects everyone are not specialists. Usually they do not analyze definitions and frequently use the concept of "fiscal reform" not in the strict meaning of the term, implying improvements in the entire monetary economy, something which, unquestionably, is very necessary. To be accurate, however, we should also bear in mind that such an improvement would presume taking a long series of steps. They include eliminating the state budget deficit, price-setting and price reform, adoption of a convertible ruble, etc. In this series the fiscal reform, i.e., a regressive exchange of monetary savings of the population, is the step which is the least necessary for the national economy and the most painful for the population. It is an extreme measure. Even in Poland, whose fiscal economy is much more severely disturbed than in our country, such a measure has still not been applied.

In these notes, however, we cannot discuss in detail the expediency of the monetary reform, for this is a separate topic. As to Sergeyev's suggestions, let us mention something else: a discussion must be conducted honestly. If a specialist believes that the state should declare bankruptcy and refuse to honor its debts to the population, let him try to convince the people of the need for sacrifice for the good of the state. Let him acknowledge that only one of two things is possible: either an exchange which would not affect the work income and which cannot

substantially influence the monetary mass, or an exchange which would remove from circulation a substantial amount of money but which would also, unquestionably, confiscate some of the labor savings. Understandably, voicing such a truth at a public meeting would not trigger applause. However, the cultivation of illusions on the possibility of miraculous easy ways is an extremely hazardous occupation.

Finally, we come to Sergeyev's main claim, his effort to describe perestroika as a retreat from socialism and as advancing along the path of capitalism. Once again he starts with an actually accurate statement: The country's economic situation is extremely adverse. Then he rejects the universally accepted diagnosis of the reason for the disease: the domination of administrative economic management methods. Does he offer his own analysis of economic processes or does he refute someone else's? He does neither. He does not consider either real economic processes or decisions and actions on the part of the authorities. He analyzes exclusively the economic views of authors he dislikes. This is done quite originally. He lumps together statements by a great variety of economists, historians, philosophers and sociologists. This includes ideas which were accurate but were not put to practical use and could have influenced the course of development. It also includes unfortunate statements as well as specific suggestions by authors who, on the whole, held accurate views. This includes people who truly have no faith in the potential of the socialist production method. Are those the people who pass laws and who run the economy? The answer is not convincing. For that reason, Sergeyev had to borrow data from the "second economy." For that reason as well, he resorts to questionable and arbitrarily interpreted "assessments" of random results of isolated old surveys, even though there may be universally known, complete, updated and entirely official data (such as on the structure of savings deposits). Finally, this is also the reason for such an exaggerated attention paid to the only real small step taken toward a market economy—the cooperatives. This sector, which has existed for no more than 18 months and which, in terms of the volume of output of consumer goods, has not even reached 2 percent of the overall volume of retail trade in the country, is being kicked from all sides and accused of all sorts of things! It is being blamed also for the second economy, although that economy has been parasitizing at the expense of the state sector decades before the cooperatives were set up.

Sergeyev demands a strengthening of "political guarantees of the socialist direction followed in economic perestroika." He concretizes the idea: "We need a strict planned blocking of private ownership and exploitation, based on the systematic implementation of the prohibition of employing hired labor." So that is the solution: apply a "strict planned prohibition" and expel capitalism from everything. We would like to ask Sergeyev: If capitalism, as he presents it, is so viable that only a "strict blocking" would contain it, while socialism is so weak that only such a "blocking" would save it, why does

he favor socialism? Those who favor the equality of forms of ownership in our country are convinced that in the course of an equal competition socialist ownership will be cleansed from monopoly rot; it will recover and retain its leading positions. Do the people who oppose such competition have faith in the strength of socialism?

Now as to the choice of the form in which Ulyukayev presents his notes.

As V.I. Lenin pointed out, "form is essential" (Lenin included in his summary this conclusion from an extensive discussion included in Hegel's "Science of Logic" (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 29, p 129). In other words, content cannot be separated from form. However, since the content is not disputed, a criticism of the form is justified only if it has been proved that the wrong form has been chosen, that it does not express the content but clashes with it. The author of the notes has abandoned the standard form of a scientific work. Was it only because Sergeyev himself gave him a reason to do so, by frequently replacing scientific arguments with political labels? No, the reason is different. There are concepts which do not require scientific refutation. Physicists have agreed to ignore blueprints for a "perpetual motion machine" without studying them. The same prevails in economics: an author who, let us say, would state that he has mastered the secret of immediately lowering prices in a national economy suffering from a tremendous surplus of money and a severe scarcity of goods, such an author deserves to be deprived of the right to address a gathering of specialists.

However, the problem is that not only specialists take part in economic debates, which is as it should be: one way or another, everyone of us is involved in the economic process and everyone has economic interests. Therefore, under democratic conditions everyone can and must express his view. This enhances even further the responsibility of those whose views are accepted by the masses as the words of a knowledgeable person. There are those who believe in Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Sergeyev. Some of his arguments may be recognized even in speeches at the Congress of People's Deputies. Although his conclusions and concepts have not been supported by single serious scientist or approved by any one scientific organization, they are nonetheless supported by the weight of the printed word, and the attractiveness of an idea which touches everyone and thereby becomes somehow universally acknowledged. Under the conditions of democracy, becoming part of the political arsenal of some speakers, ideas such as these acquired the tangible nature of proven and scientifically tested truths. This is a dangerous illusion, like a drug. Many people fall for it not because they read and thought about the arguments or understood the figures but simply because the propaganda of a miracle is addressed to a natural feeling and simply appeals to the prejudices of an equalitarian mind. In opposing such propaganda scientific and logical conclusions may be necessary but are insufficient, for some of the readers will simply not hear them. They will ignore them and will

not study the heart of the matter. Why are the supporters of the opposite view refused the right, in turn, to appeal to emotions? Let us repeat: not **instead** but **together** with facts and arguments. Laughter is a legitimate weapon in a dispute.

Today we frequently hear appeals to reason, to restrain our emotions. Such appeals may be found in KOMMUNIST as well. However, we are not appealing to people to forget their emotions. What are we asking? First, for feelings, even the most legitimate, not to obscure reason, for in our stressed times this is particularly dangerous. Second, there are people who precisely with the help of skillfully aroused passions try to turn a mass into a crowd. No, our journal does not intend to abandon its usual intonation of calm discussions, which M.I. Bubnov writes about in his letter. Whenever we come across unconscientious methods a dispassionate attitude becomes inappropriate. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

The Humanistic Vector in Science

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[Article by Vladimir Petrovich Zinchenko, doctor of psychological sciences, deputy chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium Center of the Sciences of Man]

[Text] More than a year has passed since the decision was made to create, under auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, an all-Union interdepartmental Center of the Sciences of Man, headed by Academician I.T. Frolov. The center will be publishing the journal CHELOVEK, which will start publication in 1990 (Doctor of Philosophical Sciences B.G. Yudin editor-in-chief); it is setting up the Institute of Man, whose director and organizer will be Doctor of Psychological Sciences V.P. Zinchenko. This center will coordinate work on the basis of a priority program for basic research of the USSR Academy of Sciences "Man, Science, Society." Its main task will be to bring together scientists from different areas, working on this program, above all those who study man in the academic, VUZ and sectorial sciences. The members of the scientific council set up under the center are providing extensive help in this project, which includes not only scientists but also men of culture and the arts.

At the present time 53 scientific research organizations and higher educational institutions, 25 of them of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 16 of the academies of sciences of Union republics, and 12 under the State Education Administration, the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, and other departments are working on the "Man, Science, Society" program. In 1989 the program included,

on a competitive selection basis, 127 projects; this year more than 40 projects will be added.

In April 1989, at a conference in Moscow, a coordination committee of the academies of sciences of the socialist countries on the problem of "Man as the Object of Comprehensive Study" was created. The center is currently drafting a program for joint research together with the House of the Sciences of Man in Paris, UNESCO, a number of American universities, the International Organization for Humanistic Psychology, and others.

The end results of the activities of the center will be the practical contribution which such cooperation, which it organized (and finances) can make in the study of human possibilities under the conditions of the new spiritual and intellectual revolution and in shaping the new political, economic, legal, and sociocultural (including pedagogical) thinking. We must point out that despite the large number of discussions about man, culture and spirituality, a turn toward "facing man" in science, economics, law and education, is being made extremely slowly. This is the effect of the well-organized obstruction mechanism. From this viewpoint the establishment of the center and the target financing of the "man, science, society" program and involving in the implementation of the program professional philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, physiologists, geneticists, engineers and people working in other specialized fields, is of essential significance. This year the center will begin to publish the initial results obtained in the implementation of the program. However, none of this can replace the Institute of Man, the decision for the establishment of which was made more than a year ago. Is it not time to implement this decision, which was received with interest by our public? V.P. Zinchenko's article submits concepts which could fully become the base for the activities of the Institute of Man. The resolution on its establishment should not remain merely a symbolic gesture.

In the period of revolutionary renovation of the country the problem of man and his nature, new living conditions and new links between the individual and society assumes priority. Therefore, it is high time to discuss ways of formulating a unified strategy for the scientific study of man and for the organization of basic comprehensive studies. Such a formulation of the task is determined also by the fact that the study of man has already gone far beyond the range of the specialized sciences and has become a general problem for the entire system of scientific knowledge. The problem of the overall study of man has a rich history behind it.

Nonetheless, the question of why are comprehensive studies in this area necessary not only appears again and again but answering it remains necessary although today we no longer have to prove why systematic studies of nature and outer space are important. When it becomes a question of man we constantly encounter the illusion

that man is a known and understood quantity. Obviously, this illusion is based on a tendency which is difficult to surmount, that of identifying the individual "I" with mankind.

Another argument used in opposing comprehensive studies of man is the following: there are, it is claimed, anthropological, demographic, ethnographic, medical-biological, neurophysiological, psychological, pedagogical, linguistic, ergonomic, sociological, cultural, legal, philosophical and ethical studies of man. Man is being studied in manifestations such as play, communications, learning, work, military, management and other activities. Another particular aspect is the study of human creativity in the scientific, technical and cultural areas; studies are made of the social and individual forms of consciousness. A variety of sciences claim to understand the nature of the human personality, both normal and pathological. Furthermore, man has been studied to such an extent that we know the ways and means of treating a number of diseases and creating artificial organs, not only anatomic-morphological but also functional. Science has no longer simply threatened but has indeed undertaken to model, simulate and technically duplicate man's perceptions, movements, specific actions, memory and, finally, intelligence.

In other words, body and soul have become the subjects of the science of man along with spirit, activities, consciousness and personality. What more do we want? Would it not be simpler to find our way in such achievements, sum up that which has been learned and use it even more efficiently than we have been so far? Why set up new centers, scientific councils and other institutions? Is this such an urgent task precisely now, when perestroika has faced us with such broad targets in politics, ideology, economics, all areas of the national economy, medicine, education and instruction? Would it not be better to order the more purposeful and practical orientation of already existing establishments and organizations which must deal with man, his health and education, his knowledge, labor and recreation, such as the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, State Committee for Labor, AUCCTU and the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences?

We must point out that such a formulation of the matter has its own apparent attractiveness. The main merit of such an approach is that nothing radically new must be introduced in this type of approach. However, we must not forget that this contains an entire philosophy which prevailed in our country for a number of decades. It consisted of a peculiar graded strategy applied in resolving governmental and political problems. The mind preserved the following priorities: development of industry, followed by the upsurge of the social area, the molding of the new man and, finally, the satisfaction of his vital needs. What is most striking is that at all levels of this strategy man acted in an alien, an instilled function of component, a "cog," a link in technology, an

object and not a subject in pedagogy and medicine, a system for silent vote casting in ideology and politics. This despite the fact that "there was pride" in the word man and "he had a burning engine for a heart." What man truly was bothered very few people, including man himself. What was important was for man to have "sensible" needs. Obviously, it would be worthwhile to reconstruct not only the system of concepts of man and of the individual, prevailing in our country in the social and humanitarian sciences, but also the system of the molding and educating of the individual by the collective, something which all too frequently led not only to the depersonalizing of the individual but also which made the educating collective itself faceless. Perhaps this may not have had to be recalled, the more so since it took place in perhaps memorable but not all that recent times, had this type of educational system been outlived and surmounted. Unfortunately, a great deal of it has been retained to this day. Otherwise we would not have had to reform the school, to reorganize the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, to protect innovative teachers, to scatter the "twilight of education" (V.V. Rozanov's expression) and urgently to develop new concepts for education and instruction, which is currently the project of the USSR State Committee for Public Education.

Naturally, such reconstruction is the job of historians. In our country, however, everyone has developed a kind of schematic consciousness and psychological stereotypes which have become second nature and part of our vocabulary and of our customary contacts with people, and means of intercourse. In the past few years we have begun to get rid of all this. However, in order for this process to develop more successfully it is important to realize the inadequacy of both purely reflexological, reflexive and behaviorist as well as purely phenomenological approaches to man. In psychology, for example, to this day the myth prevails of the full and complete determination of human behavior. The principle of determinism, brought through this peculiar method to a logical end, could constitute, so to say, a scientific foundation for depriving man of freedom, responsibility and dignity, and a basis for all kinds of manipulative technologies involving man.

The legacy from those times includes technocratic orientations which define methods for solving all, not only technical but also natural, social, humanitarian and human problems. For the sake of fairness we must point out that technocracy is not our exclusive property. Such orientations are widespread throughout the world. But elsewhere they have been softened by perhaps not a very rich but nonetheless humanitarian standard which, in our country, we uprooted so systematically and consistently that we could even classify it an endangered species.

This mistrust of nature (which should be changed, redone, irrigated or drained or, in a word, reinvented), of man (who must be improved through gene engineering) and of the human mind (we must urgently develop an artificial intelligence) is the full sister of the technocrat

deprived of humanitarian standards. All of this, possibly, makes some sense and is even sometimes useful and necessary, providing that we respect the measure, which is man himself. Unfortunately, however, the teachers forgot to set for themselves the interesting task of developing individualities and told their students: either be like everyone else or be like thus and such. Hence the mistrust we mentioned. Along with mistrust, amazingly, there is a mysticism, i.e., an exaggerated faith in miracles, in the existence of some kind of "master keys" offering a quick solution to global problems and the existence of some panaceas to heal all troubles; faith in the word and the plan unsupported by labor efforts and resources; faith in hasty projects, etc.

It would be hardly suitable at this point to rate as "good" or "bad" the status of the numerous sciences of man. Naturally, they are developing and, in the case of many of them, quite successfully at that. The point, however, is that the development of sciences is not catching up with the development of man himself and we must sadly note that they are not only unable efficiently to contribute to man's development but also efficiently to prevent man's degradation.

At this point a full and direct analogy may be drawn between our attitude toward man—on the practical and not theoretical level—and our attitude toward nature. Let us emphasize that it is precisely man who must solve virtually all global problems of our time. It is high time to realize this. It is also high time to act more energetically, for man himself has become a global problem.

We do not understand sufficiently well what is human nature, and what are the standards, limits and boundaries of development of the possibilities and capabilities of the individual (are there such limits!), and what are the prospects for human existence?

Spinosa has said that no one has as yet determined what the human body is capable of. This statement remains valid. However, we know even less what the human spirit can do with a free development, consistent with human nature. This should not be construed as a reprimand to the sciences of man although, naturally, there would be sufficient grounds for such reprimands. It is simply that the real, the practical problems which are appearing today and which we shall discuss later, are being solved not by any given science. In this case we need not only science and not only a family of sciences—mechanical or integrated. Today we need a new philosophy of man and a standard of thoughts about man; we need a new way of thinking, a change in obsolete views and customary ways of looking at man.

The following question is legitimate: Why do we need a new philosophy? It is a question not of a philosophical study but, above all, of a "practical philosophy" (L.S. Vygotskiy). This means that we must seek means not only for the study but also for the resolution of practical vital problems which, by virtue of their nature, are complex. Correspondingly, we need comprehensive aid

which cannot be provided even by an entire department. Such a complex practice must be wise and capable of an overall understanding of the situation and of anticipating the long-term consequences of its interference. That is why it is a question of a practical philosophy and of the age-old understanding of philosophy as the love of wisdom, as well as of its contemporary practical meaning. Let me re-emphasize that practical philosophy does not mean philosophizing as it is ordinarily understood. It presumes the creation of our own set of instruments, a kind of humanitarian technology. For example, methods are already being applied in the area of humanistic psychology for easing conflicts, from conflicts within the family to conflicts among nations. Ergonomics has developed and is applying methods for the study, optimizing and projecting human activities under complex systems. Experience has been gained in comprehensive studies involving the participation of medical and biological specialists, psychologists, sociologists and engineers.

Every specialist is well-familiar with situations in which he must go beyond the range of his own professional area and interact with representatives of other sciences. Let us point out that in solving practical problems strictly professional ambitions are eliminated much faster, although not always easily, compared to the solution of academic problems.

Nonetheless, it is obvious that each separate discipline creates, at its own risk and peril, a corresponding practice based on its own image of man. This leads not only to the fact that many technologies are by no means perfect but also that the exchange of experience in the structuring of different technologies becomes much more difficult. Therefore, we need both to improve those which exist as well as to develop principles for the creation of new technologies in the various areas of social practices, the purpose of which would be to proceed from the overall image of man.

In order to build such an image we must reinterpret our customary picture of the world and determine which is the real place which man should occupy within it. For the time being, this place is still far from being honorable. Man himself is as yet unable to believe that he is not only a means but the object of history. In order for him to believe this it is necessary to change both his way of life and his consciousness. Naturally, one can say that changing the way of life and consciousness exceeds the possibilities of science. However, science cannot be a marginal observer of the complex processes which are taking place in the social consciousness, in the minds of the people, in real life. What makes this even more important is that in recent years the party has steadily appealed to the scientists not to substantiate already passed resolutions or actions but to submit constructive suggestions. In this area not only the social scientists and men of culture but also the representatives of other sciences are in great debt to society. The sciences of man have become sufficiently mature to be able more actively to influence the processes developing within society.

Unfortunately, we are not in the leading ranks when it comes to developing problems of the comprehensive study of man. Incidentally, studies of man are financed on the basis of the residual principle not only in industrial sectors but also by the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The formulation of the methodological principles governing the organization of interdisciplinary comprehensive studies of man is an equally complex matter. Such problems affect more the philosophy of science than the philosophy of practice which we discussed earlier, although it is a well-known fact that the interdisciplinary research which is based on the logic of the development of science contains a tremendous practical potential which, true, does not immediately become apparent. We know that at a given stage a science starts being "short of breath" without interdisciplinary contacts. Its advance is held back. We must point out that rich and interesting experience in interdisciplinary studies of man has been acquired by the science of history, in its current condition. There is an impressive list of twin sciences which are described with a syncretic name, i.e., sciences one of which directly develops into the other. They include psychophysics, psychohygiene, biomechanics, psycholinguistics, psychobiology, neuropsychology, neurolinguistics and even neurophilosophy, sociobiology, sociopsychology, etc. Some of them have rich traditions while others are in the stage of development. Initially such a combination is achieved only by combining books dealing with the different disciplines.

The very fact of the existence of such combinations proves that an objective trend toward a unification of the sciences of man exists. The study of the already existing interdisciplinary complexes, both traditional and new, and the analysis of their successes and failures are highly instructive in the formulation of the principles for structuring the conceptual foundation of interdisciplinary studies of man. However, one must realize that in solving this problem we encounter essential difficulties. Clearly, the reason for them is that each of the sciences has already established its own subject, taking it out of a specific overall context. This takes place also within the individual sciences.

For example, for centuries philosophers, psychologists and physiologists tried and are still trying directly to link the brain with the soul or the consciousness. Three variants exist in the solution of this problem: total identification, total separation and clever, although lacking sufficient scientific justification, attempts at combining them. The purpose of this example is to emphasize the methodological complexity of developing conceptual foundations for establishing true interdisciplinary ties among the sciences which study man.

Is such a situation leading to an impasse? If such is the case, inevitably the question arises of the possibility of developing a humanitarian technology within the context of practical philosophy which we mentioned earlier. In that case we would need no practical philosophy

whatsoever. Empirical experience would suffice in solving practical problems which require the participation of different specialists.

However, such a practical philosophy does not justify this kind of skepticism. At this point one aside would be pertinent. In his time, our outstanding philosopher P.A. Florenskiy proved that there either is no or, in any case, there should not be any direct path leading from an idea to an instrument (object) and vice versa. This path must go through sacred or cultural symbols. In reality, it is exceptionally difficult to imagine a direct development from idea to object. However, even if it were to prove possible, it would be detrimental both to ideas and objects, which is something we have frequently observed. P.A. Florenskiy's logic was that a cultural or sacral symbol concentrates, combines within itself both object and idea such as, for example, a sculpture, a laurel wreath, an icon, etc. One would think that interdisciplinary ties among the sciences as well should be not direct but indirect.

If we accept this viewpoint a most difficult problem appears: What could play the role of such a binding link? The simplest answer could be that such a role should be played by an integral man, not a man split even with the most modern and proper scientific means. Let us recall the example of the brain (the object) and the soul (the idea). Had we initially taken them out of their integral context, we would have never been able to combine them within the framework of a logically homogeneous and strict reasoning. When subjects of sciences have been separated from the start, their synthesis is carried out on an intellectual level. Naturally, we must not forget that this initial separation of the soul from the body is a tradition of primarily European philosophy and that it is beginning gradually if not to be surmounted at least questioned. In science, civil rights are granted to terms such as "live matter," or "live motion" (see Pushkin's "A Flight Conducted With the Soul"). There also are reasons to assume that a live substance, combined with a live movement, leads to the creation of a living soul. Interesting ideas were formulated starting with Hegel and Marx on the existence of a special class of functional rather than anatomic-morphological organs, within which they included mental processes and formations. These ideas were superbly developed in the works of domestic physiologists (A.A. Ukhtomskiy, N.A. Bernshiteyn) and psychologists of the schools of L.S. Vygotskiy, A.N. Leontyev and A.R. Luriya. One may assume that finding an adequate intermediary link would strengthen the noticed trend of integration between the spiritual and the physical organism. There are reasons to assume that in the case of practical philosophy, which is surmounting science-oriented approaches, it is indeed the integral man who must act as the binding link or, rather, his image, which embodies concepts of an individual capable of engaging in a free and responsible action or act.

The legitimate question arises: Where can we find this image of the integral man if, as we already pointed out,

he is the product of numerous sciences and numerous practices? It is true that in the latter he appears as a more complete entity. It would be pertinent to recall here the good old terms science of man and knowledge of man. Let us take the first. Science of man is a special area in the development of which science, culture, art and practice, understood in the broadest meaning of the terms, participate on an equal basis. It grows and develops along with them, along with the history of society. It would be naive to imagine matters as though it must be structured as a separate special science or a sum, a system of sciences. It can exist without this as well. The need to determine what it constitutes now, at the present stage in the development of society and culture, is a different matter. It is precisely the science of man that should teach us the standards of the study of man, and to make us think of him and of our reaction to him. It ensures the cultural and ethical context outside of which the science of man cannot develop fully and, obviously, nor could all the other sciences which today, in the words of Nobel Prize Laureate I.R. Prigozhin, should become humanitarian, i.e., take man as their measurement. Humanitarian techniques and psychotechniques, understood in the broad meaning of the term (medical, psychotherapeutic, pedagogical, ergonomic, social, communicative and even ideological) cannot exist outside of this context.

The trouble is when pedagogy, medicine, psychology, sociology and ergonomics are eliminated from this context. This also applies to the social sciences which cannot develop without the science of man. Essentially, the social sciences developed to the extent to which they were related to this science. Outside of the science of man the study of man by the basic and applied sciences turn him, willy-nilly, either into an object of study like an object in the social sciences, or else a means of achieving some social or technical objectives.

Ideally, the study of man should inspire such studies and instill in them values, a meaning and humane objectives. The purpose of the science of man is to concentrate within itself precisely universal human values. It is also the source of an integral image of man. In terms of humanitarian technologies, both should play the role of a meaningful and not meaningless symbol, understood in its real rather than metaphorical sense.

Universal human values cannot be formulated, and priorities in the intellectual, moral, material, spiritual, individual and collective values cannot be defined outside an orientation toward the science of man. The science of man, however, is not simply a source which leads to a symbol needed in the development of humanitarian technologies. It has its own complex set of problems which, as we pointed out, are resolved by culture as a whole. Let us note that although the view was expressed here to the effect that the science of man is not a science in the straight meaning of the term, it would be useful to introduce this subject in secondary schools and VUZs after necessarily compiling textbooks worthy of this subject. Incidentally, in itself the writing of such

textbooks would be very interesting despite its great complexity. It would also be useful to consider the creation of a kind of encyclopedia in the science of man or, briefly, the encyclopedia entitled "Man," which would include, in addition to scientific studies, practical experience in the structuring and applying humanitarian technologies in the various areas of social activities.

Whereas in practical philosophy the image of the integral man, structured or materialized on the basis of the science of man, could perform the role of an intermediate or, rather, a leading link, a kind of ethical imperative, in terms of the development of interdisciplinary research in the area of the sciences of man, such an image is clearly insufficient. Needed in this area are investigation, thinking and real experimentation. At this time, all we could express are more general assumptions concerning the areas in which such investigation could be conducted.

Let us go back to the idea of the symbol which connects an instrument with an idea. It is common knowledge that a symbol is the embodied or materialized awareness (social or individual). That is precisely why both the material and the ideal factors are represented in it. Perhaps awareness, understood not as an introspective reflection of reality, but as a realized existence, would be able to play the role of an intermediary link in the organization of interdisciplinary studies of man. Awareness is the most important feature of man, which precisely defines his specific status in the world, his specific ontological status. Incidentally, also essential is the fact that consciousness, which creates symbols, is itself symbolic in terms of its nature and can be fully equivalent to the symbol on which P.A. Florenskiy's "triangle" (consideration) is based. In addition to this direct analogy, there also exist other, more essential substantiations within the sciences of man themselves. On the one hand, not one of the sciences studying man could or would be willing to depict man as a being deprived of consciousness. For that reason many sciences try to single out consciousness as the subject of their research. Therefore, both man and consciousness become the subject of many sciences, not only humanitarian but also natural and even technical. On the other hand, the real practices of the study of man in many sciences proves that in the course of such studies consciousness is most frequently set in parentheses or reduced to the fact that actually no consciousness becomes apparent. At this point the approach to man as an entity is either lost or vanished. The category (and the ontology) of the partial man is projected from the area of industry and economics to the area of science. This is typical of virtually all humanitarian sciences, including psychology, which quite rarely and, as time goes on, studies less and less the psychology of consciousness. It is true that stop an increasing number of psychologists from studying the subconscious.

Awareness could perform its integrating role also because it contains not only reflexive strata within which the drama of depicting meanings, interpreting values

and creating new values and meanings, takes place. It also contains ordinary life strata in which not only the attitude of man toward reality but also the attitude within reality, i.e., real relations, actions and steps taken by man in the world, take shape and materialize. Ignoring the consciousness and spirituality of man in research, pedagogical, medical-biological, ergonomic and other practices not only impoverishes but in some cases even deprives of their meaning such studies and practices, leading them down the road of a mechanical integration of an entire set of factors covering social, psychological, biological, legal, ethical, ecological, information, engineering and, possibly, many other aspects of the survival, of the existence and activities of man and mankind. There have been frequent attempts in the history of the study of man at expressing his essence through a single term: *homo sapiens*, *homo habilis*, *homo faber*, *homo economicus*, *homo humanus*, and so on, and so forth. Naturally, they all complement each other and a person deprived of any of the properties reflected in those terms is damaged. The way to combine such characteristics is found in the development, intensification and broadening of human consciousness. The most perspicacious scientists and political personalities are only now beginning to realize the fact that the human factor is, without exaggeration, a universal puzzle not only in technology but in all social life. We must frankly admit that we are still far from being able to unravel it.

Naturally, the human consciousness, acts as a possible means of integrating the sciences of man and structuring sensible humanitarian technologies. However, this study has its own set of problems as well. Consciousness cannot be reduced to any one of arbitrarily singled out and depicted worlds: the world of ideas, knowledge, scientific values, concepts (i.e., the world of science); the world of human values, emotions and meanings; the world of productive, of tangible-practical activities; the world of images, concepts, imagination and cultural symbols and signs. We must not forget that consciousness represents man himself in the entire complexity of his life, possible conflicts, needs, objectives, meanings and, finally, man's awareness of himself.

Consciousness is not only created and is present in all of these worlds. It could switch among them; it could find a place for itself in any one of them, it could encapsulate itself within them; it could rise or hover above all of them, comparing, assessing and judging them. It could and should judge its own self. That is why it is so important for all of them to be accessible to it. Unless this exists we describe consciousness as narrow, limited, undeveloped, imperfect, etc. It is precisely in this sense that consciousness is within life (as M.M. Bakhtin said: It is involved in life, it is essential in life), reflexive and otherworldly. We understand this. However, we lack a "strong" theory of consciousness capable of combining within itself a variety of increasingly conflicting data and linking such data to practice. Nonetheless, we note a tempestuous growth in the number of applied projects which have long exceeded the limits of psychoanalysis

and are aimed at developing methods for shaping consciousness, a significant percentage of which are distinguished by the aspiration to apply manipulative technologies or practicalism, instead of being oriented toward universal human values. The combination of practical methods for shaping a creative self-awareness and consciousness of the personality with a humanitarian concept of the consciousness cannot be considered as having been attained at the present stage of development of science, pedagogy, psychology and education. The idea of the development of consciousness is rarely linked to the development of the human potential, the intellectual one above all; equally, the growth of the personality is frequently considered outside the aspiration toward expanding the consciousness. The shaping of a new consciousness faces us as a most relevant and most complex scientific and practical problem.

It is necessary to expand the consciousness not only of the individual person but of the individual sciences and of science as a whole. Today it is no secret to anyone that science and technology frequently stop being an inseparable part of culture. All too frequently they become enclosed within their own problems, methods and results, developing their own methodology, philosophy and culture. This inevitably leads to their alienation and isolation from universal human values and from culture as such. That is why the need to "build bridges" arises. In itself, the differentiation among the areas of research and engineering is, naturally, necessary and useful. The trouble begins when in the course of such differentiation the overall, the cultural context is lost. Expanding consciousness also means restoring the universal human context, and the ability to look at one area of research or another from a "bird's eye view," as they say.

Not only science and technology but many other areas of practical scientific activities become alienated from culture and from universal human values, such as pedagogy, medicine and ideology. The elimination of alienation also means building a cultural context for many scientific and practical areas. We must restore the cultural-historical traditions and create a truly sociocultural pedagogy, sociocultural medicine, sociocultural practical psychology and sociology, etc. It would be useful in this case to recall B. Pasternak's typical remark that culture does not fall into the arms of the first person it meets.

All of this should be considered as an attempt to outline the range of problems involved in the comprehensive study of man. Naturally, the problems do not stop there. The ways earmarked for integrating the sciences of man and structuring humanitarian technologies should be interpreted as no more than a hypothesis. Possibly, they will be replaced by other alternate options. Thus, for example, there is some merit to the assumption that the binding link in interdisciplinary studies of man could be not only consciousness but also tangible activities. The latter could successfully implement an integrating function in interdisciplinary research in labor, in ergonomics above all.

Nonetheless, we have described what may be an important but also merely a first stage in the organization of the comprehensive study of man. After assessing and trying one meaningful symbol or another, aimed at performing an integrating function, considerably more difficult work lies ahead: the structuring of a new subject area for the comprehensive study or corresponding humanitarian practice. Such precedents have existed in the history of science and culture. Thus, the introduction of the categories of the conscious and the subconscious in the clinical studies of neuroses and hysterias became the foundation for the development of the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. Today we urgently feel the need to introduce the category of consciousness (and not the function of consciousness, which is frequently confused with a primitively understood rationality) in pedagogy, medicine, ergonomics, economics, ideology and, finally, politics, which provides us with the most inspiring examples. However, this category as well would remain helpless unless it is backed by changes in consciousness in other areas of social life. Consciousness oriented toward universal human values, i.e., toward eternal as well as most contemporary values, should be part of such areas not only through its specific symbolic functions but also through its currently expanding area encompassing universal dimensions of the subject and moral qualities. Naturally, such work is extremely difficult. However, this author would like least of all to simplify the problem of integrating the sciences of man. At the same time, this should convince us of the fact that the task of the comprehensive study of man is being formulated not for the first time and, above all, not from ground zero. It would be unrealistic to continue to try to solve it within the limits of the "social institution of man." As it were, we have lost too much time. In our domestic humanitarian tradition, which we are now quite energetically disseminating in society, there are many ideas related to the comprehensive study of man, whose scale is close to the ideas of V.I. Vernadskiy on the biosphere and the noosphere. The time has come to treat this legacy as efficiently as we have now begun to treat Vernadskiy's legacy. However, this is not enough. This legacy must be developed and included in the context of real life, in the context of the solution of the grandiose tasks facing the country.

All too frequently we have repeated that the essence of man is the sum total of all social relations. However, the reality of the social life of man and society was such that not only the sciences of man but man himself were disintegrated. It is to be hoped that the development of ways and means and theories for the comprehensive study of man will apply more fully the formula (or the dream) which Marx had pertaining to man and human social relations. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

PUBLIC OPINION

Prose About Woman

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[Text] In this issue, the "Public Opinion" section is entirely dedicated to the topic of women. This section has

already assumed certain traditional features and is just as traditionally timed to the holiday, to woman's day. The holiday passes but the topic remains for, unfortunately, problems are more frequently raised than resolved. We would have very much liked simply to speak of women and possibly to praise them, but how can we ignore the prose of life and women's problems. We shall try here to present the views of the women themselves and not only about the pressing nature, alas, of the familiar problems but the progress made in solving them. We shall turn above all to women-deputies who have been directly entrusted with such solutions.

There are 352 women among the USSR People's Deputies, including 100 in the country's Supreme Soviet. This journal's correspondents met with some of them in Moscow, at 27 Kalinin Prospekt, which is the seat of the permanent commissions and committees of the Supreme Soviet. We begin with them.

Interview at 27 Kalinin

V. Klibik, honored worker in culture of the Latvian SSR: "So That Our Sons Will Not Die"

KOMMUNIST: Valentina Sergeyevna, as member of the Committee on the Affairs of Women, Protection of the Family, Motherhood and Childhood, you obviously receive a large number of letters. As committee secretary, whether you like it or not, you absorb their feelings. In your view, what are the particularly urgent requests or demands of the people? Do the letters influence the priority of decisions and the very nature of the decisions? Does such a "pressure from below" speed up the decision-making process?

Klibik: During the first days of work of the committee we literally received bags of mail. Currently the flow has become generally stabilized and we have been able to identify some "problem areas."

I would single out, first of all, the letters of soldiers' mothers. The committee is asked to use all of its influence and to see to it that our sons do not die senselessly, in peacetime. Today this is the women's greatest pain and concern. In sending their children off to military service, the mothers are concerned whether they will return home even simply healthy, and not maimed internally. They are gravely worried by the soldiers' social troubles, nonstatutory relations and old soldiers' favoritism. There is obvious concern with military service by young people from Central Asia, assigned beyond the Polar Circle, and Army service by physically weak and, frequently, sick youngsters, whose condition is not always taken into consideration. Let me emphasize that the letters we receive from all parts of the country demand that such problems be resolved.

When the Supreme Soviet exempted university students from regular army service, their mothers presented the deputies with two big bouquets of roses and there was sustained applause for this decision. Understandably, even this measure was not simple. However, we are

expected to take further steps and suggestions are submitted, such as exempting the fathers of small children, and freeing from army service the sole bread earners whose mothers are past the age of 50. I recently received a telegram from the Latvian Women's Council: The voters request support for the idea of alternate labor service (on religious, pacifist and other similar reasons). Obviously, the time to solve this problem has come and, sooner or later, it will have to be solved. Judging by the letters, the labor battalions are hardly considered suitable, for they are viewed as a profanation of army service. A variety of alternate options are being formulated, and in this connection the mothers' hopes are related to the draft Law on the Armed Forces.

Naturally, equally pressing are "purely women's" problems. The first Congress of People's Deputies instructed the government to submit a program for improving the situation of women in society. We began to discuss the program by section, as the sections were being drafted. The program will take several years to implement. What is expected of us also includes urgent steps, such as amending current legislation and drafting new laws. In this respect, naturally, the letters play an important role, helping us to improve the drafts which are being worked on and seeing what other "sensitive areas" demand particular attention.

A full third of the letters and appeals reaching our committee deal with improving or even reviewing the system of benefits, pensions and aid to families with several children, single mothers and pregnant women. For example, the mail revealed a problem such as jobs for minors, for this too is a motherly concern. In discussing the plan for the country's socioeconomic development for this year, we spoke out quite firmly against eliminating from the variety of light industry products goods for children and some items for elderly women and for low-income families. We are receiving many suggestions on changing or adding to the foundations of legislation on marriage and the family, health care, housing and civil rights.

The letters confirm how closely the people follow the drafts of the various bills, showing concern over any possible worsening of the situation of individual social, age and professional groups. This applies above all to the draft Law on Pensions, which has already been subject to a number of amendments. Naturally, the suggestions are varied and, sometimes, quite polarized: some, for instance, favor uniform taxes and pensions for all women; others prefer a differentiated approach; some tend to demand everything from the state, from the "center," others rely on pay supplements made by enterprises and out of regional and republic budgets.

Therefore, the "pressure from below" can be felt and does influence the work of the committee. Many requests of a private nature occur as well. As we read the mail, day after day, a kind of overall picture develops by itself. Essentially, the problems are the same: whatever the origin of the letters, the main questions are repeated both

in the letters and as we meet with the voters. Yet the ways to solve them, I believe, cannot be the same, for there are differences in cultural traditions, population density and nature of employment, and working and living conditions. Above all, naturally, what we need is a regional family policy.

Our committee consists of 42 people, eight of whom are men. We are very grateful for the fact that they have decided to work precisely with us. Our group includes milkmaids, workers, physicians, a head of sovkhoz, and a general director of a large light industry enterprise. They are all good specialists, people with practical experience. Nonetheless, the problems with which we deal are such that they cannot be solved without professional interpretation. At this point we clearly feel a shortage of jurists and sociologists. Naturally, experts and consultants are helping us on a voluntary basis. However, in the course of the rotation and renovation of the committee membership, clearly, this should be taken into consideration.

M. Rakhmanova, head of the Polyclinic Pediatric Department, Orenburg Medical Institute, doctor of medical sciences: "Free Choice Plays a Social Role"

KOMMUNIST: The view is quite widespread that today's "emancipated" woman should go back from public production to the home, to the family, at which point many troublesome problems would be resolved by themselves. The children would not be neglected, their education would become much better and there would be no reason to be concerned with providing special working conditions for women. Is this accurate? What do you think, Marina Nikolayevna?

Rakhmanova: Personally, I do not think so and, clearly, before drawing any conclusion whatsoever, we must, above all, ask the women themselves. Sociologists have already asked and, according to research data, few are the women (a very small percentage) who would not like to be employed at all. The overwhelming majority favor holding a job. However, they also speak of a shorter workday and easier living conditions. If society truly tries to ensure social equality it should offer women the real opportunity for a free choice in the social role they would like to play. Some women may prefer to be exclusively wives, mothers and homemakers; other women may choose a labor, social or political career; others again may opt in favor of a sensible combination of both. The right to such a choice should be backed by economic guarantees which, unfortunately, society is unable to offer today (for example, it cannot ensure a living minimum for women who have deliberately dropped out of the labor market to take care of their children).

Obviously, in the future, as our economy strengthens, that is precisely the way this problem will be resolved. For the time being, I believe, it is too soon to speak of equality. For decades our state policy was aimed at giving women various types of social assistance. As we

now realize, no results were obtained through such a policy. Today, to a certain extent, the system of social relations has even intensified the subordinate status of women in society. It is difficult for a woman to be a mother, a wife and a housewife. However, it is even more difficult for a woman to achieve a high social or professional status. While the woman is young, her main concerns are children and learning. But then? Society has virtually no governmental system, a mechanism for the growth of the professionalism and social activeness of women. Partly due to lack of training and partly to the prevailing stereotypes in the social mind, few women can be found in the various governmental bodies or in leading positions. The established model of the masculine woman-manager has developed in women themselves a certain negative attitude toward either their own or someone else's advancement up the professional or administrative ladder.

In my view, achieving social equality between men and women means, above all, creating for them equal social opportunities for proving themselves as **individuals**, and eliminating some stereotypes from the social consciousness.

Incidentally, in the view of some physiologists, in the 45-50 age group, after the children have grown up, and after a certain practical and social experience has been gained, women are at their peak of creative activity. Abroad, it is precisely in that age group that frequently many women have started their activities as major politicians. Clearly, it would suit us to consider this. I am convinced that today the country needs women as politicians and leaders. We can see that in republics and in the local areas almost totally "male" parliaments and soviets are being established and, therefore, policy will be made without the participation of women although they account for the majority of the population.

KOMMUNIST: Marina Nikolayevna, you are a physician and department head. Do you get full satisfaction from your work as a legislator and do you feel that your participation in the meetings of the commission and in finding a real solution to the current problems is truly useful?

Rakhmanova: Honestly speaking, my views on future deputy activities were very loose and were largely inconsistent with what I have to do today. Although I am a member of the Subcommittee on the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood (unquestionably, such problems are professionally close to me), I have to master or, more accurately put, simply to study the elements of economics and law, problems of social psychology and political sociology. This is extremely necessary.

I was elected deputy by the Soviet Children's Fund and, naturally, my program reflects problems of the family and childhood, which are relevant in virtually all parts of the country. Today, when the people are interested in the extent to which our real deputy activities are consistent with our electoral promises, I am pleased to note that

some of what we planned has already been accomplished. That which has been done, in particular in terms of the health of children and orphans is, naturally, the result of the collective efforts of society, the personnel of many departments and deputies. It is unfair and simply inadmissible to ascribe the solution of any major problem to the electoral programs of a given deputy (unfortunately, this is frequently heard in the local areas). Honestly speaking, it is pleasant to realize that such solutions include a small part of my personal contribution although the feeling, naturally, changes depending on the people we meet.

Whenever the committee is able to do something real for women, families and children, one develops the wish to work and work harder. Occasionally, however, I also feel my own helplessness.... Such was the case, for instance, at the start of this year, when we were considering the situation with the production of household equipment. For a number of years and 5-year periods this problem has been discussed! Yet it was for the first time now that the committee members heard and saw people who were responsible for such matters. Our impression was that somehow we had been taken 7 to 10 years back. We were fed figures on production increases in recent years, increased percentages in the bright future through the 14th 5-Year Plan, in the style of the "best times of stagnation." To some of us this was simply embarrassing to hear and it seemed to us that we are living in different time dimensions. Our questions and doubts have greatly increased. Our mood worsened, for it became clear that we could not hope for any radical improvements in the immediate future. Furthermore, that same afternoon the committee members visited the International Consumer Goods Exhibit and the contrast we saw worsened our mood even further. At that moment the thought arose: "Would it not be better to work in our own homes and do something specific."...

No, we then decided, we must not drop out. A great deal is changing in our life, although more slowly than we like it. Such changes instill hope and I divide my life between Orenburg, where I have my home, family and department, and Moscow.

O. Yarovaya, milkmaid at the Krasnaya Zvezda Training Farm, Atkarskiy Rayon, Saratov Oblast: "I Want to Help the People"

KOMMUNIST: Olga Pavlovna, you have been at work in the Supreme Soviet for about a year. How do you feel in your new role? What are your concerns and what could you tell your constituents?

Yarovaya: I neither hoped nor prepared myself for being a deputy. Both the rayon and the oblast have people who are worthier. However, I was nominated at a meeting of the labor collective and I was chosen among the three nominees. When I met with the voters I was asked many questions, such as would I be able to cope? One young man said: "What could a milkmaid do in the Supreme

Soviet?..." I recall these words to this day but, I think, milkmaids can do something if they know what they stand for.

I am a villager. I have worked as a milkmaid since the age of 15 and I love my work. I agreed to be nominated because I wanted to help the people. I am familiar with rural problems. I am also familiar with family problems. I have three children, my daughter is attending the university, last year my son entered an institute and my youngest daughter, who is 12, is attending the sixth grade. When I was elected member of the Supreme Soviet and the question arose of whether to live in Moscow, I disagreed: it seemed to me that this would alienate me from my constituents, from rural problems the solution of which I would like to achieve.

I do my work with pleasure (although, naturally, I feel my lack of education). I have become used to the work although not to a sedentary life; I had never left home for long periods of time so that, at the beginning, everything was quite unusual for me. However, I tried to learn my job faster. In our committee, when we would be drafting any resolution, we studied each line and discussed all of it together. When we submitted our resolutions to the Supreme Soviet we did the same thing, although everything had already been decided. Honestly speaking, I did not like this and still do not. It is possible, it is truly possible to have greater trust in the commissions and committees.

What are we able to achieve and what are we not? Considering my own program, I dreamed of creating in every village its own center with a library, a club, a medical center, and so on—a socioeducational center under a single roof. Naturally, to have good roads (we are tired of roadlessness), so that there would be no neglected villages and so that people would not be abandoning the countryside.

The primary task is that of solving the food problem, which concerns all of us. Now, however, having worked here for a few months, I doubt that we shall be able to resolve it in 2 or 3 years. Meanwhile, the item in my program concerning long-term and individual leasing is being solved, to our common satisfaction. I also raised the question of helping young rural families, and here again a hitch: no real help is being given to them. Another "hanging" question is that of supplying natural gas to hamlets and villages. Unfortunately, I am unable to tell the voters that in this area matters will be improved in the immediate future. Understandably, all deputies are formulating their demands, which are just. However, I do not see what could be cut out of my program (for example, how can we table the question of pensioning off women who work in jobs hazardous to their health sooner, including milkmaids or the question of professional illnesses: virtually all milkmaids suffer from polyarthritis).

Usually, I prepare myself seriously before meeting with my constituents. I realize that the people will ask why

various decisions are being shelved, and I try to study all available materials on such questions. Such meetings are very important and demand a great deal of strength and time. In the city of Petrovsk, for example, we started our meeting with the voters at 10:00 a.m. and ended after nightfall. After such meetings (I have 10 rayons and two cities) I am disturbed by the fact that not everything can be resolved. Honestly, my previous work was easier although we had to get up at dark and the work was physically hard. Working with people, however, is even harder. We encounter callousness and apathy when we try to solve many problems. The power of the deputy's badge gives us confidence and the right to "push" with our questions. Yes, "push." ...People come to see us repeatedly although not everything depends on the deputy. Naturally, a great deal must be settled locally. In my view, all of us must try to achieve this by displaying particular persistence.

R. Ubaydullayeva, deputy director of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, doctor of economic sciences: "Complete Initiated Projects"

KOMMUNIST: Although today science, the science of economics included, is being blamed for a great many things, nonetheless no one would argue about the need to have professional economists in our parliament. How do you, Rano Akhatovna, combine your work in the Supreme Soviet with scientific interests?

Ubaydullayeva: My present activities are largely an extension of my previous work. I have spent a lifetime studying problems of demography and employment, which are directly related to the solution of purely women's problems, particularly in Central Asia. Now, finally, the opportunity has appeared for me to implement my scientific ideas. Therefore, in our Commission on Problems of Labor, Prices and Social Policy I am by no means an outsider.

Work in the commission, seeing voters, letters (sometimes 300 letters a day), participation in conferences and roundtables, and meetings with foreign delegations are, although labor intensive, allowing me to look at problems differently and to develop, if I may describe it so, a statesmanlike view and approach. I have amended my own program with which I campaigned in the elections and divided it into stages.

What is the basis of my program? Above all, it is the preservation and development of the family and, in particular, reducing the divorce rate and enhancing the stability of marriages. I am also concerned with the education of children. We have virtually surrendered such education to kindergartens, primary schools, boarding schools and extended day groups. This is not right. A child, if he has a mother and father, should feel the family. It is precisely a strong family that is the main feature in the development of the personality, in the assertion of moral ideals and shaping a civic stance. We are concerned with the growth of crime among adolescents and even children. If the families would deal with

their upbringing, including in terms of the law, and exert a moral influence on their own children, I believe that the problem of delinquency today would not be so pressing.

In all of this I assign a primary role, nonetheless, to the woman, the mother. I believe that the direction toward such objectives which we must establish as of now is that of easing the labor burden of women. I formulate the question as follows: in the 13th 5-Year Plan we must resolve the problem of reducing the length of the workday, above all for women with children. Step-by-step, on a differentiated basis (depending on family situation and the number of children) it must be solved. This is entirely realistic within the framework of the economic reform which we have begun to implement by granting autonomy to republics, regions and enterprises. I believe that this is particularly important in the case of Central Asia: the shorter labor day would enable us, to a certain extent, to reduce the gravity of the unemployment problem.

It is pleasant to note that something is already being resolved: now, for instance, thanks to our joint efforts, young mothers are being given the opportunity to raise their children until the age of 3 (although, it is true, aid is provided for only 18 months, which is, so far, clearly insufficient).

Another tangle of problems involves the working and living conditions of women at work and at home. We speak a great deal about the scientific and technical revolution but we totally ignore in technical developments the specific nature of women's labor. Night shifts and heavy manual work are performed primarily by women. Women pick cotton manually (cotton picking machines are not even basically adapted to help them in their work). In general, for the time being we have done little for the rural women and there are no facilities to help them in their ordinary life!

Naturally, my main concern is the condition of women in the Central Asian area. Obviously, changes will not fail to affect us. Young people are becoming different. Today's Uzbek woman tries to get an education, to earn a living and to be independent. However, the old family foundations are quite strong as well. I believe that we must not destroy the positive features in the way of life of Oriental woman. However, she should be the one to choose. If her aspiration is to be active in social affairs, we can only welcome this. The problem of female employment requires particular development, taking into consideration the specific nature of local conditions. We need to develop forms affecting the very structure of the economy. We must open more processing industry enterprises. This is not a problem to be resolved in the future but today.

If a woman decides to dedicate herself to her family and the education of her children, the state must help her. Considering the tremendous budget deficit, where would the funds come from? Perhaps one could look more

closely at what the conversion of the defense industry would yield. Unfortunately, today we are insufficiently informed as to the future use of the thus released funds. I believe that they must be channeled precisely into meeting social needs, including the solution of women's problems. Unquestionably, the enterprise social development funds could be used more energetically and purposefully. Our commission has suggested that state inspection be eliminated. This is another reserve.

The work of deputies has proved to be difficult in terms of amount and responsibility. There still exists a certain duality and the present alienation from institute work triggers a certain internal dissatisfaction. My husband and my family are upset but nonetheless I have their understanding and this sustains me in my work. I would like to implement all that is planned, for that is the reason for my work.

R. Voronina, glass blower, Ryazan Production Association for Electronic Instruments: "Promote the Young"

KOMMUNIST: Raisa Grigoryevna, we know that you have been elected oblast soviet deputy four times and now you are USSR People's Deputy. You must have a great deal of experience. Could one say that you have basically decided to engage in political activities?

Voronina: I have been a worker for the past 28 years, a glass blower, in a collective where most of the workers are women. We work with gas and it is hot work and we are pensioned off earlier. Naturally, I am familiar with the problems of the working person. It is precisely these interests that I represent in the Supreme Soviet. On the other hand, probably better than many people (based on my own "longevity") I am familiar with the work of deputies in the past: one attends meeting, votes, approves.... Now, however, this is the first time that I have sensed how much depends on us, I have felt the power and opportunity of changing life for the better.

Naturally, I constantly feel my lack of knowledge. We learn as we go (courses were organized to help us); I try to consult specialists whenever various problems are being discussed, read, and communicate with people from whom I could learn something. I would like to dedicate all my strength to the work. Today it is shameful simply to be inactive at sessions.

Some voters have asked me why a number of laws were not passed at the last session. I believe that nothing should be done in haste, particularly in parliament. Today I can answer with full justification, I believe, the question of why some decisions are postponed, so that the impression will not develop that we promised things to our constituents and now table such promises. For example, I am aware of my own responsibility. However, I believe that one must vote for a given resolution only when one thinks that it is realistic, and properly thought out.

Had I been younger, I would have studied more and pursued my activities as deputy. Unfortunately, however, I am approaching retirement age. Naturally, the future belongs to the young. I shall go back to my plant and work as in the past. I must yield my position to workers who are younger and promising. Rather, to women workers. Unfortunately, the opinion still prevails that we make poor leaders. Judging by our plant, however, where women are heads of two shops, they not only are as good as the men but, in some areas, they are even better.

Everything begins with the woman and a great deal depends on her. She should be trusted more.

From the Editorial Mail

N. Kungurova, Minsk:

Probably many people have wondered about the fact that there is some disagreement with nature, when men and women work as equals, engage in the same professional work, try to achieve the same production results and begin and end their workday together. They are given identical regular leaves, identical free days, and identical material and moral incentives. Is this good for society and for the men and women themselves? Should we be proud of the fact that the members of the "fair sex" have entered all areas of labor and praise their virtually universal and full employment? In our country women have been equalized with men to such an extent that, seeing how they balance their work between job and home, one unwittingly asks: Is this real emancipation? Is this situation in which women are forced to meet two labor norms daily (one alongside men, in production, and the second, which is not being compared, at home), fully consistent with the principles of our society which is "the most humane in the world?"

Honest and truthful answers to such questions are particularly needed today, when we are restructuring our society and making it truly socialist. We talk a great deal about man and put him in the center of perestroika. However, man in our country turns out to be not only abstract but also sexless. Hiding behind departmental and even state interests, we leave the "women's problem" as though in the shadow: there are no funds, society has not matured enough.... We wish to distance ourselves from private "steps" and charity. Perestroika, however, has been called upon to be revolutionary. It demands that a start be made in the "separation" of the sexes. In the case of woman, this means creating a status in society, the family and the labor collective consistent precisely with her nature and dignity, which will also enable the men to assume their true place as men.

N. Shimin, Voronezh:

Some theoreticians of the "women's problem," as well as journalists continue to claim that women's activities must mandatorily be multipurpose, polyfunctional. Allegedly, this is necessary for the comprehensive development of their personality. Actually, in my view, such

an antihumane concept forces women to "split themselves into separate parts," as a result of which they suffer and society and the family bear the cost of such suffering.

It is time, in the final account, to abandon the view that by giving priority to family interests, women show philistinism and neglect of our social ideals. It would be fair to include the time which mothers spend in taking care of their children as part of their overall labor seniority and pay for such time as we do for any other type of work, take it into consideration in retirement pensions, and so on.

L. Yunkina, Tbilisi:

I believe that a family must mandatorily have two or three children. I personally dream of having three but I greatly hesitate to have my second. Why? Here is why:

I know from personal bitter experience that maternity homes have become true hotbeds of infection and a cause of severe diseases and the death of newborn infants. The impression has developed that in recent decades no one from the USSR Ministry of Health has ever visited such institutions. It is a rather severe trauma to experience once again the callousness, dirt and bribe-taking that prevail in them. That is my **first "against"**.

Women with small children do not need to hold jobs. I remember how after sleepless nights I was forced to go to work, taking sick leave only in exceptional cases, in order not to worsen my relations with the management. This is the **second "against"**.

I could not resign and stay home with my son, for I did not wish to lose my skills nor was it possible to survive on my husband's wages alone. In 1 year we became so poor that for a long time afterwards, out of habit, I did not enter a general store. That is the **third "against"** having a second child.

I shall not describe the difficulties related to placing a child in kindergarten (they are probably equal to those of enrolling in an institute). The matter lies elsewhere: the state wastes substantial funds for the upkeep of children in preschool institutions which, however, do not meet contemporary requirements in the least. It is virtually impossible to raise a healthy child in kindergarten. That is my **fourth "against"**.

Let me particularly mention leisure time. The overwhelming majority of family travel vouchers are for two people. What kind of a family is this, if one may ask? Is it a single mother or a childless couple? We, meanwhile, are still thinking of having a full family with two or three children! Not even the basic conditions for recreation for such a family have been provided. That is the **fifth "against"**.

Let us compute all "fors" and "againsts" and we shall see that the correlation is not in favor of the desire to have more children. If we wish to change this situation all of these problems must be resolved, the faster the better.

Letter With Comment

E. Martynova, doctor of philosophical sciences, Krasnoyarsk: The Form is Old. What About the Content?

Recently we have been openly hearing from all sides that it appears that the women's problem in our country has by no means been solved. All we had to do was to dig a little bit deeper and a mass of problems such as to make one dizzy appeared.

There were those who thought that if women's councils were to be created many problems would be solved. So, women's councils appeared and there are thousands of them throughout the country. The beginning has been laid. What to do next? Let us be frank: many women activists are short of specialized knowledge, including in the theory and history of the "women's problem." Yet, such knowledge is necessary. We have many specialists who deal precisely with such problems—sociologists, historians and economists. Unfortunately, however, so far their work is unrelated. Our aktiv, as a result, frequently does not know what system to adopt and uses the trial and error method, occasionally rediscovering the long-discovered "America." Meanwhile, theoreticians in the area of the "women's problem," are frequently alienated from practice and they are clearly short of facts and lack profound knowledge of the problems of real life.

Here is another question: How to encompass the tremendous mass of problems affecting the situation of women at work, in daily life and in the family? It is no secret that many women's councils are simply "drowned" in this mass. Possibly they should undertake to highlight and sum up the problems of contemporary women, and to define priorities. It is important to single out what is most important precisely for a given republic, region and so on.

Nonetheless, it is precisely the women's councils which can already now do a great deal in practical terms: they could assume control over plant cafeterias and work in children's preschool establishments, laundry rooms, dry-cleaning establishments, taking orders and organizing family recreation. Without solving the problems of daily life it is simply immoral to call upon women to engage in active social work, for it is clear that in that case such work can be achieved only as a result of the superexploitation of women's enthusiasm.

Today many women workers are writing in the press and to the Soviet Women's Committee about the excessive difficulties they experience, breathing poisoned air, working the night shift, and so on. Why do they not turn to their women's council? Could it be that the council lacks the authority in their eyes and in the eyes of the local managements? Or else is it the result of the custom of relying on the help of the center and waiting for instructions from above? Possibly both. The main reason, in my view, is that in the women's councils as well the people frequently meet a deaf ear and lack of

understanding. Is this not the case of yet another formal structure frequently appearing in the local areas?

We asked A. Fedulova, first deputy chairman of the Committee of Soviet Women, to comment on this letter.

KOMMUNIST: Alevtina Vasilyevna, clearly, this is a topic for a discussion on more general problems of the women's social movement. As we know, women's councils existed in the past as well. Why did it become necessary to revive this form now? How is it being revived: "From below" or is it still "from above?"

Fedulova: It is true that women's councils appeared in our country a long time ago. Some of them are several decades old and have been working steadily. Their role was understandable for the time when women actively aspired to join in building the new society or even during the hard war and postwar times, when the desire to help one another and to give one another as much aid and support as was possible was natural. At that point the women's councils were isolated and worked "intuitively." Possibly, this could be considered a minus but, at the same time, it was also a great plus, for it was indeed a question of a free movement "from below," of a real form of social activity. That is why women's councils were recreated with the start of perestroika. They are formed at places of residence, work and training. Today there are already some 240,000 of them. Their present purpose as well is quite clear: they defend the interests of women, specifically resolving (on their own level) and promoting the resolution (on the state level) above all of social problems.

The fact that for the time being the women's councils work in different ways and not always quite efficiently is a different matter. There is a lack of practical experience and serious knowledge, as is accurately stated by the author of the letter. It is true that we regularly gather the heads of women's councils in Moscow and in republic and oblast centers, sponsor seminars in various parts of the country on specific pressing topics (of late we have been substantially helped by the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences). Obviously, however, we also need studies as such. We need the real exposure of our women to statesmanlike thinking. In connection with the problem of training, the following should be mentioned as well: a number of legislative acts have been passed in our country, which can ensure the social protection of women. Naturally, this is good. However, occasionally women literally have to solicit something that is theirs by law simply because they are ignorant of their rights. Legal illiteracy frequently leads to social helplessness, for which reason our councils today have assumed the job of giving women legal training.

KOMMUNIST: Nonetheless, Alevtina Vasilyevna, are women's councils, given the present and quite varied sociopolitical structure, a kind of formal-artificial formation? Do they not duplicate the work of the trade unions

or the people's control groups, in an effort to create their own "posts" and so on, as the letter specifically mentions?

Fedulova: Naturally, our specific "image" is only now taking shape. Indeed, the women's councils occasionally act as "women's trade unions," by providing working women practical assistance (for example in placing a child in kindergarten) and in efforts to improve working conditions. Given the present shortage of everything and, let us be honest, the passive attitude of many trade union organizations, generally speaking, this is useful. However, I do not believe that their activities should be limited to this. By rallying the representatives of different social strata, professions, age groups and religious faiths, the women's councils could become a real social force, identifying the most sensitive problems and submitting "legislative initiatives" on the local and national levels. The women's movement has already proved that, to a certain extent, it can also independently solve major problems, ranging from benefits to mothers to military service. In my view, particularly active in this case are the women's councils in the Baltic areas, which have convinced many people that women are not simply the "weak sex," which out of politeness (in as much as it exists) could be heard and occasionally agreed with (most frequently in words only). I believe that a great deal could be achieved through the interaction between women's councils and other social organizations, particularly the various foundations and philanthropic societies (let me remind you, for instance, that the Soviet Women's Committee is the co-founder of the Charity and Health Foundation and the "Peasant Woman" Foundation).

Actually, we should not exaggerate our possibilities. We still frequently are told, "take care of your own problems." We accept this and begin to propagandize and call on each other for help. It is clear, however, that the women's councils cannot build kindergartens, increase the amount of housing, open special shops for work with future mothers, etc. This is a matter for the entire society.

However, I equally oppose "giving up," for which reason I cannot agree that "without solving problems of daily life it would be immoral to call upon women to engage in active social life." Naturally, under our present circumstances, particularly those related to daily life, it is not a question of being active. However, it is only by displaying activeness and by uniting that women will have the opportunity to make progress. Otherwise the residual principle in solving social problems will be preserved.

KOMMUNIST We would like to focus your attention on another aspect of the women's problem: life has become more difficult and the feeling that man is protected is frequently being lost; understandably, in such a situation it is precisely women who need particular support and backing. What could the women's councils do in this area?

Fedulova: The unstable and, as you accurately say, rather difficult situation in society, and increased discontent and

even bitterness, caused by a number of reasons, naturally could not fail to affect women. Today women must fight for everything. Transportation, goods, medicines, hospitals, all of it must be acquired by storming. When you storm everything, naturally, your character changes or, in any case, its external manifestations do. Women as well have become perhaps more curt, harder. However, they have not lost their inherent human qualities. Possibly, however, they are merely concealing their goodness under the armor of self-preservation. To a certain extent they are hiding that which today is being frankly discussed: the revival of spirituality and morality.

I believe that the women's councils will help the people "come around," and become gentler and better. They are rallying here precisely to seek advice, approval and mutual support. Naturally, wherever such organizations have found their proper place (incidentally, if they are created formally, only by instruction "from above," they could hardly find their place). The women's councils have conquered a small bridgehead in several areas, in the home, the housing office or the club, and if you visit such places you would immediately feel the warmth of relations, something which cannot be created artificially, something which cannot be preprogrammed. If they are able to help someone or even simply to show the desire to help, the person himself changes.

KOMMUNIST: Are you not bothered, Alevtina Vasilyevna, by the fact that as though parallel with the women's councils (the so to say official organizations) of late other, informal organizations are being formed? Obviously, the desire of women to "be independent," to create their own clubs and associations, particularly on the basis of professional interests, is obvious. As we know, such "associations" of women writers, journalists and painters have already made their appearance. Women painters, for example, in forming such unions, set the following task: women must remain women. Is the appearance of such "parallel structures" not explained also by the fact that the women's councils as well as your committee do not take fully into consideration precisely this task?

Fedulova: To a certain extent, this may possibly be the case. However, I support the women painters: a woman must remain a woman even under our difficult conditions. As to the establishment of "parallel structures," we welcome them and we ourselves contribute to their establishment, as was the case, for instance, with the Association of Women Painters. I believe that we should not fear "competition." Conversely, it will force us to seek new forms of work and organize a dialogue.

Not An Outsider's View

T. Chernyshkova, correspondent for the weekly SEMYA: "...Obsolete and Now Humorous"

"She can stop a horse in mid-jump and go into a burning house," is a favorite saying, which we learn in the fifth or sixth grade, in describing an eminent woman: it is some kind of classical compliment which is presented along

with flowers. I recall the inspiration with which my classmates recited Nekrasov's poetry. They were much more inspiring than "I Recall a Miraculous Instant...." Broad shouldered "women of the Russian villages" clearly blocked the tender "fleeting visions." The reason probably was that the mothers of our children were always tired and overworked, with rarely combed hair and almost never wearing any make-up, little resembling the "genius of pure beauty," which Pushkin praised.

We, their classmates, who may have taken better care of ourselves also, alas, were not like those images. However much we wanted, and however hard we tried with all our forces, with whatever strength was left after the working day and the daily cooking chores and, in between, with raising the children, we could not resemble those charming and frail heroines about whom so many novels had been written. Neither skillful make-up (naturally, if such is available) nor a new dress purchased after many hours of waiting, or even stunning Italian shoes bought from speculators, costing a 2-month salary, help. It is as though nothing can eliminate the fatigue imprinted on our faces, for the face of a woman is a mirror which reflects both the errors of man and the hardships of life....

It is fashionable to speak of the natural stamina of women. It turns out that women can withstand physical hardships longer than men. Probably in the West special experiments had to be conducted to determine this. In our country one could reach this conclusion without any additional cost. Hence, obviously, the appeals: "Protect the men!" Indeed, we must probably need also the famous female compassion, nature having gifted us generously with stamina. It is true that as we read serious medical considerations on the "masculine inability to withstand stress," not once did I find an explanation for the shorter life span of men, compared to women, ascribed to the liking by a significant percentage of men, of alcohol, nicotine and a slack-sedentary way of life. My neighbor, who manages not only to do shop work in her job but also brilliantly to manage her home, loves to repeat that her main consolation, whenever she starts washing the floor, and move the chair together with her sleeping husband in it that she will not die of hypodynamia.

It seems to me sometimes that the women's love of compliments has played a malicious joke on us. Listen to what our men praise us for. Is it because we are well-proportioned, elegant or cheerful? By no means! They praise us because we are able to "procure" food despite our bare shelves. For the fact that in a couple of hours we can lay quite a decent table to welcome unexpected guests and for the fact that in our home everything is neat and shiny. Initially they were puzzled: How and when could one do this? Then they become used to it and once in a while show a burst of tenderness: "Why do you not rest, finish tomorrow."

Against the background of such a stamina ascribed to us and, above all, the high trust which has been given to all

of us, Soviet women, by allowing us to drive a tractor and a tower crane and allowing us to be truck drivers and theater directors, in a word, anything we want, it seems almost indecent to speak of the weakness of women. On this subject, in general, it would be more prudent to keep silent and, should one decide all of a sudden to hold a "prestigious" position, people may say: we need workers for that position and not women.... Therefore, one should not keep advertising one's vulnerable spots. One should not mention the difficulty, when we come home (popular among women is a different verb—"crawl" home) after work to be a "responsive wife," and "good mother," and that there is no strength left to smile after an 8-hour workday with its rushes, lack of coordination, lack of time, transportation delays, conflicts in lines, and lugging heavy bags....

It becomes totally stupid to mention yet another one of our roles (actually, the main one) of being simply women, charming lovely and mysterious. Against the background of our great purpose the sentiments we find are the following: in the dictionary, for example, opposite the word "charm" we read that the synonyms are "obsolete, now jocular." Actually, when we watch programs of our beauty contests, we begin to agree that this French word has indeed not sunk roots on our soil. Should we blame the poor competitors, taken out of their ordinary life and called upon, for 2 hours, in an atmosphere of a cheap auction house, to pretend to be queens in the beautiful dresses which they were allowed to wear? Our Katya Chilichkina, who was crowned "Miss Europe," described how at the "peak hour," in her native Chertanovo, she was pushed out of the bus, fell on the ground and was almost trampled by men rushing to get in; no one helped her up. Characteristically, such a story would hardly amaze anyone.

We are still trying to determine when was the first time that the concepts of "chivalry" and "gallantry" were ordered to appear. Was it when the struggle against the lords and ladies started? Perhaps this was a struggle for happiness waged by those same women in the Russian settlements, whose lot left something better to be desired. However, instead of giving them a brighter life of being worshiped and cared for, they were reduced to the level of comrades, proud of being rid of the "privileges" based on sex. Differences, alas, remain. Fraternity between men and women looks more like a parody of the ideal towards which we aspired. Alas, as a rule, it is men who undertake to determine what we, women, need in this life and what is not mandatory. The result is that what is not mandatory includes beautiful clothing, various petty or not so petty matters of daily life, not to mention special appliances on the job, which would facilitate our labor. Briefly, what is not mandatory is the main thing: for a woman to keep being a woman. How frowningly the collective (the managers in particular) welcomes the announcement that a woman will be taking maternity leave. Ah, if only demographic problems could be resolved without taking production workers away from their jobs! Naturally, one could sympathize with

the managers in such a situation: they love children. However, there also are those eternal noncoincidences between what is private and what is public!

"Social progress can be precisely measured on the basis of the social status of the fair sex," a classical writer said as early as the 19th century. What can one add to this? COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

PAGES FROM HISTORY

The 1924-1925 Military Reform

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[Article by Semyen Vasilyevich Lipitskiy, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] The movement toward defense sufficiency and corresponding structural changes in our armed forces inspire us, along with the analysis of the contemporary situation and a scientific projection of its development, also to look at the history of military building in the USSR and to turn to the experience of the most significant reforms in this area. Despite the total lack of comparability between times and conventionality of historical analogies, we believe that this experience is of more than merely informative interest.

"...For the first time in history, an army is built on closeness, unbreakable closeness, one could say unbreakable unity between the soviets and the armed forces," Lenin wrote in March 1919. "The soviets bring together all working and exploited people, and the army is based on the principles of socialist defense and consciousness" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 38, p 50. Subsequent references will indicate volume and page only). How efficient such an unusual method of military building turned out to be was convincingly proved by the course and outcome of the Civil War and the collapse of the anti-Soviet intervention.

The RKP(b) Central Committee received Frunze's historical telegram on the complete routing of Vrangeli and the liquidation of the Southern Front on 16 November 1920. Five days later, addressing the Moscow Guberniya party conference, Lenin said that the country had entered a new stage, in which the existence of the Soviet republic within the net of the capitalist countries had been won and when the economic front was becoming essential in solving the constructive problems of the socialist revolution and in building new economic relations. "The transition here is exceptionally sharp and difficult, demanding different means, a different allocation and utilization of forces, and a different concentration of attention, psychology, etc." (vol 42, p 28).

In the first half of the 1920s, the political and economic system and the entire way of life of the Soviet people underwent decisive changes. Naturally, in the course of

this, major changes occurred in the military area as well. A mass demobilization of the Red Army took place while the ways and means of military building consistent with the new military and political situation were being developed theoretically and tested through practical experience, and prerequisites were being created for ensuring the reliable protection of the peaceful toil of the Soviet people.

The array of decisions and steps which contemporary Soviet military-historical publications describe as the 1924-1925 Military Reform were, essentially, the main and concluding act of the first perestroika in the armed forces of the Soviet republic. The need for, the objectives and the trend followed in this perestroika were substantiated in Lenin's report on the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet government at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1920) and the resolutions of the 10th Party Congress (March 1921). These documents note, above all, that although the war imposed upon the Soviet republic by the White Guards and the imperialists had essentially ended, the threat of a new military pressure remained and one had to be on guard. While continuing with the demobilization of the Red Army, it was necessary to reduce the number of troops but also substantially to improve their quality, strengthen their combat capability and persistently enhance the level of combat and political training of the personnel and to improve the material and technical support of the armed forces. "...We shall aspire," Lenin said at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, "to retain, while reducing the size of the armed forces, the type of basic nucleus which will not put an unbearable burden on the republic in terms of its upkeep and, at the same time, with a reduced size of the army, better than in the past, we shall ensure the possibility, should it become necessary, once again to raise it and to mobilize an even greater military force" (vol 42, pp 130-131).

By the end of 1920, after Lenin had formulated this pivotal idea for all subsequent efforts to reorganize the defense system of the country, the armed defense of the borders and interests of the Soviet republic were secured by a cadre regular Red Army and Navy, which numbered some 5.5 million men. It was obvious that a country exhausted by the imperialist and Civil wars was unable to support such a large army. Equally obvious, however, was the need to preserve and strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet state.

The ways and means of solving this vitally important problem were determined by the Bolshevik Party. Who would ensure the safety of the country in a hostile surrounding? How to structure the armed forces? What should be their functions and tasks under the conditions of a still fragile peace? Those questions were extensively debated at the Ninth (1920), 10th (1921), 11th (1922), and 12th (1923) party congresses, at RKP(b) Central Committee plenums, at the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (1921) and the Third Congress of Soviets of

the USSR (1925). Heated debates and arguments were taking place on the same problems within the armed forces as well.

The foundations for the discussions were the resolutions of the Eighth and Ninth RKP(b) congresses. They stipulated that in the next historical period one of the programmatic tasks would be a conversion from a regular army to a territorial militia which would train the working people in military affairs with the least possible separation from productive labor, in such a way that the "live manpower of some economic rayons would be at the same time the live manpower of certain military units."

No one denied the fact that a conversion to a territorial-militia system was expedient. However, a great variety of judgments were expressed on the ways and means of such a conversion. Some party members in the military, displaying recurrences of "left-wing disease," which bordered on adventurism, suggested that literally in a few months the Red Army be entirely demobilized and replaced by militia-type military formations.

The resolution on the military question, which was passed at the 10th RKP(b) Congress, judged the suggestions of the immediate and total conversion to a militia system wrong and practically dangerous. In developing Lenin's formulation, the congress resolved that "for the forthcoming period our armed forces must be based on the present Red Army, possibly reduced by demobilizing the older people and upgrading the proletarian and communist personnel." It was also pointed out that under the then existing military and political situation a partial conversion to militia formations could be started only in areas with the most compact proletarian population (Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals).

In narrating and commenting on the resolution of the 10th Party Congress on the military problem, military historians frequently omit the fact that it was taken in accordance with and on the basis of resolutions on basic political problems of that time: "On the Role and Tasks of the Party on the National Problem;" "On Replacing Apportionment With Tax-in-Kind;" and "The Soviet Republic in a Capitalist Encirclement." In a letter to the workers of Petrograd, the congress presidium reported that the party "is resolving precisely problems of how better to organize the trade unions, how to bring them closer to production management, how to improve, upgrade and increase output, ...how to improve the situation of workers and peasants by facilitating trade between town and country, ...how to quantitatively reduce and qualitatively improve the Red Army and how to establish stronger permanent peaceful relations with all countries." In formulating the course of the country's domestic and foreign policy on a peacetime basis, the party thus directed the working people to resolving an entire array of urgent socioeconomic and political problems, including in the area of military affairs.

The demobilization of the multi-million strong army was made substantially more difficult by the fact that at the turn of the 1920s military operations against the intervention and internal counterrevolutionary forces were still continuing in the Far East, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Furthermore, some military units and formations had been temporarily reorganized into "labor armies" and were participating in the rebuilding of transportation, industrial enterprises and other important national economic and defense projects. In addition, the dislocation of the transportation system and the grave shortage of fuel excluded the possibility of ensuring within any limited period of time the possibility of shipping millions of demobilized Red Army men to their permanent homes.

Under those circumstances it was only the coordinated efforts of party and state authorities, the military department and the public organizations that made it possible to ensure a systematic and organized demobilization. The former Red Army men had to be given clothing and shoes, and their feeding and medical care along their entire travel to their homes had to be ensured. In the large cities and transportation centers urgent transfer and medical control centers, quarantine facilities, cafeterias and premises for spending the night and resting had to be urgently provided.

The management and supervision of this work was entrusted to a governmental commission which was established in December 1920. It included M.I. Kalinin, the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, chairman of the VChK, E.M. Sklyanskiy, deputy chairman of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council, high officials of the transportation and other departments, and representatives of the trade unions. Local commissions with the same functions were set up as well.

The workers who had been discharged from the army had to be either given jobs or paid unemployment compensations. It was necessary to provide funds to the demobilized peasants for purchasing the necessary inventory, seed grain, construction materials, etc. Solving such problems in a country ruined by the war was no simple matter. That is why initially demobilization was extremely slow: in the course of the 1920-1921 winter no more than 800,000 men were demobilized.

Subsequently, however, the pace of demobilization increased, as is confirmed, among others, by a most interesting Leninist document: the letter which Lenin sent in May 1921 to G.M. Krzhizhanovskiy, chairman of the Gosplan. Vladimir Ilich pointed out the timely need for drafting a scientific statewide economic plan which would be based on assessing food and fuel resources and, in addition to other factors, taking into consideration the planned reduction of the Red Army by the autumn of 1921 for up to 1.6 million men and, the next year, as much as 800,000 men. The letter contained recommendations on considering the possibility of reducing the

number of workers in state establishments ("Soviet employees") by 25-50 percent (see vol 43, pp 260-263).

In accordance with Lenin's stipulations, the strength of the Red Army had been indeed reduced by 800,000 by November 1922. Furthermore, taking into consideration the exceptionally difficult economic situation of the Soviet republic and a certain improvement in the international situation, the December 1922 RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum deemed necessary and possible to reduce the strength of the armed forces by February 1923 by yet another 200,000. The plenum also noted that the 600,000 men remaining in the army would be a minimum which could ensure the security of the country under peacetime conditions. The plenum also indicated the need to improve the armament and ordnance of the Red Army.

Systematically implementing a course of reduction of the armed forces, the RKP(b) proved through its actions its loyalty to the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence. In item 1 of its resolution "On the Red Army," the Third Congress of USSR Soviets (May 1925) noted: "The aspiration for peace and for establishing friendly relations with all countries was and remains the basic principle of the international policy of the Soviet Union. The reductions in the Red Army which, at the present time, has been reduced from 5.5 million men to 560,000 is an irrefutable proof of such peaceful policy."

With that strength the Red Army could ensure, although with a great deal of stress, the country's security under peacetime conditions. However, it was no longer in a condition to train the necessary number of strategic reserves, for of the existing cadre units (even with a minimal—2 year—service) only 30 percent of the contingent of the draftees could undergo army training. Ways of military building had to be found which would make it possible to provide military knowledge and skills to young inductees, without any major material outlays. As a whole, this difficult task was achieved in the course of the military reform.

The difficult and painful process of demobilization, and of disbanding and reforming, reorganizing and ensuring the mass movement of cadres, changing areas of deployment, and so on, took 3 years. At the same time, and in close connection with demobilization, work was launched on establishing territorial militia units and formations. Initially, as an experiment, in the summer in 1921 an infantry territorial militia brigade was formed in Petrograd. Subsequently, realizing the expediency of this form of military building, in 1923 the Petrograd Brigade and nine cadre infantry divisions located in various parts of the country were reorganized into territorial militia divisions.

The objective circumstances in which the Soviet republic and its armed forces found themselves in 1921-1923 extremely limited and, in frequent cases, totally excluded the possibility of providing any planned combat and political training of the troops and work on forming

subunits and units, ensuring the steady supply of the troops with food and uniforms, with military ordnance, etc. The army mechanism, which had been created with such difficulty during the Civil War, broke down. A contributing factor was the shortcomings in the work of the central military department authorities.

Concerned by this situation, in January 1924 the RKP(b) Central Committee set up a special commission which was instructed to make a thorough study of condition in the armed forces. It included A.A. Andreyev, A.S. Bubnov, K.Ye. Voroshilov, S.I. Gusev, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, I.S. Unshlikht, M.V. Frunze, N.M. Shvernik and others. After studying the condition in several military districts, the Central Committee commission found a huge personnel turnover, low level of combat and political training, weak mobilization reserves and shortcomings in the structure and work methods of the military administration authorities. The overall conclusion was brief and categorical: "As it is now, the Red Army is not combat capable."

The RKP(b) Central Committee, having approved the work of the commission, noted that the circumstances and shortcomings it had exposed were threatening the army with a breakdown and called for a reform of the entire system of Soviet military building. An expanded reform plan was drafted by a group of military personnel within the party and experienced military specialists, headed by M.V. Frunze who, in the spring of 1924, was appointed deputy chairman of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council (RVSR) and was made people's commissar for Army and Navy Affairs, the chief of staff of the RKKA, and the chief of the RKKA Military Academy and, in January 1925, the chairman of the RVSR and the people's commissar for Army and Navy Affairs.

In accordance with the 1924-1925 plan, the system for the organization of the country's defense, and all constituent elements, were subjected to a profound reorganization affecting the method of staffing the armed forces, the organizational-personnel structure of the troops, the procedure for fulfilling military service duties, the content and methods for combat and political training, the structure and principles governing the work of the management and procurement authorities, the organization of party-political work, and the ways and means of training command and political cadres. The main feature in this set of measures was the energetic completion of a conversion to a mixed system for the building of the armed forces; by the end of 1925 46 out of 77 infantry divisions had already been converted into territorial-militia units. Infantry divisions deployed in the border military districts and most cavalry units and the naval and air forces and technical troops were kept as cadre forces.

The territorial formations were deployed in internal military districts, primarily in economically developed areas with adequate population density. As a rule, the

boundaries of the districts where the divisions, regiments and battalions were staffed and deployed matched the lines of guberniyas, uyezds (rayons) and volosts. This made possible the close rapprochement and the merger of the armed forces with the masses of toiling people and the soviets.

In the autumn of 1925 the Soviet government passed the Law on Universal Military Service, according to which male citizens from the ages of 19 to 40 were considered subject to military service and had to spend 2 years of predraft training (short-term training rallies organized by the local military commissariats), followed by regular service (5 years), after which they passed into the reserve. The law stipulated a clear and efficient procedure for staffing cadre and territorial-militia formations and for performing military service in them.

All cadre formations and units were staffed on the basis of the extraterritorial principle; privates in the Red Army and Navy served in them, respectively, 2, 3 or 4 years (depending on the branch), after which for the balance of the active service they were granted long-term furlough and subsequently moved into the reserve. Administrative authorities, technical subunits and supply agencies for the territorial troops drew their staffs from the cadres of army commanders, political workers and technical specialists. The bulk (as much as 90 percent) of the renewable personnel of the territorial formations were military draftees living in that area. They were given combat and political training in their subunits and units for a period of 3 months during the first year of service and 1-2 months over the next 4 years; throughout that time, in between training rallies, they lived at home and worked at their civilian jobs.

In close cooperation with the local soviets and party and Komsomol organizations and in periods between rallies, the command and the political authorities of the territorial units promoted political and military-patriotic upbringing and upgrading the cultural-educational standards of free draftees, Red Army men and the entire population (lectures, talks, motion pictures, literacy circles, meetings with sponsors, etc.).

Therefore, the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole and, in particular, the territorial-militia forces, actively influencing the mass of rural and urban youth, greatly contributed to strengthening the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and implementing Lenin's concept of advancing an extensive cultural revolution.

By the turn of the 1930s the beneficial close contacts and ties between the local authorities and the population, on the one hand, and Red Army soldiers were reduced to a minimum. This was done under the pretext of the need to increase revolutionary vigilance. Actually, the purpose was to isolate the masses of Red Army men from truthful information concerning the protests of the peasantry

opposing the coercive comprehensive collectivization and the elimination of kulak elements among the middle peasantry.

One of the most complex problems of the 1924-1925 Reform, from the sociopolitical viewpoint, was that of national military formations. For the first time the question was raised at the 12th Party Congress (April 1923) in connection with the December 1922 historical resolution on the founding of the USSR. Giving its full approval to the voluntary unification of national republics within a single multinational state, the 12th RKP(b) Congress recommended to the party members to intensify educational work within the Red Army "in the spirit of instilling the ideas of brotherhood and cohesion among the peoples of the Union" and undertaking "practical steps for the organization of national army units."

Let us immediately note that the course toward developing national military formations was decisively influenced by political considerations: the party implemented the concepts of its program of granting to all nations and ethnic groups equal rights in all areas of government building, including the military. National forces were to be (and actually were used as) above all an important channel for political education and an efficient instrument for enhancing the educational and cultural standards of peoples previously oppressed by tsarism, as a kind of "school" for the training of national cadres.

National regiments and divisions were raised without any particular difficulties and quite rapidly (by the beginning of 1925) in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, i.e., in areas where the necessary political and socioeconomic prerequisites and conditions already existed: a relatively high level of economic and cultural development, a relatively large working class, a network of party, Komsomol and trade union organizations, and availability of local command and political cadres which had been trained in World War I and the Civil War.

While acknowledging the political expediency of raising national military units and formations in the mid-1920s, let us also note the very serious shortcomings of this form of military building. The worst among them was a certain conflict with the principles of internationalism, unity and friendship among Soviet nations. The organizational separation among the soldiers belonging to different ethnic groups and the existence of ethnic military formations created grounds for manifestations of nationalism, parochialism and separatism. As early as December 1924, M.V. Frunze noted with concern that "...in some areas there is a tendency to turn ethnic formations into nuclei of national armies."

The experience of the Civil War itself indicated the danger of such trends. At that time, at the start of 1919, two Ukrainian, a Lithuanian-Belorussian, a Latvian and an Estonian armies were raised, consisting of volunteer

units and formations. As early as February of that year Ya.M. Sverdlov, chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and RKP(b) Central Committee secretary, wrote in this connection that "occasionally terrifying results are obtained from the wave of spontaneous actions rolling over the Ukraine, Latvia, Estlandia and Belorussia...."

The high command of the Red Army repeatedly informed the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Soviet Government of separatist actions and the low combat capability of most of the national formations. In his regular report to Lenin (23 April 1919) Commander-in-Chief I.I. Vatselis expressed his extreme concern in connection with the fact that at the time when the Civil War had reached its highest peak of stress, a number of Soviet republics had assumed a "specific appearance of separatist independence in matters of waging the war." The commander-in-chief considered the splintering of the armed forces into national armies "inexpedient from all viewpoints and extremely damaging in terms of our success."

Lenin immediately wrote E.M. Sklyanskiy, the deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council:

"It is necessary, **urgently** and immediately:

"1. To draft a **text** of a directive of the Central Committee to all "nationals" on military **unity** (merger);

"2. To distribute it to the press for the sake of writing a series of articles..." (vol 50, pp 287-288).

The text of the directive demanded by Lenin was discussed and approved on 4 May at the session of the RKP(b) Central Committee. It pointed out that "violating unity of control and command and the national splintering of armies result in national frictions among Red Army units and are the right way to the breakdown of the armed forces." It was such a harsh yet entirely objective evaluation of the national armies that made the Central Committee predetermine their fate: On 1 June 1919 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee passed a resolution on the military unity of Soviet republics. On the following day the Central Committee Politburo drafted specific suggestions on the elimination and radical reorganization of all national armies. During the month of June such reorganization was carried out in full. Under wartime conditions national armies proved unviable. They vanished from the battlefields 6 months after their appearance.

The re-creation of national military units in the mid-1920s was based less on political considerations than the specific nature of territorial-militia forms of military building. This took into consideration the danger of manifestations of nationalism in such units, countered by purposeful political-educational work and intensified propaganda of the ideas and principles of proletarian internationalism and Soviet patriotism and the inviolable organizational unity of the Red Army. Under the relatively stable peacetime conditions of that period

national military formations helped to involve the toiling masses of all nationalities in the implementation of the sacred duty of defending the socialist fatherland and, at the same time, were an important factor in the socioeconomic and cultural upsurge of previously backward peoples. However, the moment the clouds of a new war gathered on the foreign policy horizon, the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR Sovnarkom passed a resolution (March 1938) on the reorganization of national units and formations into extraterritorial regular regiments and divisions.

In the course of the 1924-1925 Military Reform, the administrative authorities, whose work methods had been largely inherited from the old army, were also subject to profound reorganization. Above all, paper work was reduced by 75 percent! As early as 1924 the personnel of the central authorities of the military department had been reduced by nearly 25 percent; those of military districts by one-third and the procurement system by 40 percent. "We were able to achieve tangible results in making major reductions in this area," M.V. Frunze noted, "both in terms of saving from our common budget as well as reducing the number of mouths to feed."

Nonetheless, the main content of the restructuring of the military authorities was improvements in their structure, upgrading the skills and a daring rejuvenation of cadres and strengthening the party stratum and the by no means mechanical reduction in the size of the apparatus. As a whole, the 1924-1925 Military Reform made it possible to reduce to a maximum the cost of maintaining the country's armed forces while retaining and increasing their capability to repel any attack from the outside.

Regardless of how specific the historical situation and the reasons which determined the objectives and methods of the military reform of 1924-1925 may have been, the experience in carrying it out remains largely instructive to this day, despite the specific features of the nuclear age. This applies to implementing the principle of sensible sufficiency of armed forces for defense and upgrading the quality of the armed forces, while significantly reducing their number, and ensuring the optimal rapprochement (merger, to use the Leninist term) between the armed forces and the toiling masses and the Soviets, and the implementation of the Leninist principles of national policy and social justice in the army's organizational structure and life. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

BCP Course of Radical Reforms

905B0018M Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 4,
Mar 90 (signed to press 22 Feb 90) pp 110-113

[Compiled by G. Cherneyko, KOMMUNIST special correspondent]

[Text] The 14th Extraordinary Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party marks the conclusion of a series of congresses of communist and worker parties of Eastern European countries. Such party fora mark a historical turn in the development of the socialist political system. KOMMUNIST already published commentaries on some of them (see Nos 16 and 18 for 1989 and No 2 for 1990).

Having proclaimed that the BCP was an "organic part of the great socialist movement," the congress declared its loyalty to the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Blagoev and Dimitrov and the outstanding Marxist theoreticians of other countries and parties. Readiness and interest in making use of everything valuable and useful gained by the communist and social democratic movements, progressive non-Marxist social sciences and the entire contemporary world civilization were expressed.

Supporters of all party platforms participated in the activities of the central commission in charge of preparations for the congress. Through joint efforts the BCP Central Committee Political Report was drafted and submitted for review by this high forum. It was presented by Petur Mladenov, party Central Committee general secretary; also submitted were a draft Manifesto on Democratic Socialism in Bulgaria and the BCP Statutes. They became a good foundation for a constructive and fruitful debate which reflected a broad spectrum of views and viewpoints on key problems of party life and its place in the social process. Furthermore, all the ideological trends submitted their own platforms at the congress, where their views on the problems under discussion were presented in detail.

The following excerpts from the congress' documents and the statements by congress delegates indicate the nature of changes in BCP activities.

From the Political Report of the BCP Central Committee to the 14th Extraordinary Congress:

"Asserting the principle of democratic unity will enable us to part with the harmful legacy. After the "monolithic" unity around the "line," and the stagnating convenience to which we became so strongly accustomed, today alternate associations, trends, ideological platforms and clubs are developing within the party structure itself. They are introducing a fresh current in the search for the truth, expressing various viewpoints. At the present time everything is seething. The initial confusion created by this phenomenon is increasingly yielding to understanding the usefulness of the clash of opinions, pluralism of ideas and variety of approaches and actions."

Ivan Nikolov, member of the Alternate Socialist Association (ASO).

The ASO has proclaimed itself a party faction. It is the legal form of alternate thinking and acting within and outside the party. It does not consider any factional struggle as antiparty. Acknowledging itself as part of the BCP, at the same time it cooperates with all forces

striving toward a radical democratic party reform and a radical restructuring of all social life.

The renovation of the party means the emancipation of the party member as an individual. As an organizational force, the party must not stand above the personality of the party member. Its duty is to be his social environment, which guarantees to him scope for self-expression and political and social stability.

The party must become a voluntary association of ideologically united communists with full power. The strength of the party lies in the wealth of human individualities and talents and the possibilities offered by this ideological unification.

Must a decision of the majority be mandatory to the minority or the individual? The individual is always in the minority. The answer to this question should be sought in the contemporary trends of development of human civilization, human rights and the possibilities of man to display his uniqueness in his right to make a choice.

Decisions must be binding only to those who make them. The wisdom of those who make decisions consists of contributing to the unification and conscious cohesion among party members rather than relying on coercion, threats or the imposition of their will. There neither is nor should there be any power over the communists other than their own conscience and ideological convictions. That is where the greatest power of the party lies. That guarantees its organizational unity.

Can the center pass decisions which are mandatory for all? As an answer to this question, claims were voiced to the effect that the party cannot manage without a center. This is true. However, we must also most categorically reject the coercive nature of the decisions formulated by superior authorities in terms of the primary party organizations. Such organizations are autonomous, being associations of party members which are self-organized and self-managed.

Academician Kiril Vasilev, member of the Alternate Socialist Association.

Everyone realizes that today we are facing a dilemma: either a reborn party, armed with the ideas of humanism and democracy, or its gradual reduction to the point that it turns into a political dwarf, an orthodox sect with no substantial significance in social life.

Today our party faces the historical task of taking a decisive turn, such as it has never taken before, not toward capitalism but toward democratic and human socialism. We need flexibility and maneuverability within the framework of a principle-minded orientation. Straight orthodoxy is the greatest hindrance in making a decisive turn toward the ideal. This means people who have not forgotten anything old or learned nothing new and seem to be unwilling to learn.

The main question which assumes priority is that of unity. What kind of unity? It should be a unity of a variety of views and viewpoints on the party, under the banner of socialism. Otherwise we shall have a repeat of the well-familiar sterilized monolithic nature of an organization which would be totally useless.

The purpose of the ASO is not to blow up the party but to contribute to its recovery. I have been a party member for 52 years and I shall never allow anyone to undermine its foundations.

Aleksandur Tomov, member of the Coordination Council and Coordinator of the Movement for Democratic Socialism.

The Movement for Democratic Socialism, which operates within the BCP, favors democratic and humane socialism and the participation of every citizen in labor, ownership and management, the creation of constitutional guarantees for the existence of different types of ownership, the combination of market mechanisms with strong socially oriented functions of the state, shaping the institution of the presidency, party renovation and reform and separating the party from the state.

What is the possible way for the development of the party? One option is retaining the administrative structures and blaming Todor Zhivkov and his circle for everything. Could we follow this path, preserving the authoritarian and hierarchical structures, suppressing the minority and the innovators for the sake of a coercive unity? Is it not clear that the established party and administrative structure paralyzes thinking and, in general, any ideological movement within the party?

The second possible way leads to the rejection of the administrative-command structures in the party, abolishing the party and creating a new party in its place.

However, there is also a third way which was and is favored by the Movement for Democratic Socialism. It is the way of radical reforming based on the principles of democratic socialism. Whatever differences may exist on individual specific problems and however sharp the debates may be, I am confident that the party can and must rally around the line and principles of democratic socialism which are included in the draft documents.

It would be sensible to ask the following: Do they include adequate guarantees for a party reform, renovation and cleansing? Taking into consideration the nature of changes in the statutes, I believe that we need certain additional guarantees and standards. To begin with, the apparat must never replace the elected authorities. Second, the executive authority which will be elected should not assume the functions of a higher party council while the chairman of the party and his circle should not assume the functions of an executive authority. Party activities and the bulk of its resolutions should be shifted to the primary party organizations. Immediate steps should be taken to strengthen the party organizations at places of residence, for it is precisely there that in 3

months the fate of the elections will be decided and, I would say, the fate of the country as well. The radical separation of party and state structures is a major problem. Until recently they were a support for Stalinism and neo-Stalinism. I entirely approve the suggestion of separating the positions of party and state leadership. In precisely the same way I consider abnormal for members of the party leadership to be members of the government.

Petur-Emil Mitev, chairman of the "A Bulgarian Way to Europe" Platform Coordination Council, elected member of the Presidium of the BCP Supreme Council.

Communists who have proclaimed themselves an ideological trend within the party but, however, who oppose factional struggle due to the fact that at the present stage the BCP lacks a sufficiently clear line of action which could be pitted against various options, have rallied around this platform. The platform program is based on several principles: a European path of development of the country; democratic understanding of ownership; de-Stalinization of the party and uprooting Zhivkovism; freedom of the individual; national accord and nonviolence. The supporters of this trend believe that the links which existed between Eastern and Western Europe were broken and that the further development of the continent is impossible without restoring economic, political and spiritual contacts. The supporters of the platform consider socialism not a type of social system but a trend in the development of mankind.

The question is what made possible for the idea of socialism to be so different from real socialism? A variety of explanations are provided, some elements of which are found in our own documents. First: the builder was poor. This explanation contains a share of the truth. How did it happen that many "fraternal buildings" were erected by poor builders? The second explanation: it is not the builder who was to blame but the brigade, known as the nomenclature, in which not everything was as it should be. That is where the reason lies. This as well contains a share of the truth. The impression should not be created that we would like to put the entire blame on the builder for the sake of saving the brigade. The third explanation: neither the builder nor the brigade but it was the architect who made a mistake. Something was wrong with the blueprint. This explanation as well has its share of the truth. The problem is that there is no ready blueprint for construction and that we must change our understanding of socialism and abandon the primitive viewpoint of socialism as being something similar to a house under construction. Socialism is a civilization process. Stalinism begins from the viewpoint of socialism in a single country. After World War II this viewpoint developed as an understanding of socialism as a camp, as a barricade. Socialism, however, is not at all like this. It is not a house under construction. It is an organic process. It is like a plant and it can be uprooted only by force. This is not to say that there are no ways of influencing this process. However, such conditions have nothing in common with power pressure. We must

abandon the power understanding of socialism. That is precisely where our error was. We must develop a different understanding of what it is.

Nor is there anything fatal in the fact that for a while we must become the opposition. Socialism will not perish from this. Like social progress, it is not identical to a system of power. The opposite concept is the basis of the idea which we must abandon for the sake of adopting the concept of democratic socialism which supports, stimulates and frees the existing socialist factors rather than creates them on the basis of some kind of plan or blueprint.

We most firmly state that we are in favor of achieving radical objectives through moderate means and gradual development. We are in favor of preventing a breakdown of the entire social system. We do not share the left-wing radical views which are being shaped abroad.

Chavdar Kyuranov, elected member of the BCP Supreme Council Presidium.

It is possible that our party, which may be structured according to a principle which allows for differences while maintaining unity of action may not be all that cohesive. However, it will be free. What will unite it? It will be united by conscious discipline (I have not much faith in this), but we must acknowledge that it will also be united by competition, for there will be other forces and other parties. Although there are differences among us, we also know the common features which bind us.

It was legitimate to believe in the case of Stalinist-type parties that those who are the closest to you are also your biggest enemy. It was on this basis that we defined our relations with the social democrats. The time has now come to change this viewpoint decisively and to redefine our attitude also toward factions and ideological trends. I belong to neither but I believe that the existence of such associations is absolutely necessary for us if we wish to achieve freedom within the party.

It seems to me that an increasing number of people support the reform and so are people who support that which has been already established and become traditional, but which cannot rescue our party.

In my view unity is possible. Not the old, hypocritical and coercive unity but a unity which presumes differences despite the existence of common ideas. If we can preserve unity and differences we shall be a modern party.

The congress considered BCP unity a prerequisite for its radical restructuring and renovation. The manifesto adopted at the party forum sets the task of building a new type of contemporary Marxist party which can act as the ideological and political leader of social forces and the people's masses fighting for the building of a society of democratic and humane socialism.

The resolutions of the congress marked the beginning of the renovation of the BCP. De-Stalinization is the first step. Subsequently, profound changes are planned in the

nature of the party and its understanding and resolution of the major problems of social development. As a party of democratic socialism, it voluntarily surrenders its monopoly on power and convergence with the state. It calls for acknowledging the supreme will of the people as to who should rule them and how.

The congress formulated as a strategic task the radical renovation of the party from the theoretical, political, organizational, moral and cadre viewpoints.

Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Communist Party Higher Council: "If we do not make the renovations, we shall not be in step with our time, with the changes which are taking place currently in our society and with anything progressive that exists in the working class, particularly the young and the intelligentsia. Furthermore, the question is when shall we accomplish such changes. If we are too slow we should expect the fate of the SED, PZPR and CZCP, not to mention the Romanian Communist Party.... It is only by immediately taking up the work of renovation while preserving our organizational and political unity, and only in the course of a tempestuous political electoral struggle that the party will regain the trust of the people and will play the role of vanguard in perestroika."

[Comment by G. Cherneyko] The new style of party work is the implementation of policy and programs above all through the activities of the party members at their place of work and residence and through dialogue, discussions and reaching agreements.

Having demonstrated its resolve to achieve unity within its ranks, the party spoke out in favor of a national consensus: the creation of a government of national accord, based on the broad participation of all significant sociopolitical forces; implementing an economic reform while making use of all accessible forms of social dialogue, including referendums; unification of all social forces for the formulation and implementation of efficient ecological policy; preventing the monopoly of power on the part of any given party including itself; encouraging the free organization of people in clubs, movements, unions, foundations, associations, etc., including some of an alternate nature; granting the National Assembly the right to control the activities of the armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs; separating the party from the state; and establishing a pluralistic and truly functional multiparty system. The BCP proceeds from the fact that the existence of an opposition is a natural and necessary feature for the political system as well as for the party itself and for its preservation as a political organization, for without competition the party cannot develop normally. By encouraging a political opposition, the BCP at the same time openly proclaims its readiness to join in a coalition with any party for the sake of the implementation of positive national objectives. It looks not at the distant future but sets itself an immediate and direct goal of building a democratic socialist society, governed by the rule of law, a rich and civilized Bulgaria, through reform.

The congress acknowledged that the party is not ready to adopt an integral political program, for this will be the task of the next party forum. At this stage it limits itself to the formulation of a new ideological and political orientation consistent with contemporary global processes and trends and the requirements of a radical restructuring of the party itself.

The activities of the Bulgarian communists under the complex circumstances of the contemporary world assume a separate significance which exceeds the limits of national boundaries. As it relies on the difficult experience of the other parties, the BCP is seeking its own answers to the imperatives of our time. COPY-RIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

Geopolitical Aspects of Defense Sufficiency

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[Article by Sergey Yevgenyevich Blagovolin, doctor of economic sciences, department head at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations]

[Text] The changing nature of East-West relations, the abandonment of a number of negative stereotypes reciprocally perceived and, above all, the continuing forward movement which promises the reaching of essentially new levels of cooperation and reciprocal understanding have a strong impact on policy in the area of military problems.

The implementation of the principle of defense sufficiency is becoming increasingly relevant within it. Naturally, this problem includes a great number of specific and purely military aspects (such as determining the optimal structure and composition of the armed forces (VS), changes in tactics and operational skills, and so on, new requirements facing the training of the VS and many other). However, problems of military-political and economic nature, most closely related to the entire set of global and regional problems, assume a particularly important, a dominating position. They have some common and distinct features in each country, big or small, which play an active role in the process of the radical restructuring of international relations.

To a large extent these commonalities and differences are related to the geographic location of the country or the area, and the system of its interconnections and interdependencies with the surrounding world, the configuration and size of the territory, and so on. In other words, they are related to geopolitical factors, as I understand them and as I have tried to study them for many years. I believe that for our country the geopolitical aspects of defense sufficiency are of unique significance. The geopolitical dualism of the situation of the Soviet Union, which is both a European and an Asian country, easily reveals, from a simple glance at the map, its entirely different nature from the viewpoint of ensuring the

country's security, compared to the same type of dualism of the United States (which is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power). Adding to this indicators, such as the state of the economy and the level of scientific and technical development, the extent of economic development of various parts of the territory and the nature of international relations, I believe that the vital importance of this problem in terms of the USSR will become even more obvious.

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In assessing the events of recent years, we unwittingly reach the conclusion that however we may explain the events, the scale of our military preparation exceeded all sensible parameters. Until very recently, and for long years after we had achieved nuclear missile parity, we produced as much or even more types of armaments (tanks, IFV, submarines, tactical aircraft, artillery guns, anti-aircraft guided missiles, etc.), than all other countries in the world combined. The country paid a high price for such excesses. Until recently, approximately one-third of the entire work force in industry was engaged in the production of military items. If we recall that it was precisely to that area that the best raw and other materials were directed, along with equipment and cadres, and that most of the NIOKR in the country (substantially more than one-half) went to meet such needs, one can easily imagine how much and what remained for the rest.

It hardly makes sense for us to console ourselves by recalling the size of our budget allocations for defense—70.9 billion rubles—although, obviously, from the strictly mathematical viewpoint, the figure is more or less accurate. Let us look at it from another standpoint—the economic and military-political. For example, it is being said that our weapons are substantially cheaper than the American (by a factor of 9 for cruisers and of 11 for helicopters) because both raw materials and manpower in our country are less expensive. The question immediately arises: Is this the case with all other types of industrial goods in which the situation in terms of raw materials and manpower are absolutely the same? Clearly, such is not the case. Something else is obvious (as has been repeatedly written by defense industry specialists): in our country prices of military items have been lowered by several hundred percent or, in general, are purely symbolic. This means that in terms of all absolute and even relative indicators (other than the share of the GNP) our military budget is significantly lower than the American and the difference in the share of the GNP is small—it is 6 percent in their case and 8 percent in ours. It is now quite clear that if we want to resolve our economic problems we must stop playing hide-and-seek and openly speak of the huge burden of military expenditures which, combined with other well-familiar circumstances, brought the country to a state of economic crisis.

On the military-political level such "double bookkeeping" played a major role in rallying against us virtually

all highly developed and newly industrialized countries. This made our huge efforts in the military area not only unnecessary (we shall return to this later) but also absolutely futile. Our economic potential, grossly speaking, is lower quantitatively by a factor of 7-8 and totally noncomparable qualitatively with those against whom we set ourselves. In the analysis of this situation, it seems to me, we must distinguish between two aspects. The first is the reasons for the confrontation in the world arena, which appeared and began to function after World War II. It would be profoundly erroneous to fail to see that in this case a great share of the responsibility falls on the West, particularly the United States. In this case we must not convert "repentance" into self-flagellation. There is something else as well. The perimeter of military activities as demarcated by our previous leadership, until 1985, largely failed to coincide with the perimeter of our security (which, generally speaking, is determined for each individual country by the vitally important areas of political, economic and military interaction and a supporting communications system). Furthermore, the ideologizing of our foreign and military policies, brought to an extreme, led to the fact that even where such a coincidence did occur, such as in Eastern Europe, a situation of an active rejection of the entirely legitimate interests of the USSR developed within the Eastern European countries as well as in the rest of the world. Instead of a security zone a powder keg was being created in Eastern Europe.

Only two examples can be cited of a sensible combination of the short-term interests of our own security and the ability to look slightly ahead—Finland and Austria. Despite the differences between the two countries, they have something in common: We did not impose upon these countries an ideology alien to them and an inefficient social system; instead, we obtained from these areas reliably guaranteed interests in the field of security. These are exceptions, however, which merely prove the rule.

The line of behavior we chose demanded an endless increase in military power as the only real component of security. Let me repeat, however, that relying on it was fictitious and, for entirely objective reasons, simply groundless. An impasse developed, the simple and obvious resolution of which nonetheless did not suit us.

As the period since 1985 proved, the solution was to acknowledge the fact that although not absent, the military threat from the West had become substantially undermined and weakened, to say the least.

When nonetheless, displaying legitimate caution, we say that the purpose of our military preparations is the prevention of war, one of the ways for achieving this is that of "maxi-minimizing," which calls for retaining the possibility of inflicting unacceptable damage. At the same time, this is the only way for releasing resources needed to accelerate the growth of the economy, without which, considering the pace and scope of the scientific and technical revolution, the irreversible lagging in the

military area as well becomes increasingly real. We do not have to console ourselves with illusions that by investing increasing resources in this area now we could perhaps keep afloat.

Such views have been expressed quite clearly. One of the most "substantial" arguments may be reduced, generally speaking, to the following: What if now we were to "reduce everything" yet fail to accelerate our development? Let me answer this. To begin with, unless we reduce we would face a rapidly increasing economic and political pressure, for whether we like it or not, the shape of our VS and their size, structure and deployment could hardly have been described strictly as defensive for a number of years. Remaining on such positions would mean dooming ourselves to political isolation and economic collapse. Second, if we reduce without accelerating, the answer, alas, is clear: it means that we have proved to be historically bankrupt; it means that the pace of progress of contemporary civilization is more than we can achieve and that within such a civilization we are simply unnecessary. We have the right to expect of the world surrounding us all kinds of proof of good intention; however, one thing we cannot expect: that other countries would artificially slow down their progress to stay on our level.

So, where is this solution to the situation we mentioned? Does all this not sound absolutely hopeless? By no means. It is precisely geopolitical analysis which enables us, in my view, to find grounds for sensible optimism. The development of events in recent years and months has indicated that the West is truly interested in the existence of a stable and prosperous Soviet Union, compatible with it in terms of basic characteristics and features. Compatible, precisely, but by no means merged with it. What does this mean from the military and military-political viewpoints? It seems to me that we could speak of approaching a historical landmark when many of the old measures, concepts and views have to be rejected. The essence of the matter is that the steps taken by the USSR in restructuring its military program (I emphasize restructuring and not introducing perhaps noticeable but nonetheless individual changes, as was the case with unilateral reductions) are encountering an increasingly interested response in the West. The time of true and deep changes is coming.

This is related above all to the nearing agreements in the Vienna talks. Their achievement and implementation will not in themselves mean a total conversion to defense sufficiency but, unquestionably, will open the road to it. The distance which the West is prepared to go in meeting us is absolutely clear. The Bundeswehr will be reduced by 20 percent; a reduction is being contemplated of all the military budgets of NATO countries. Furthermore, literally everywhere it is being emphasized that the successful outcome of the Vienna talks and the continuation of the same line will inevitably lead to the fact that the Western European countries will achieve an essentially regional consensus on the subject of reducing military efforts.

Naturally, what matters to us the most is the reaction of the United States. A great deal of speculations exist on this most important problem. Even at the second Congress of People's Deputies President Bush was "quoted," as having said that he opposes a drastic reduction in military expenditures. It was also claimed that military expenditures will be higher in the 1989/1990 fiscal year compared to the previous one. Let me begin with this: they may be higher but this is in current prices, without taking inflation into consideration; with inflation, without which nothing can be computed anywhere, they are approximately 1 percent below the 1988/89 fiscal year and 12 percent lower than in the peak 1984/85 fiscal year. What are the views on which the assessment of future American military expenditures and military preparations in general is based? President Bush indeed said that he opposed any fast drop in the level of American military expenditures by one-half (U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 1 January 1990), i.e., reducing them to roughly \$145 billion. According to his instructions, the Department of Defense is working on a reduction of the military budget by approximately \$180 billion over a 5-year period, compared with the previous reduction which amounted to no more than a few percentage points. Therefore, the 1991 fiscal year budget will be reduced by yet another 2.6 percent. This constitutes a substantial reduction in the American Armed Forces during the 1990s (down to approximately 1.7-1.8 million men compared to 2.12 million presently), reducing the number of older armaments, including aircraft carriers (from 14 to 12) and naval vessels of the main classes, as a whole (down to 500 compared to the present more than 570 instead of the previously planned increase to 600). In addition to the so to say natural reduction of the navy, the idea of the need for holding discussions with the USSR on such problems is becoming increasingly popular (see, for example, THE TIMES, 9 January 1990). A substantial reduction in the American Forces in Europe is contemplated. All of these changes are aimed, as the leaders of the armed forces of the United States assert, at changing their aspect which was previously oriented above all toward a military confrontation with the USSR.

All of this supports the claim that on the geopolitical level our conversion to defense sufficiency will be neither a one-sided disarmament nor an effort to present a wish as reality, something which is being claimed today. A unique possibility exists of creating in Europe an entirely new type of "security space" which will make it possible not only to minimize military preparations but to do so somehow in full view of one another. In this connection, let us mention the very interesting article by USSR Defense Minister D.T. Yazov (KOMMUNIST No 18, 1989) in which he mentions quite justifiably the steadily growing role of transparency of military preparations. As the process of talks draws to an end at any given stage, it is precisely such transparency that will be the most important constant in maintaining and expanding this "security space."

Unquestionably, however, we should not be limited only to Europe in USSR-U.S. and East-West relations. Therefore, the question arises of the Asian-Pacific area (ATR) where we are still very far from engaging in talks similar to those being held in Vienna, the more so since in that area the military confrontation is of a scattered nature and related to a number of added circumstances. In my view, in terms of the situation in the ATR which pertains to Soviet-American and other Soviet-"Western" relations (the others will be discussed later), we could proceed from what I would suggest to describe as the "principle of global equalization of the level of reciprocal threats."

Naturally, one of the most important parameters of defense sufficiency is changing the trend of military preparations. For decades all of us knew that West and East were pointed at each other and that any talks could reduce tension only to some extent without essentially changing this key circumstance. Therefore, should the present process continue, the already mentioned transparency, including a joint survey of military doctrines, and the manifestation of forms of active cooperation in the military area become vital tasks. Combined with the growing ties in the economic, political and humanitarian areas in the future, which could bring the situation closer to the one which now exists in relations among Western countries, for instance. Many of them have substantial armed forces. However, it is not only formal membership within an organization but the entire "united way of life," and the entire system of interrelationships that makes the use of such forces against each other totally inconceivable.

Defense sufficiency on the geopolitical level does not mean having armed forces of a certain size and structure, deployed in respective areas. It also means the absence of "concealed targeting" in certain specific directions, contained either in mobilization plans or, in the final account, in the mentality of military activities itself. If one wishes, it means repeating under contemporary conditions General de Gaulle's idea of "defense in all directions," naturally, taking into consideration all the profound changes which have taken place since then in the area of the development of means of armed struggle and in military-political relations. It is a question not only of the lack of desire to attack or to have the potential to do so but also the lack of hostility and, above all, of reasons for hostility. This aspect of the matter is particularly important also because, naturally, for a long time into the future the world will not become demilitarized.

2

The circumstance we already pointed out is related to a number of processes which directly influence concepts which took decades to develop and, in frequent cases, changes them quite seriously. That which yesterday seems to be an appendix to, an echo of the main confrontation, occasionally assumes independent significance and its own motivations and motive forces.

This applies above all to the arms race in the zone beyond traditional military confrontation between East and West. Frankly speaking, for many long years the USSR, the United States and several other countries stimulated this process for the sake of their own interests (as it seemed then), in an effort to gain political, military and economic influence. Today this same process has largely escaped their control and threatens to become one of the most acute problems of global security. If such is the case, it threatens to become one of the problems which influence the scale and structure of military preparations, involving the majority of developed countries throughout the world.

The events of the Iran-Iraq War proved that instability in South-South relations could most unexpectedly threaten the vital interests of countries which are totally uninvolved in such conflicts. One can easily imagine the possibilities of such influence, taking for example into consideration the steady proliferation of missiles as well as missile-manufacturing technology. According to the London Strategic Research Institute, more than 20 developing countries already have their missile armaments which could strike at the territories of other countries (*"Strategic Survey"*, London, 1988-1989, p 15). Bluntly stated, the present questionable condition of the system of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons greatly increases fears related to the probable consequences of possible conflicts which could affect the global situation.

In my view, this proves that if the "upper level" of military preparations is defined by East-West relations, the "lower" level should have entirely definite limitations related to other circumstances, the role and significance of which must steadily increase. Despite the profound positive changes occurring in Europe, it is also clear that the search for stability under the new circumstances will require time and effort. In particular, a military confrontation between the two blocs should in no way be replaced by a new "Balkanizing" of the continent and the appearance of hotbeds of likely conflicts which would be particularly dangerous precisely within Europe. The world has indeed proved to be "multicolored." In terms of our country (and not our country alone) this also means the existence of various conditions for security "in different directions."

Therefore, the conversion to new quality parameters of defense building in our country (or, in other words, the military reform) is called upon to resolve simultaneously quite a broad range of political, economic and military problems. As to the economy, as we pointed out, the situation is more or less clear. In terms of the military and political aspects, essentially totally innovative and very complex work lies ahead. Our armed forces (as is the case with military activities in general) must be reoriented from the quite customary course of preparedness for a major war with the West to the ability to resolve, if necessary, problems of different nature and scale. Naturally, this means that we must eliminate elements which not only do not fit the new "safety

space" which we are creating jointly with the West but, incidentally, also do not essentially add anything to our security outside a dependence on any possible "direction" chosen as a basis for assessing the situation. In particular, once again we must soberly evaluate our shipbuilding program. Aircraft carriers are not our weapon either economically or politically. Furthermore, to have only two is the equivalent (compared with the Western countries) to not having any. To have 10 or 15 would be simply inconceivable without definitively ruining the country. An aircraft carrier with the aircraft it carries costs in the order of \$5 billion (interestingly, how many rubles would it cost—could it be 0.5 billion?). The cost of an aircraft group is triple that. The main question, nonetheless, is why? Our shores can be defended quite efficiently with other weapons, which would be several hundred percent less expensive.

Reducing the size and the reorganization of the VS must unquestionably be paralleled by enhancing the level of combat training and eliminating situations in which even the "elite" of our armed forces—fliers—have, according to Western data, several hundred percent less flight hours compared to the United States. Improving the structure of the VS and relieving them from all extraneous functions (construction, civil defense, etc.) are also part of such measures. I am absolutely convinced that we must formulate clear criteria concerning the level of personnel training. Comparisons are only possible with NATO and, above all, the United States. References to the need to have a mass army to defend the territory, as was the case 40 to 50 years ago, totally ignore, to begin with, the most profound changes which have taken place in the military-technical area. Second, for some reason they are totally unrelated to the fact that no single country or group of countries which may be of even theoretical "interest" to us from this viewpoint have such mass armies nor do they intend to have them.

As to extra-army training (which in the West, in the different countries, includes the national guard, reserves, and so on), in this case as well profound changes must be made, also taking into consideration the experience of the Western countries, where the level of such training makes it possible to have highly skilled cadres, although in limited numbers.

Essentially, today the problem can be formulated simply: to have a great deal of something that is poor or less of something that is good. Therefore, relatively small forces (in my estimates, roughly equal to the size of the present American forces) but well-trained and equipped with modern weapons, naturally, most of them professional, combined with nuclear weapons, the total elimination of which (taking the already mentioned facts into consideration) is still far into the future, are, from the military viewpoint, a reliable guarantee for the inviolability of the state.

Today, based on the military-technical aspect of the matter, the "period of guaranteed security" could be assessed at approximately 10 to 15 years. In the course of

this time, obviously, there will be no scientific and technical change in the military area which would require the application of essentially different military-strategic evaluations and approaches. The updating of already existing types of armaments, which is inevitable to a certain extent, should be carried out both in our country and in the West in such a way as to fit the "security space."

The main thing, however, is for this "guaranteed" time to be used with maximal efficiency in resolving the political problems of perestroika in defense activities. In the military area, as in all other, our country must become an organic part of the community of all countries with which we intend to build the "European home," including the United States and Canada.

I already tried to prove that however successful present and future efforts to reduce armed forces may be, nonetheless the latter will remain a very noticeable factor which would influence the international situation and world stability. Therefore, even changes in the "vectorial nature" of military preparations, which we mentioned, and changes in the psychology guiding military activities would already mean the appearance of a new political quality which would dictate all such changes. Naturally, this will apply to both conventional and nuclear components of military power. Today it is quite difficult to describe more or less fully the way this quality will take shape. The fact that it is a question of more than simple openness in the military area, however, is unquestionable. Gradually, step-by-step, cooperation must develop, for without it it would be difficult to hope for a decisive qualitative change in the area of economic interaction and in politics as a whole. The entire system of interrelationships and interdependencies, which will define the "European home" as a new geopolitical reality, cannot develop normally without, in any case, the military area itself not looking like a time bomb in this entire system. One can easily imagine the thoughts of our partners to the effect that while assisting our country's economic development, tomorrow once again it could become a powerful potential enemy. This would be a rather unprofitable and even a not very sensible occupation.

Naturally, the political task of perestroika in the military area is for the country to react to all possible "breakthroughs" of a military-political nature, which would have a major negative impact on our security, not in a state of isolation but with strong allies interested in its stable development and accepting the threat to its security as a threat to the entire existing and necessary system of relations. If similar dangerous "breakthroughs" do not occur and if we assume a more or less smooth development of the situation for the better, in that case such a system of relations will ease even further a gradual transition to a world free from weapons.

Is this possible? I believe that postwar history has already provided us with numerous examples of how even countries the history of relations between which is burdened with difficult passages of armed conflicts (such as the

FRG and France, and the United States and Japan), which are occasionally even traditional, were able, under different circumstances, to develop essentially new types of relations in the military area. In the past, the main obstacle dividing the USSR from the West in this case was the extreme ideologizing, including in the area of military policy. As it turned out, having removed this armor, both discovered that there were no grounds for hostility and that the geopolitical realities were leading the two sides in the entirely opposite direction—toward cooperation.

3

However, there also exists another, as important as it is touchy, part of all problems in the study of the scale, nature and aim of military efforts, which determines to a great extent both the likely limits of changes as well as their long-term reliability. It is a question of the influence of military thinking in society and the extent to which the "official function" of the armed forces and, in general, the military segment of its institutions are stable. In other words, the extent to which the militarization of society and, consequently, the likelihood that this power approach which, alas, has become so customary to society, could once again prevail over the efforts to find political solutions. Naturally, within the framework of a geopolitical analysis, assessing the extent of the reliability and stability of the situation is exceptionally important.

For entirely understandable reasons, for quite some time no one in our country dealt with this question. It was considered self-evident that the USSR has full political control over its armed forces, that there was no military-political complex in our country and that, consequently, this problem can be solved quite easily. A sober analysis leads to entirely different conclusions. The main and, probably, most important factor in understanding the situation is that the entire so-called administrative-command system was essentially militarized, from top to bottom. Indeed, a firm political control, unfortunately, meant only control of the military over the military. This was, more specifically, even not the military in the professional meaning of the term. We developed, over a long period of time, a special category of officials on all levels, including the highest, who had little understanding of military affairs but who wore the uniforms of the highest military ranks, for which reason they made all decisions as though they were battlefield "commanders." Incidentally, practical experience proved that it was precisely such leaders, who were subject, to the greatest extent, to militaristic influence as such, who were always ready to rely on military force, considering it the most understandable and, as it seemed to them, simplest tool. Therefore, control of this kind did not mean in the least the existence of specific and strict limits which would establish the measure and extent of the influence of the military in society. Let us add to this that historical experience proves that also from the viewpoint of ensuring the necessary level of security of the country this too was leading to a total impasse.

I would divide the problem into two parts. The first is the status of the military in the society; the second is the problems and ways of localizing power-oriented thinking, including the functioning of the armed forces and anything related to them under the conditions of developed governmental institutions and legislative and executive powers.

One of the paradoxes of our reality is the fact that despite the exceptional significance which has always been ascribed to anything military, the situation of the military servicemen themselves cannot withstand any criticism whatsoever. Living conditions, as a rule unacceptable, lack of legal protection, low wages, uncertain future, significant difficulties in service promotions due to the mass of structural disparities, "prestige" positions, and so on, all led to a sharp decline in the prestige of military service. The so-called negative phenomena in the armed forces, modestly described as "old soldiers' privileges," and "nonstatutory relations," became among the gravest social and even moral problems of military service, greatly increasing such negative phenomena in the eyes of public opinion and, at the same time, drawing away from the VS a significant percentage of people who, under different circumstances, would have been prepared to have a military career.

For some reason no one tried to assess the number of social problems which could have been solved in the armed forces if we had not pursued for decades all those tank, artillery, ship, chemical and other "gross outputs," and had, for such a long time, a leadership which naively assumed that one could fall behind in everything but be greatly ahead in military power. Essentially our society neglected (the reasons which neglect is a different topic) the lives of the people serving in the VS. This is one of the most difficult and skilled professions (let me emphasize the word profession rather than amateur occupation) in the contemporary world. Hence not only a decline in the quality of training and the moral condition of the VS. Inevitably there appears a dissatisfaction with one's situation, concern for one's life and the future of one's family. As to many draftees, in general they do not entirely clearly understand why, for a period of 2 years, they must "dig ditches from here to there." On the one hand, this leads to the waste of huge resources and, on the other, generates not inflammatory but explosive material. Any subsequent steps aimed at reducing the size of the VS could intensify this trend even further. Who could guarantee that under the present most difficult domestic political situation there would be no forces who would like to benefit from this situation, including some extremists? In the course of such efforts they could also try to make them fully presentable. Even in the familiar open letter which, Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev, whom I profoundly respect, published in the journal OGONEK, he categorically denies such a possibility, saying that a military coup would mean, to the say the least, a change in the social system. What if it is no more a question than that of replacing by force one leadership with another?

In short, for an entire set of considerations, both purely human and political and those related to the most reliable and efficient guarantee of security, it is necessary urgently to change the existing order of things. Career personnel must begin to feel themselves entirely secure and their interests and rights as, actually, those of all other citizens, must be based on the law. This can be helped with the now urgently necessary target program for providing social security to military personnel and members of their families and to officers and ensigns who have passed into the reserve.

As to the second part of the problem, at this point we are at the very beginning of a conversion to a practice which has long become customary in all developed countries. For many long years of "military" control over military activities, a stable system of lack of control developed. It was only recently that initial more or less satisfactory data came out concerning the military expenditures of the country and the quantities of basic types of ordnance and armaments. Until then there was no discussion or analysis of the military budget, the program for the development and production of armaments, military doctrine, or long-term military building projects. Even our parliament has not reached this point. This is both ridiculous and sad: to this day Soviet specialists are relying on Western data about the USSR. Such data, we must point out, are as a whole quite accurate (as is confirmed by the now available, albeit quite limited but nonetheless existing experience in comparing such assessments with the real situation). As a rule, the differences are caused by definitions: weight, caliber, displacement, and so on, accepted as limits to define various categories of equipment and armaments. Therefore, these were secrets kept not from the West but from our own "curious people." To this day many of our military leaders can simply not accept the idea that secrecy, which is necessary from the viewpoint of security interests, has nothing in common with secrecy used to conceal lack of control. Matters have gone so far that, having initiated the conversion, to this day we have not published any figures about the number of people engaged in the defense industry, and the scale of resources this industry consumes. This is simply foolish, for not a few people particularly trusted or engaged in work on such extremely complex problems are involved in this process throughout the world but trade unions, entrepreneurs, governments and the public. All, literally all, of them have the necessary data in quite adequate volumes.

Of late the military has increasingly spoken out against civilian "nonprofessionals" who are "getting into" their affairs. It was openly voiced at the second USSR Congress of People's Deputies that people who have no business being there are inflicting themselves as unrequited advisors of the ministry of defense.

To the best of my understanding, such people include specialists in the area of military policy and military economics, disarmament, the natural sciences and technology, social problems, etc. In other words, people who,

for quite some time, have most actively participated in the discussion and formulation of concepts of military preparedness, long-term strategy, structure and scales, throughout the world. Consequently, this includes members of parliament without whose agreement no whatsoever significant decisions could be made at all. Quite indicative in this respect is the article by Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, published in the 31 August 1989 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in which he expresses his open displeasure with the interference of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the process of staffing the VS (in reference to the early discharge into the reserve of military personnel drafted from full-time VUZ studies). I do not intend in the least to blame Comrade Krivosheyev, for all of us are the children of our own time and, whether we like it or not, find it tremendously difficult to reject its influence. The difficulty lies elsewhere. We are still trying to live in this most important area of activities as though on a different planet and as though that is the way it should be. We know quite well that in all Western countries even ministers of defense when they are not in that position are full-time civilians: they are professional politicians, entrepreneurs or lawyers. Could it be that all of them are stupidly dealing with something that does not concern them? Naturally not! The heart of the matter lies elsewhere. In all such countries military preparedness is considered an inseparable part of all political and economic activities—both domestic and foreign. It is precisely in the formulation of the basic parameters and strategies of such preparations and the choice of priority areas of development, closely related to the overall situation, that the activities of the respective ministries are formulated. Strictly military problems related to the practice of implementing the formulated course within the armed forces themselves are under the jurisdiction of general staffs or corresponding authorities. I believe that we too cannot avoid a review of the functions of the Ministry of Defense and all other military institutions, in order to assess the extent to which the current division of labor among them is consistent with contemporary requirements and what features reflect a situation which developed in the past.

In the final account, it would be good for all—society as a whole and the military—if as a result of our country emerging in this area on the level of the type of interrelationship among them practiced in the developed countries, a clear understanding of the real and not the formal control over military activities would develop, making it part of the overall system of democratic relations. This does not mean in the least that the specific features of military thinking, a certain difference in views, and so on, should disappear. Such differences exist in all countries and the military, like the members of other professions, make efforts to prove the priority nature of their demands. However, all of this takes place within the framework of a comprehensive approach to the assessment of the domestic and foreign situation. I do not idealize this practice, for it too has quite a number of blunders, errors and the influence of lobbyists. Nonetheless, the trends and principles governing it are no less

clear. Speaking of the military, this situation means, in their case, in the United States for example, the possibility of assuming the highest possible positions in the country, such as president, secretary of state, etc. (but never minister of defense). Such precedents exist in other countries as well. This is as natural as is appointing such people to positions of heads of corporations, ambassadors, etc. At least some of them make quite efficient use of everything positive learned in the course of military service, combined with a good knowledge of the general political and economic situation, which is simply necessary in order convincingly to substantiate one's views, initially on the level of the Ministry of Defense and, subsequently, in parliament and in addressing the public.

Thus, here as well, I am convinced, we need a profound restructuring. It is vitally important in order to strengthen all the positive changes which are taking place in the international situation. This importance is due to the fact that neither transparency nor cooperation or else real trust in military affairs can exist without an adequate degree of openness and trust that tomorrow the controls of one country or another will not be in the hands of leaders who will ignore concluded agreements and will once again rely on force.

The new political thinking is making its way in both East and West. We are not simply establishing new starting points and a new level of reciprocal understanding. The conversion to defense sufficiency in military preparations could become one of the most significant achievements of this process as well as one of the factors which determines further prospects. The thorough consideration of general and specific interests and the sober and accurate assessment of the situation, including a comprehensive geopolitical analysis of the problems, should assist us in our progress from confrontation to cooperation. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

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Short Book Review

905B00180 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 4, Mar 90 (signed to press 22 Feb 90) pp 124-125

[Text] "Yest u Otechestva Proroki. Dokumentalnyye Ocherki, Vospominaniya, Dnevniki, Pisma" [There are Prophets in the Fatherland. Documentary Essays, Memoirs, Diaries, Letters]. Kareliya, Petrozavodsk, 1989, 199 pp. Reviewed by S. Khizhnyakov.

It may happen that things which we have read somewhere separately but which, put together in a certain basic, not only historical but also logical, sequence, all of a sudden acquire a special power from such a combination. They strike us and lead to profound thoughts. Such is the case with this small book produced by Izdatelstvo Kareliya (we thank it for this initiative!), which put

together recent newspaper and journal publications about people whose statements and actions were kept hidden from the broad public for decades, but which are amazingly consistent with our current thoughts: "...How did we go astray so far in good and evil; how did we start to build a temple but what came out was a barracks; where did the revolution disappear, which was supposed to rule through people and humanity?" (pp 16-17) The concern shown by these people and their warnings and protests, their humanistic and prophetic ideas which were not only not demanded but, even worse, which were persecuted, trigger, in addition to a sharp feeling of empathy, another, proud feeling: never, even during the most difficult periods, was there a lack of bright minds and true prophets among the people. All that was needed was to notice them on time, to understand them, to be able to listen to their perspicacious opinions and to assess their civic courage....

Who were those people—"the knights of morality and justice who were always present during the most tragic moments and who acted in accordance with their own conscience and nothing else?" as they were described by writer S. Zalyagin.

The voice of the outstanding writer and citizen V.G. Korolenko, who objected to the "systematized rage" and the "Mephistophelian grimace on the face of our revolution" and who demanded a "concerned attitude for human life" comes to us from the distant 1920s. "...We eliminated a great deal of the capitalist system prematurely," he notes in his *Letters to Lunacharskiy*. "...A possible measure of socialism can be applied only in a free country" (p 75). Also: "It would be normal for all shades of thoughts to be represented in the country. ...The live struggle prevents decay and turns even insensible aspirations into a kind of inoculation: that which may be insensible and harmful at a given time frequently preserves its strength for the future" (p 74).

The concerned questions of N.I. Bukharin come to us from 1925, in his essay "In Memory of Ilich:" "Shall we be able to come closer to Ilich's impartiality and to cutting off anything that is personal in politics? ...Shall we be able to instill it into the spirit of the party and with and through it into the working class and the peasantry?" (p 26). The views of the great scientist I.P. Pavlov, who rejected the Stalinist approach to man as a thoughtless "cog" in a state machinery, caution us and warn us: "Could one accomplish a great deal of good with slaves? One could build pyramids yes; however, one cannot build overall true human happiness" (p 13). "...That which was being used is being used by yourselves," he wrote to the USSR Sovnarkom: terror and violence. Is this not visible to anyone who can see?" (p 80). The end of the 1930s marked the sentence and prophecy of F.F. Raskolnikov who had no hope whatsoever of being understood at that time, addressed at Stalin: "Sooner or later the Soviet people will put you on the bench of the accused as a traitor to socialism and the revolution..." (p 116).

A 1940s entry in the diary of Academician V.I. Vernadsky: "...The more I think, the clearer becomes to me the feeling that ...the great democratic ideas will get rid of temporary accretions, such as the GPU, which are actually corrupting the Bolshevik Party.... The major failures of our system are the result of the weakening of its standards...." (pp 125, 127) Follows the prediction-hope: "The immediate future will bring us a great deal of unexpected features and radical changes in our living conditions. Will there be people to accomplish this?" (p 130) "...Why is it that today people dislike work so much?" asks A.P. Dovzhenko, the great movie director. "Why do they have to be urged on by the press! ...One should not frighten the working people this way. Labor should be something pleasant and joyful...." However, Dovzhenko concludes, "there can be no joy of life... in the country where the person does not exist, where no one cares for the person, where the person is third-rate, false or forged, whatever lofty words may be grafted in stone in the hands of the great intellectuals Marx, Engels and Lenin" (pp 141, 142).

Vivid proof of civic exploit comes to us from the 1950s. "The first open disagreement with the superior authorities about which I heard in my life," notes D. Granin, who witnessed the public persecution of the most popular writer M.M. Zoshchenko, whose words he emphasizes: "...I shall speak the way I think and only thus one could fully understand that a person is" (pp 156, 153-154). However, the people reached the truth not only alone but also through collective efforts. This is confirmed by the "Letter of the 300" included in the collection, in which scientists object to the domination of "Lysenkoism" in science in the mid-1950s.

Live sociopolitical thinking did not stop also during the period of stagnation, which was noted for the fierce persecution of "dissidents." The book includes a letter by Academician P.L. Kapitsa in defense of scientists A.D. Sakharov and Yu.F. Orlov. "Dissidence," he wrote, "is closely related to useful creative human activity, and creative activity in any area of culture ensures the progress of mankind.... In order for the desire for creative work to appear, it must be based on discontent with what is, i.e., one must be a dissident. This applies to any area of human activity" (pp 101, 102). Alas, such a truth, so obvious to us today, barely inched forward during the times of "unanimous approval."

Meanwhile, the sober voices not only of authoritative but also entirely unknown people could be increasingly heard through the unceasing toasts and the beating of kettledrums. "...Awarded to Brezhnev," was the heading of an essay included in the book about a modest director of a shoe factory in the remote Siberian town (and today people's deputy of the USSR) T.G. Avaliani. "...Today any delay in reviewing the new methods of management of Soviet society could cost a great deal to the people," he cautioned in 1980, on the eve of the 26th Party Congress. "...No time is left now for being touched. One must do something! We can no longer tolerate this situation and become increasingly entangled in it!..." (p 189)

"Something must be done!" Let us remember Vernadskiy: "Will people be found for this?" The answer to this is the revolutionary perestroika taking place in the country. To be able promptly to see, to understand and to support and not waste anything that is valuable, innovative and prophetic, which is born in the course of its progressive social thinking is what we are taught by reading the dramatic parts of the book about people who were by no means known to all of us and to whom we owe a great deal of our current radical changes. It is only regrettable that the alarm bells sounded by yet another outstanding citizen of our country, A.D. Sakharov, were not included in the collection. After a long delay, they were finally published by Izdatelstvo Sovetskii Pisatel posthumously.

Familiarity with the legacy of the "prophets of the Fatherland," although belated, not only helps to interpret the tragedy of indiscriminate destruction of age-old foundations of culture, labor and way of life, the depreciation of the human individual and damage caused to democracy in the past.

The arguments and thoughts put together in the book contribute to the shaping of moral guarantees against any whatsoever repetition of coercion over life and creativity in the present and the future. From the depths of their cruel times they also warn us against that which could threaten perestroika today and its ability to develop.

To promote socialism by means worthy of its humanistic ideals is the subtext of the statements and actions of the characters in this book. This is also the main idea of the collection itself, which reminds us only of a small segment of this "intellectual stratum" of Soviet history, the study of which is still ahead of us. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

Letters to the Editors

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[Text] R. Petrov, academician:

Dear editors:

After the publication of my article "The Prospects of Biology—Blossoming or Catastrophe?" (No 1, 1990) I received several letters whose authors mentioned the period of confrontation and the struggle against Lysenkoism in 1964-1966, when the persecution of genetics and geneticists in our country took place. These letters substantially add to the short topic of the article in which I tried to describe the views held at that time by one of the thousands of young people who had completed their university studies in biology or medicine in 1953. From the genetic point of view, at that time we turned out to be not educated but twisted by "Lysenkoism," which, starting with 1948, was the only subject in this field taught in VUZs throughout the country. Naturally, many of us sought the "genetic truth" from the numerous

remaining geneticists and tried, in our own way, to oppose Lysenkoism. Eventually this path led to B.L. Astaurov, N.V. Timofeyev-Resovskiy, V.N. Sukachev and others. Occasionally our activities were "semiclandestine," our only aspiration being to promote true genetics. I have tried not to avoid emotionality in leading the reader to the conclusion that genetics was being routed totally, by the state, and that to this day there has been no state rehabilitation. To this day classical genetics is living a rather pitiful life in our country. Once and for all, we must find a worthy solution to this situation.

In speaking about myself and my coevals, I mentioned the names of a number of mature scientists at that time. Naturally, Lysenkoism was also opposed by many noted scientists I did not name in the article, such as N.P. Dubinin, A.R. Zhebrak, N.N. Medvedev, I.A. Rapoport, V.P. Efroimson and many others, including physicists and mathematicians and some philosophers. For that reason, I am thankful to the authors of the letters I received and I deem necessary to add to my story, which describes the way the young biologists of the 1953 class perceived scientific life, the extensive quote from the letter by Academician N.P. Dubinin.

"The prehistory of the revival of genetics was the struggle for that science, waged by geneticists, biologists, physicists, chemists and mathematicians, who addressed their letters on this subject to the CPSU Central Committee. In 1956 the first laboratory for radiation genetics of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Biophysics (headed by N.P. Dubinin) was opened since the routing of genetics in 1948. By 1960 this laboratory had a personnel in excess of 100 people and the major geneticists in the country worked there. The laboratory studied problems of general, radiation and molecular genetics. There was an extensive training of cadres, lectures and popularization work. The establishment of the laboratory and its expansion took place thanks to the constant active help of A.N. Nesmeyanov, USSR Academy of Sciences president.

"The second most important event was the organization in 1957 of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics in Novosibirsk. This institute, initially headed by N.P. Dubinin and, subsequently, D.K. Belyayev, functioned for 9 years, until 1966, in Novosibirsk, parallel with the Lysenkoist Institute of Genetics in Moscow. The USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department Institute of Cytology and Genetics is functional to this day.

"The creation of the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department Institute of Cytology and Genetics is owed to the perspicacity and courage of M.A. Lavrentyev who, in 1957, gave in Siberia the green light for the development of genetics. This was accomplished despite N.S. Khrushchev's opinion. In 1958, on the initiative of I.V. Kurchatov, a department of radiobiology, headed by S.I. Alikhanyan and R.B. Khesin-Lurye, was established within the Atomic Institute. This department became

the foundation for the present USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Molecular Genetics. That same year, N.N. Semenov established a department of chemical genetics, headed by I.A. Rapoport at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics.

"Your presentation makes no mention of people who participated in all of these fundamental events. You give priority to secondary events. One may think that your presentation is influenced by memories of your contacts with N.V. Timofeyev-Resovskiy. However, references to other "semiclandestine" groups lead the reader to the idea that it was precisely the semiclandestine activities of the group you mention that were the main link in that period.

"You also bring confusion into the history of the fundamental Institute of Genetics in Moscow. You write that in 1959 Lysenko headed the Institute of General Genetics. Is this the same Institute of General Genetics which is currently functioning in Moscow? Actually, there was no Institute of General Genetics at all until 1966 and, consequently, nor was there any in 1959. Lysenko headed the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Genetics, which had been established by N.I. Vavilov in Leningrad, in 1933. In 1934 that institute was moved to Moscow. Until 1940 its director was N.I. Vavilov. He was replaced by Lysenko who headed it from 1940 to 1966. He headed the Institute of Genetics, which developed the Michurin-type biology for 26 years. In 1966 the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Genetics was closed down by the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium. That same year, once again, for the first time, the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General Genetics was established, the purpose of which was to work on the basic problems of contemporary genetics.... The establishment of the Institute of General Genetics was carried out with the sympathetic and active cooperation of M.V. Keldysh, USSR Academy of Sciences president."

I am grateful for these critical remarks. The facts quoted in this letter are quite important as an additional illustration of my main thought. Actually, the individuals who dared to disobey Khrushchev or who helped genetics despite official Lysenkoism had to carry the truth through a sea of lies. The institute, headed by Lysenko, and his dictatorship were eliminated only in 1966. Taking these facts into consideration it becomes even clearer that the 1956-1966 decade was to Soviet genetics a period of protracted "semiclandestinity." Once again, as in my article, let me repeat: it is time for our society to correct the grave errors of the past. It is time for the state officially to rehabilitate genetics and the scientists who were loyal to it.

Following the publication of materials on the meeting held in the editorial premises with some participants of the second USSR Congress of People's Deputies, reported in issue No 2 of KOMMUNIST for 1990, the editors received the following letter which we publish without comment:

V. Mesyats, USSR People's Deputy, first secretary of the Moscow Party Obkom:

"It has already become traditional for your journal, while the USSR Congress of People's Deputies is in session, to organize meetings with its participants, offering the editors, the opportunity for frank discussions leading to a deeper study of events, for arguing about problems and prospects of our development and sharing concerns and doubts. The objective thoughts, constructive considerations and suggestions presented in the rubric 'The Position of the People's Deputy' are of great interest to the readers and fruitfully serve the cause of perestroyka and the revolutionary renovation of society.

"However, in the talk published in your No 2 for 1990, People's Deputy Comrade N.I. Travkin has clearly distorted the meaning of my address at the session of the second USSR Congress of People's Deputies. At the start I said the following: '...The second Congress of People's Deputies, on which today the attention of the entire Soviet people is focused, should provide an answer to the main question: Are the democratic institutions of state administration currently being established and is popular rule able to lead the economy out of the crisis?' As interpreted by Comrade N.I. Travkin (KOMMUNIST No 2, p 37) this came out as follows: 'Or read the speech by V. Mesyats at the session. What does he begin with? With the fact that the congress should answer the following question: Could the newly created democratic authorities influence the situation in the country and lead it out of the crisis?' Further on Comrade N.I. Travkin claims that I ended my speech with the following summary: '...The only force which is capable of doing so is the party. The result is that everything which was established, the Congress, the Supreme Soviet, is some kind of a game and that 'we shall lead you'. Who are 'we'?' Actually, there was nothing of the sort in my address which ended as follows: '...I believe that the campaign which has been launched against the party, in addition to dividing forces will not lead to anything. Our common task is to defend perestroyka against attacks from the left and the right. There is no doubt in our oblast party organization that the party alone, interacting with the renovated authorities of the people's rule, will be able to act as the consolidating force in the implementation of the revolutionary changes and lead the country out of the situation of crisis.'

"I firmly object to the misrepresentation and excessively arbitrary interpretation of my speech at the session during the second Congress of People's Deputies and I would ask you to publish in your next issue of the journal this letter.

"As your steady reader, I regret this event and wish that the journal's editors check more thoroughly the materials published in its pages, whoever their author may be. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

From the Editors

905B0018Q Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 4,
Mar 90 (signed to press 22 Feb 90) p 127

[Text] On 16 February 1990, at a conference-seminar for propagandists organized by the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu.D. Maslyukov, USSR Gosplan chairman, was asked about the accuracy of the information quoted in *KOMMUNIST* (No 2, 1990, p 27) about the number of construction projects initiated in 1989. Let us recall that the publication quoted the following data: "The number of temporarily halted and frozen projects was 24,600. Conversely, the construction of 146,600 new projects was undertaken." Comrade Yu.D. Maslyukov said that the figure 146,600 does not correspond to reality. The editors believe it necessary to report that the data obtained by the USSR State Committee for Statistics are accurate. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

Chronicle

905B0018R Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 4,
Mar 90 (signed to press 22 Feb 90) p 128

[Text] A wide range of problems related to the course of perestroika in the party and society were discussed at a meeting between the editors and the party-economic aktiv of Dmitrov City, Moscow Oblast. The party and economic workers were interested in the journal's participation in the discussion of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress, the solution of the problem of the further democratization of the political system, the implementation of the economic reform and the stabilization of the situation in the country. Wishes were expressed concerning the enhancement of *KOMMUNIST* activities in the interpretation and analysis of the complex and contradictory processes taking place in the Soviet Union and throughout the contemporary world.

The editors were visited by a delegation from the Center for the Study of Problems of Peace of the Hungarian University, and from the Austrian Committee for European Security and Cooperation. The guests were interested in the participation of the journal in the debate taking place in the Soviet Union on the new image of socialism. The discussions dealt with the role of European social thought in resolving problems of humanitarian cooperation within the framework of the Helsinki Process, party policy in the field of culture and the organization of a broad dialogue among communists, social democrats and Christians. In connection with the draft bill prepared in the USSR on the freedom of conscience, the problem was discussed of enhancing church activities and relations between church and state. Suggestions were also considered concerning the interaction between *KOMMUNIST* and a number of Austrian social organizations. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

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